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Political connection is believed to be one of the most important forms of capital for 
firms’ development and growth worldwide. As the largest developing country, 
China is criticised for the lack of sound legal and political infrastructure. Due to a 
powerful government, political connection is important for firms to survive in the 
Chinese markets. Therefore, Chinese firms actively participate in establishing 
political strategy to seek rent from the government. Another important strategy 
Chinese firms employ nowadays is to disclose CSR report after the advocacy by 
the Chinese government to build a ‘harmonious society’. However, the ultimate 
purpose and the consequence of Chinese firms being ‘socially responsible’ are 
unclear. The present thesis aims to disentangle the real functions of political 
connection and CSR disclosure among Chinese listed firms.  
 
The first study of the present thesis investigates the functions of political 
connections between family firms and non-family firms among non-state-owned 
enterprises (non-SOEs). This study adopts a natural experiment approach to 
examine the responses of Chinese family firms to political disconnection following 
the exposure of corruption scandals. The results are consistent with the view that 
family firms build political connections for better performance, access to external 
financing, and more investment opportunities. The study also indicates that the 
impact of political connections built through direct bribery is more profound than 
those built through personal connections. The larger impact is also shown for firms 
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located in provinces with a low level of marketisation, firms located in the same 
provinces as their related corrupt officials, and firms belonging to industries with 
high corruption intensity. 
 
The second study of the present thesis explores the political strategy for Chinese 
non-SOEs after the loss of their political connections due to the exposure of 
corruption scandals. Using the difference in difference estimation, it is shown that 
firms are more likely to issue their CSR report after losing their political 
connections. This phenomenon is more prevalent for firms facing more severe 
financial constraint, firms locating in provinces with low marketisation and firms 
belonging to industries with high competition. Moreover, the results suggest that 
non-SOEs respond to government signals to rebuild their political legitimacy, and 
the operational cost which is proxied by bank loan, tax benefits and government 
subsidies, are the channels through which losing political connection influences a 
firm’s CSR disclosure. The results also imply that political legitimacy is a valuable 
capital for firms to maintain their competitiveness in the markets. The main results 
are robust to alternative measurements of key variables and estimation methods. 
 
The third study of the present thesis examines the impact of mandatory CSR 
disclosure on CEO pay performance sensitivity of Chinese listed firms from 2005 
to 2012. Using the mandatory requirement of CSR disclosure for selected firms 
which took effect in December 2008 as an exogenous shock, this study finds that 
mandatory CSR disclosure enhances CEO pay performance sensitivity. The results 
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also suggest that monitoring CEO power is the channel through which mandatory 
CSR affects CEO pay performance sensitivity. The positive impact is more 
profound in firms with a powerful CEO (i.e., politically well-connected, taking dual 
roles as both CEO and Chairman, or/and with long tenure). Furthermore, the 
increased CEO pay performance sensitivity after the mandate is only prominent 
among state-owned enterprises (SOEs). These findings suggest that although it 
does not require firms to spend on CSR investments, mandatory CSR disclosure 
alters firm behaviour, and contributes to mitigating the agency problems. 
 
Overall, this thesis provides evidence that political connections in China have a 
differential impact on family and non-family firms because while political 
connections are beneficial for family firms on average, they seem detrimental to 
non-family firms as the interests of minority shareholders are sacrificed. After the 
inevitable loss of political connection, non-SOEs appear to re-establish political 
connection by responding to the government signal encouraging CSR disclosure as 
non-SOEs view the connection with government as a critical resource for market 
competitiveness. Furthermore, examining the impact of mandatory CSR disclosure 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
1.1 Motivations of research 
One of the most salient institutional characteristics in developing countries is 
political connection (Bunkanwanich and Wiwattanakantang, 2009; Siegel, 2007). 
Because of the ill-functioning markets and weak legal protection for investor and 
property right, firms endeavour to establish networks with the government to 
overcome market failure, get protection from government appropriation and gain 
competitive advantages (Li et al., 2008; Haveman et al. 2014). In the context of 
China, the government has the absolute control over the allocation of resources that 
firms need, like land, capital and favourable government contract. Obviously, state-
owned enterprises have priority in getting the resources because of their inborn 
connection with the government. On the contrary, private firms are discriminated 
unfairly in resources allocation as well as regulatory terms. Therefore, Chinese 
private firms have more incentive to build political connection (Fan et al., 2007 & 
2008; Chen et al., 2011; Cull et al., 2015). A large number of studies explore the 
incentives and benefits of firms having close ties with government officials. 
Empirical evidence proves that politically connected firms could have better access 
to bank loan (Cull and Xu, 2003; Johnson and Mitton, 2003), lower cost of equity 
capital (Boubakri et al., 2012), more opportunity to be bailed out when facing 




(Goldman et al., 2013; Amore and Bennedsen, 2013) which in turns benefit 
shareholders. 
 
The first part of the present thesis explores whether political connection plays 
different roles in family firms and non-family firms among non-SOEs. Under the 
‘private benefits of control’ hypothesis, it is argued that the value of family firms 
is maximised only for family members and minority shareholders are expropriated 
(Burkart et al., 2003; Cronqvist and Nilsson, 2003; Steijvers and Niskanen, 2012; 
Gomez-Mejia et al., 2014). On the other hand, the ‘competitive advantage’ 
hypothesis states that family firms outperform non-family firms due to controlling 
shareholders’ high alignment of interests, long investment horizons and reputation 
concerns, so all the shareholders of family firms are better off (Gallo and Vilaseca, 
1996; Anderson and Reeb, 2003; Villalonga and Amit, 2006; Andres, 2008; Ma et 
al., 2017). In regards to the function of political connection, different from the 
convention that political connection could improve the overall performance of 
firms, a few studies have also proved that political connection could enable firms 
to face fewer constraints from regulations and more protection from capital market 
punishment (Lemmon and Lins, 2003; Berkman et al., 2010). This indicates that 
political connections could be exploited by controlling shareholders to seek 
personal benefits by expropriating minority shareholders and gaining an exemption 
from supervision and punishment from authorities afterwards. Due to the weak 




shareholders, accompanied by the concentrated ownership structure in China (Allen 
et al., 2005; Jiang et al., 2015), controlling shareholders have the incentive and 
ability to expropriate minority shareholders with the protection from political 
connection; However, the different characteristics of family firms, that is the 
pursuit of socialemotional wealth (SEW) and the competitive advantage political 
connection can bring could make the controlling shareholders of family firms 
constrain their expropriation incentives. So, the first part of this study attempts to 
disentangle the incentives of family firms to establish political connections from 
those of non-family firms. 
 
There are many different ways for firms to establish political connections. The 
studies on the political strategy focusing on developed economies find that firms 
take political activities, including lobbying, contributing to political action 
committees (PACs), and participating in key political issues, to shape government 
policy in ways favourable to the firm (Hillman 2003; Hillman et al., 2004). For 
developing markets, companies are found to establish political connection in a more 
direct way, for example by offering bribery to governmental actors, or hiring senior 
managers and board members with government working experience or having 
personal relationship with government officials (Fan et al., 2007; Chen et al., 2011). 
Alternatively, scholars also contend that the government could use signalling 
process to create norms and standards for firms, and firms’ strategic response to 




government will view the firm’s action as being in accordance with norms and laws 
(Dobbin and Sutton, 1998; Dobbin et al., 1993; Marquis and Qian, 2014). After the 
proposal of ‘harmonious society’ by the former Chinese president Hu Jintao in 2005, 
corporate social responsibility becomes an important agenda. Chinese government 
has constantly signaled to the market that CSR is an appropriate and desired 
activities since 2006. Especially after the strong suggestions to disclose CSR report 
by Shanghai Stock Exchange (SSE) and Shenzhen Stock exchange (SZSE), 
Chinese listed firms start to actively participate in CSR initiatives and disclosure. 
The second part of the present thesis explores whether responding to government 
signals to disclose CSR report is an alternative way for firms, especially non-SOEs 
who are supposed to have less responsibility for social welfare, to rebuild political 
legitimacy after losing their previous connection with government officials due to 
scandal exposure. 
 
To further explore the function of CSR disclosure in China, the last part of the 
present thesis examines the mandatory CSR disclosure among all the listed Chinese 
firms, including both SOEs and non-SOEs. The present thesis pays special attention 
to mandatory disclosure because mandatory CSR disclosure in China is different 
from voluntary CSR disclosure for several reasons. First, mandatory disclosure is 
not a choice made by firms; those firms subject to the mandate have no choice but 
to respond passively to the disclosure requirements imposed by the authority, even 




ex ante basis, it is not clear whether and how mandatory disclosure might affect 
companies. On the one hand, the increased information transparency arising from 
mandatory disclosure provides incentives for firms to engage more actively in 
socially responsible activities in future. On the other hand, different from voluntary 
initiatives, mandatory disclosure may just be a symbolic action or gesture in 
response to government requirements, especially when there is an absence of 
specific disclosure guidelines and assurance of the adoption as is the case in China. 
Therefore, it is illuminating to investigate whether and how mandatory CSR has an 
impact on firms’ behaviour. 
 
1.2 Institutional background 
This section provides institutional background regarding non-SOEs in China, 
Xi’s anti-corruption campaign, and CSR reporting, which are the important 
topics for the present thesis. It pays special attention to the Chinese non-SOEs, 
which do not have inborn connection with government, and examines their 
incentives and strategies to establish political connection in the first two studies. 
As one of the most significant events in China, Xi’s anti-corruption campaign 
has provided an opportunity for the present study to adopt a natural experiment 
approach for the first two studies. The CSR reporting in China also has some 
special characteristics which inspired the second and third studies. 
 




All Chinese firms were completely owned by the government before 1978. 
Although private firms have emerged due to the economic reform, they actually 
started to grow after Deng Xiaoping’s seminal speech in 1992. Two stock 
markets were established in China in the early 1990s, but individuals were 
prohibited from holding more than 0.5% of listed firms. This regulation was 
abolished in 1998 (Pan and Tian, 2017). Ever since, the privatisation process 
has been in place and it has gradually transformed some of the SOEs into 
private firms.  
 
Although they have merged and expanded, private firms have been 
discriminated against socially and economically in China. Besides the long 
history of ideology in the Chinese culture that private ownership is inferior and 
ignoble, they are treated unfavourably for resource allocation. The Chinese 
government still controls most of the resources, and SOEs unsurprisingly enjoy 
preferential access to scare resources such as bank loans and other key inputs, 
as well as profitable government contracts (Li et al., 2008). Therefore, private 
firms have a strong desire to establish political connections to gain 
compensation for their weak position and a competitive advantage in the 
markets. Moreover, unlike the situation in developed markets which is based 
on formal legal contracts, the business environment in China is mainly 




political connection is considered the most desirable and beneficial for private 
firms (Liu et al., 2015). 
 
Among private firms in China, the family firm is apparently the most important 
form. In the sample for the first study, family firms constitute about 60% of all 
the Chinese listed non-SOEs. In addition, Chinese family firms have some 
unique characteristics that make them distinct from their counterparts. Firstly, 
due to weak legal protection, Chinese family firms generally have a highly 
concentrated ownership structure1. In the sample for the first study, the average 
percentage of family ownership is more than 37%, while it is only about 16% 
in the US (Anderson and Reeb, 2003; Villalonga and Amit, 2006). Secondly, 
because of lack of trust and the short history of family firms in China, a large 
proportion of family firms are mostly managed by their founders, instead of 
hiring professional managers or passing them over to next generation. This is 
different from the way family firms are run in other economies, which are 
typically managed by several generations or handed over to non-kin managers. 
Thirdly, family members’ participation is substantial in Chinese listed family 
firms, with a majority of firms having multiple family members participating 
in the business (Fan and Yu, 2016).  
                                                          






1.2.2 Xi’s anti-corruption campaign 
China has been criticised for its severe corruption problem. According to the 
official report from the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI) 
of China, there have been about 4.2 million government officials punished 
during the past 30 years because of corruption, and among them 465 are 
provincial or higher level bureaucrats. The corruption problem in China has 
attracted more attention due to Xi’s high-profile anti-corruption campaign. On 
December 4, 2012, less than three weeks after President Xi’s inauguration, the 
Politburo of the CPC Central Committee announced the ‘Eight-point 
Regulation’2 which is generally regarded as the commencement of Xi’s anti-
corruption campaign. The determination of President Xi to crack down on 
corruption is well reflected in his vow that corruption should be terminated by 
both ‘tigers and flies’ (which means both high-level government officials and 
lower-level civil servants). However, the ultimate purpose of the crackdown on 
high-level government officials is regarded with suspicion by media and 
academics. Fan et al. (2008 and 2014) state that corruption cases, especially 
those involving high-level government officials, are normally exposed during 
political struggles or for other reasons not directly related to corruption. 
                                                          
2 The Regulation provides clear guidance for the behaviour of government officials; please refer 




Therefore, corruption exposure is a top-down process from the central 
government that is exogenous to related firms, and provides an opportunity to 
design a natural experiment to measure political connections in the first and 
second study. 
 
1.2.3 CSR reporting in China 
After the Open-up policy in 1978, China has witnessed rapid economic growth 
with an average annual growth of about 9% (Du, 2015). However, China is also 
criticised for subsequent environmental and social problems. The fatality rate 
of Chinese workers is over 20 times compared to that of U.K. (Fisman and 
Wang, 2015), and approximately 32% of the reported deaths in 2013 among 74 
leading cities were associated with PM2.5 due to air pollution in China (Fang 
et al., 2016). In 2005, Chinese former president Hu Jintao proposed a new 
concept, ‘harmonious society’, to guide the future development of China. 
During the Sixth General Meeting of the Sixteen Central Committee of the 
Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in 2006, specific guidance for firms stated 
that ‘firms should create a harmonious situation in which everyone promotes 
harmony, and focusing on enhancing a sense of social responsibility among 
citizens, enterprises and all kinds of organizations’ (Marquis and Qian, 2014). 
Ever since, corporate social responsibility has become an important agenda, 
and various governmental actors started to issue guidance and 





In 2008, the Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE) issued ‘Guidelines on Listed 
Companies’ Social Responsibility', requiring listed firms to take socially 
responsible activities, assessing the performance of their CSR and disclosing 
their CSR report on a voluntary basis. Later in 2010, the Guidelines on Standard 
Operating of Listed Companies was issued to provide further guidance for 
listed firms to disclose their CSR report. In December 2008, both Shanghai 
Stock Exchange (SSE) and Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE) announced the 
mandatory disclosure of CSR reports for a certain group of firms. Specifically, 
SSE required firms that belong to ‘Corporate Governance Sector’, firms that 
listed shares overseas, and firms in the financial sector to release their CSR 
reports along with their annual reports. SZSE at the same time mandated firms 
listed in its ‘Shenzhen 100 Index’ to release their CSR reports. Both SSE and 
SZSE encouraged all the firms listed to release their CSR reports. As a result, 
more and more companies release their CSR reports along with their annual 
reports either mandatorily or voluntarily. According to The Blue Book of CSR 
report drafted by Rankins CSR Rating China, there are about 140 CSR reports 
released between the year of 2005 and 2007, while there are almost 400 CSR 
reports released in the year 2008. Ever since, the number continues to increase 
each year and reached almost 800 in 2016. 
 




In order to explore the functions of political connection and CSR for Chinese 
listed firms, the theoretical framework of the present thesis has been established 
based on the theories on family firms, political connections and CSR.  
 
1.3.1 Theories on family firms 
There are two theoretical approaches that explain the behaviour of family firms. 
One strand of literature, especially in the early stage focusing on the U.S. 
markets, is using agency theory based perspective. On one hand, family firms 
could serve as a mechanism to mitigate type I agency problem since the 
concentrated ownership structure could provide at least more incentive to 
monitor the managers to align their interests (Villalonga et al., 2015). On the 
other hand, type II agency problem will be exacerbated. When the controlling 
shareholders are individuals or families, all the ‘private benefit of control’ will 
be obtained by the individuals or families instead of sharing among independent 
individuals as is the case when the controlling shareholders are states, 
institutional or banks. Therefore, the incentive of expropriating minority 
shareholders is greater for controlling shareholders in family firms. 
 
Another approach is based on theories focusing on the special characteristics of 
family firms, namely competitive advantage theory and socioemotional wealth 
theory. Both theories emphasise family firm’s internal idiosyncratic resources 




counterparts. Family members could bring unique and immobile resources to 
firms, for example better understanding and vision of the business and the 
industry, valuable relationships with government and customers, irreplaceable 
trust among family members and so forth (Habbershon and William, 1999). 
Moreover, due to family’s desire to exercise authority, enjoyment of family 
influence, and maintain family identity, family firms are motivated by and 
committed to the preservation of their social reputation and long-term 
development. Both highly concentrated ownership and multiple family member 
involvement are associated with the family goal. Therefore, more value-
enhancing decisions will be made by the controlling shareholders (Gomez-
Mejia et al., 2007; Berrone et al., 2012). 
 
1.3.2 Theories on political connections 
The present thesis employs the rent-seeking theory to explain the motivations 
for firms to establish political connections. As stated by Hartle (1983), ‘rent 
seeking theory is concerned with the deployment of interest group power to 
manipulate government in order to obtain special advantages’. Regardless of 
whether the ultimate purpose is to benefit controlling shareholders only, or 
make all shareholders better off, firms endeavour to establish political 
connection to seek rent from the government. On the one hand, politically 
connected firms could gain market competitiveness for the benefit of all the 




(Faccio, 2010), more external financing (Fan et al., 2008; Gropp et al., 2011), 
and more investment opportunities (Chen et al., 2009). On the other hand, 
politically connected firms could manipulate the legal system to obtain 
favourable court decisions, as well as exemptions from compliance with 
relevant laws and regulations (Haveman et al., 2014). As a consequence, 
controlling shareholders could take advantage of the political connections to 
tunnel money out of the firms, and protect them from supervision and 
punishment afterwards. 
 
1.3.3 Theories on CSR 
There are primarily two different perspectives examining CSR. On one hand, 
CSR-conflict theory is proposed which is largely drawn on agency theory. 
Based on Jensen and Meckling’s (1976) agency theory, Friedman (1970) is one 
of the first to raise the topic of CSR by arguing that the only responsibility of 
managers is to maximise shareholder’s wealth, so any actions that go beyond 
the goal are the result of agency problem. The conflict of interests between 
shareholders and managers leads to managers’ decision to invest in CSR 
activities through which they achieve their personal agenda at the expense of 
shareholders wealth. For example, managers tend to overinvest in CSR 
activities to improve their personal reputation and social networks and destroy 





On the other hand, the conflict-resolution theory is proposed based on 
stakeholder theory. According to stakeholder theory, managers should consider 
the interests of various stakeholders (employees, suppliers, community and 
government) because the long-term survival and prosper of the firm cannot 
continue without the support of stakeholders (Freeman, 1984). Later on, CSR 
has been proved to be a strategic tool to minimise transaction cost and potential 
conflict of interests among stakeholders which eventually increases firm value. 
For example, CSR has a positive impact on the value of firms’ cash holding 
due to the appreciation of investors towards the CSR activities which they 
believe encourages managers to make better use of cash resources (Arouri and 
Pijourlet, 2017); CSR could mitigate the information asymmetry between 
insiders and external stakeholders, and consequently decrease SEO 
underpricing (Feng et al., 2018).  
 
1.4 Key findings and contributions 
1.4.1 Key findings 
The present thesis examines whether and how political connection and CSR 
affect firms’ behaviour in the Chinese market. The first study in the present 
thesis shows that political connection plays different role in family firms and 
non-family firms among non-SOEs. The second study shows that after non-
SOEs lose their political connection due to corruption scandal exposures, they 




study finds that among all the Chinese listed firms, mandatory CSR disclosure 
improves the CEO pay performance sensitivity. 
 
The first study compares the responses of family firms and non-family firms to 
the political disconnections. The results indicate that expropriation activities 
conducted by related family firms do not change significantly after they lose 
their political connections, whereas the reduction in the expropriation by related 
non-family firms is significant. The results also indicate that firm performance, 
the accessibility to debt financing, and investment decrease significantly for 
related family firms after the political disconnections, but not for related non-
family firms. Furthermore, the results indicate that after corruption scandals 
involving government officials were exposed, family firms that built political 
connections through direct bribery, which locate in provinces with lower 
marketisation, in the same province as their related officials, and belong to 
industries with high corruption intensity suffer more severely than those which 
established connections through personal relationships, which locate in 
provinces with a higher level of marketisation, in a province different from that 
of their related officials, and belong to low corruption intensity industries. 
 
The second study examines the impact of losing political connection due to 
corruption scandal exposure on the likelihood of disclosing CSR report. The 




to corruption scandals are more likely to disclose their CSR report. Through 
further splitting the sample according to different levels of financial constraint, 
provinces with different marketisation and industries with the different 
competitive environment to examine the heterogeneous effect of losing 
political connections on CSR disclosure, the present study indicates that the 
impact of losing political connection on firms’ incentive to disclose CSR report 
is more pronounced for those firms that are more financially constrained, 
located in provinces with lower marketisation, and in industries with higher 
competition.  
 
The third study, using a sample of Chinese listed firms during the period from 
2005 to 2012, examines the impact of mandatory CSR disclosure on CEO pay 
performance sensitivity. Using 2005 to 2008 as pre-mandate period, and 2009 
to 2012 as post-mandate period, the results indicate that CEO pay performance 
sensitivity has increased significantly among firms mandatorily required to 
disclose their CSR report after adopting the mandate. Furthermore, the results 
indicate that the positive relationship between mandatory CSR disclosure and 
CEO pay performance sensitivity is more pronounced in sub-samples of CEOs 
having dual roles, and/or CEOs with political connections, and/or CEOs having 
longer tenure in the firm. Moreover, the results also indicate that the positive 






1.4.2 Main contributions 
The present thesis makes several contributions to the literature on political 
connection and CSR. Firstly, it finds that family firms and non-family firms 
(among non-SOEs) respond differently to the political disconnections that 
result from the exposure of corruption scandals. Although some recent studies 
have examined the responses of firms to the political disconnections, little 
attention has been paid to the question of whether the responses are concordant 
within corruption-related SOEs and non-SOEs. The present study complements 
previous studies that compare the responses to corruption scandals between 
SOEs and non-SOEs by treating non-SOEs uniformly (Griffin et al., 2016; Ke 
et al., 2016; Lin et al., 2016; Liu et al., 2016; Liu et al., 2017; Pan and Tian, 
2017). 
 
Secondly, instead of assuming a unified impact of political connections as most 
studies do, the present study investigates whether political connections built 
through direct bribery or personal relations affect the results differently. It also 
examines the impact of political connections on firms located in provinces with 
different levels of marketisation, firms located in the same province as their 






Thirdly, the present study provides new evidence on how firms respond to the 
loss of political connection. A growing number of recent literature have focused 
on the consequence of losing political connection, including having less 
financing access (Fan et al., 2008), declining investment opportunities (Pan and 
Tian, 2017), and losing market competitiveness in M&A markets (Liu et al., 
2016). However, the strategic response of firms after the loss of political 
connection has received less attention. This study adds new evidence to show 
that CSR disclosure is an alternative mechanism to rebuild the political 
connection with government official due to corruption scandal exposure.  
 
Last but not least, different from the majority of the previous studies that focus 
on voluntary CSR, the present thesis pays special attention to the mandatory 
CSR disclosure in China. Although firms passively disclose their CSR report 
due to the mandate, the result indicates that mandatory disclosure is still 
effective for delivering more information, and restraining CEO power as a 
consequence. Contributing to a growing strand of literature on the mandatory 
CSR disclosure requirement in China (Hung et al., 2013; Chen et al., 2018; 
Wang et al., 2018; Liu and Tian, 2019), the present study indicates that even 
without the assurance of the adoption, mandatory CSR disclosure improves 
CEO pay performance sensitivity.  
 




The present thesis is organized as follows: Chapter 2 examines the responses 
of Chinese family firms to political disconnection following the exposure of 
corruption scandals; Chapter 3 explores the political strategy for Chinese non-
SOEs after the loss of their connection due to the exposure of corruption 
scandals; Chapter 4 examines the impact of mandatory CSR disclosure on CEO 






Chapter 2: Corruption exposure, political disconnection, and their impact on 
Chinese family firms 
 
2.1 Introduction 
The extant literature has documented that politically connected firms have better 
access to bank loans (Cull and Xu, 2003; Johnson and Mitton, 2003), lower cost of 
equity capital (Boubakri et al., 2012), more opportunity to be bailed out when 
facing financial distress (Faccio, 2006), and favourable treatment in obtaining 
contracts (Amore and Bennedsen, 2013; Goldman et al., 2013). Consequently, their 
performance is superior to their counterparts, and all shareholders could benefit 
from political connections. However, a few studies have also proved that political 
connection could enable firms to face fewer constraints from regulations and more 
protection from capital market punishment (Lemmon and Lins, 2003; Berkman et 
al., 2010). This indicates that political connections could be exploited by 
controlling shareholders to seek personal benefits by expropriating minority 
shareholders and gaining an exemption from supervision and punishment from 
authorities afterwards. The political connection could be used by controlling 
shareholders either to improve overall performance by seeking rent from the 
government which could benefit all the shareholder, or to expropriate minority 
shareholders with the protection from the related government officials. Therefore, 





Family firm, an important and prevalent form of business, is controlled by 
individuals or a group of family members. According to Family Firm Institute, it 
takes up about two thirds of all enterprises in the world creating an estimated 70% 
of global GDP annually. There are two strands of literature that explain the 
behaviour and performance of family firms, which are termed ‘private benefits of 
control’ and ‘competitive advantage’ by Villalonga and Amit (2010). Under the 
‘private benefits of control’ hypothesis, it is argued that the value of family firms 
is maximised only for family members and minority shareholders are expropriated 
(Burkart et al., 2003; Cronqvist and Nilsson, 2003; Steijvers and Niskanen, 2012; 
Gomez-Mejia et al., 2014). On the other hand, the ‘competitive advantage’ 
hypothesis states that family firms outperform non-family firms due to controlling 
shareholders’ high alignment of interests, long investment horizons and reputation 
concerns, so all the shareholders of family firms are better off (Gallo and Vilaseca, 
1996; Anderson and Reeb, 2003; Villalonga and Amit, 2006; Andres, 2008; Ma et 
al., 2017).  
 
The purpose of this study is to disentangle the incentives of family firms to establish 
political connections from those of non-family firms. The question explored is 
whether political connections only benefit family controlling shareholders or 
favour minority shareholders as well. If the goal is to maximise family wealth only, 
political connections would primarily be used to facilitate controlling shareholders’ 
expropriation activities. If the goal is to maximise the wealth of all shareholders, 
political connections would manifest positive outcomes for all shareholders by 
resulting in enhanced firm performance, facilitating easier access to external 
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financing, or providing more investment opportunities (Anderson and Reeb, 2003; 
Villalonga and Amit, 2006; Setia-Atmaja et al., 2009; Batta et al. 2014; Huang et 
al., 2015; Deng et al., 2017; Peng et al., 2017).  
 
Specifically, the present study examines the responses of Chinese family firms to 
the political disconnections and compare to those of non-family firms, among non-
SOEs 3. The traditional measurement of political connections in China is either 
using senior managers’ and board members’ current and former working 
experience as government officials, serving in the military and having the 
membership of the Communist Party of China (CPC) and Chinese People’s 
Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) (Fan et al., 2007; Boubakri et al., 2008; 
Chen et al., 2011), or using government appointed CEO and state ownership as 
proxies for political connections (Cull et al., 2015). However, those measurements 
could be challenged by the endogeneity problems because the possibility of having 
political connections may be correlated with focal firms’ characteristics that can’t 
be fully controlled. Therefore, this study adopts the natural experiment approach 
initiated by Fan et al. (2008) and uses cases of corruption that involved provincial 
or higher-level bureaucrats. The underlying assumption of this approach lies in the 
exogenousness of the arrest of higher level bureaucrats to focal firms. The 
disclosure of information about high level (provincial or higher) bureaucrats’ 
corruption scandals effectively and unexpectedly breaks the connection between 
                                                          
3I have excluded SOEs due to a substantial difference between SOEs and non-SOEs in firm size, 
access to external financing, different motivations for running the firms and so forth.  
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related firms 4  and corrupt bureaucrats. Moreover, although the arrest and 
investigation of high level bureaucrats are nominally accused of corruption, they 
are actually triggered by political struggles that are exogenous to focal firms (Fan 
et al., 2008; Fan et al., 2014; The Diplomat, 2014; The Forbes, 2016). 
 
China offers a good ‘laboratory’ for this study. The business norm in China is 
dominated by networks (so-called ‘Guanxi’) which are profoundly rooted in the 
Chinese culture (Zhao & Li, 2013). To establish connection especially with 
government officials, the common practice for firms is to offer bribes. The 
phenomenon is particularly prominent among non-SOEs who do not have inborn 
connections with the government (Fan et al., 2007 and 2008; Chen et al., 2011; Cull 
et al., 2015). Consequently, corruption becomes one of the most severe social 
problems in China5. During the 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of 
China (CCPC), President Xi Jinping launched a high-profile campaign that aims to 
terminate corruption by both ‘tigers and flies’ (which means both high level 
government officials and lower level civil servants). Since the start of the anti-
corruption campaign, there have been more than 100,000 people questioned for 
corruption, most of them are government officials (The Guardian, 2015). At the 
2015 year-end, there were more than 133 government officials at the provincial or 
                                                          
4 ‘Related firms’ in this study refer to firms that have ever bribed corrupt bureaucrats, or where 
senior managers or the top 10 largest shareholders have an educational or working affiliation with 
corrupt bureaucrats. 
5 According to the Corruption Perception Index (CPI) provided by Transparency International, 
China ranked 100 out of 174 countries in 2014. 
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higher level who were arrested or under investigation (Jiancha Daily, 2015). 
Although the eye-catching anti-corruption campaign attracts wide-spread attention, 
the ultimate purpose of the crackdown of high level government officials is 
suspected by media and scholars as the exposure is generally top down from the 
central government due to political struggles or other reasons not directly caused 
by corruption (Fan et al., 2008; The Diplomat, 2014; The Forbes, 2016). Therefore, 
the anti-corruption campaign started in 2012 provides a distinct opportunity to 
examine the impact of political connections on firms’ behaviour through a natural 
experiment approach. 
 
By comparing the responses of family firms and non-family firms to the political 
disconnections, the results show that expropriation activities conducted by related 
family firms do not change significantly after they lose their political connections, 
whereas the reduction in the expropriation by related non-family firms is 
significant. These findings imply that family firms do not establish political 
connections for the purpose of expropriating minority shareholders, whereas 
political connections for non-family firms serve the role of facilitating controlling 
shareholders to tunnel resources out of a firm. The results also show that firm 
performance represented by return on assets (ROA) and Tobin’s Q, and the 
accessibility to debt financing represented by bank loan and investment 
achievement represented by investment expenditures, decrease significantly for 
related family firms after the political disconnections, but not for related non-family 
firms. This indicates that before the connection break, family firms used political 
connections to seek rents from government and enhance firm value, while political 
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connections in non-family firms do not support those value-added activities. The 
results are consistent with the view that family firms use political connections to 
benefit the firms as a whole and non-family firms take advantage of political 
connections for expropriation which is in line with the ‘competitive advantage’ 
theory.  
 
In addition, this study also examines whether different channels for establishing 
political connections as well as firms’ location and industry characteristics affect 
the results. The restuls show that after corruption scandals involving government 
officials were exposed, family firms which built political connections through 
direct bribery, which locate in provinces with lower marketisation, locate in the 
same province as their related officials, and belong to industries with high 
corruption intensity suffer a larger impact than those which established connections 
through personal relationships, which locate in provinces with a higher level of 
marketisation, locate in a province different from that of their related officials, and 
belong to low corruption intensity industries. To further support the positive impact 
that political connections have for shareholders as a whole of Chinese family firms, 
the market reactions to Xi’s anti-corruption campaign using cumulative abnormal 
returns (CARs) around the announcement of the ‘Eight-point Regulation’ are also 
tested. The results show that the related family firms have a more negative CARs 
than related non-family firms, which demonstrates more pessimistic attitudes 
towards the political disconnections for investors of family firms. Moreover, this 
study also investigates whether the results differ across the sub-samples of family 
firms that are categorised by their characteristics. According to the results, the 
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overall behaviour of family firms appears to be driven by firms where the founders 
still serve as senior managers, belong to non-SOEs de novo at the time of their IPO 
and have more than one family member involved in ownership or/and management. 
 
The present study contributes to the literature on political connections and family 
firms in several ways. Firstly, the results show that family firms and non-family 
firms (among non-SOEs) respond differently to the political disconnections that 
resulted from the exposure of corruption scandals. Lin et al. (2016) examine the 
market reactions to the ‘Eight-point Regulation’, and claim that the reaction of 
SOEs has been uniformly positive, but that non-SOEs have reacted 
heterogeneously in different provinces. Pan and Tian (2017) identify that the 
investment expenditure of corruption-related non-SOEs decreases more than SOEs, 
and there is an improvement in investment efficiency for SOEs, but a decline for 
non-SOEs, after the investigation of corrupt bureaucrats. However, there has been 
little investigation into whether the responses are concordant within corruption-
related SOEs and non-SOEs. This study complements previous studies that 
compare the responses to corruption scandals between SOEs and non-SOEs by 
treating non-SOEs uniformly (Griffin et al., 2016; Ke et al., 2016; Lin et al., 2016; 
Liu et al., 2016; Liu et al., 2017; Pan and Tian, 2017). Secondly, instead of 
assuming a unified impact of political connections as most existing literature does, 
this study investigates whether political connections built through direct bribery or 
personal relations affect the results differently. The present study also examines the 
impact of political connections on firms located in provinces with different levels 
of marketisation, firms located in the same province as their connected officials and 
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firms belonging to industries with different corruption intensity. Thirdly, this study 
contributes to the body of literature on the behaviour of family firms by examining 
how they make use of valuable resources in the context of special institutional 
background. The results show that Chinese family firms use political connections 
to enhance firm values instead of expropriating minority shareholders, which 
implies that the impact of institutional backgrounds shaping the characteristics of 
family firms outweighs the agency problems in explaining the behaviour of family 
firms in China. This study also adds new evidence to the body of literature which 
investigates the determinants of family firms’ behaviour by examining the impact 
of their origins, whether newly established by entrepreneurs or privatised from 
SOEs; newly established family firms and privatised family firms typically have 
different incentives to establish political connections. These conclusions and their 
implications also shed light on whether the government should transform SOEs into 
non-SOEs or help entrepreneurs to establish their own firms. 
 
The remainder of the present study is organised as follows. Section 2 presents the 
hypothesis development. Section 3 illustrates the methodology by introducing the 
data, the variables and the econometric models. Section 4 presents the empirical 
results and interpretations, and Section 5 provides the concluding remarks.  
 
2.2 Hypothesis Development 
2.2.1 Responses of family firms to the exposure of corruption scandals 
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There are two competing theories that explain the behaviour of family firms. On 
the one hand, according to agency theory, the conflict of interests between 
controlling shareholders and minority shareholders (type II agency problem) is 
exacerbated in family firms. When the controlling shareholders are families, highly 
concentrated ownership leads the board less independent, and multiple family 
member involvement intervenes the management decisions. The expropriation 
incentive is enhanced because the ‘private benefit of control’ can be enjoyed by the 
family instead of being shared with independent individuals (Villalonga et al., 
2015). On the other hand, according to competitive advantage theory as well as 
socioemotional wealth (SEW) perspective, family firms are motivated by and 
committed to the preservation of their social reputation and long-term development. 
Both highly concentrated ownership and multiple family member involvement are 
associated with the family goal. Therefore, more value-enhancing decisions will be 
made by the controlling shareholders (Anderson and Reeb, 2003; Villalonga and 
Amit, 2006; Gomez-Mejia et al., 2007; Chen et al., 2011). 
 
To disentangle the competing arguments for the behaviour of family firms in China, 
their special characteristics and the agency problems that may determine the roles 
political connections play in family firms are considered. One possibility is that the 
controlling shareholders of Chinese family firms would take advantage of political 
connections built through corruption to enhance their overall value rather than use 
them to expropriate minority shareholders. Firstly, as mentioned above, Chinese 
family firms generally have concentrated ownership structure, which means the 
wealth of the controlling shareholders is less diversified and this could encourage 
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the controlling shareholders to closely monitor the firms and take more 
responsibility for their decisions. Secondly, Chinese family firms are normally still 
in the hands of the founders. Founders with a lot of experience and a great passion 
for maximising firm value are likely to make more responsible decisions for firm 
development. Thirdly, according to Schulze et al. (2003) and Fan and Yu (2016), 
participation by family members has a governance-enhancing effect, which benefits 
public investors. The reason is that information asymmetry is lower when 
monitoring is carried out by family members rather than outsiders since 
communication and cooperation between family members are better. Moreover, the 
deep involvement of family members makes them more reliant on the profits of the 
firm, so they have more incentive to monitor the controlling shareholders. 
Therefore it can be argued that family firms in China are more likely to make better 
use of political connections for value-added activities which ultimately increase 
firm value instead of helping controlling shareholders to expropriate minority 
shareholders. If this is true then subsequent to the exposure of corruption scandals 
involving their related bureaucrats, expropriation activities by related family firms 
are likely to be unaffected, while their performance, bank loans and investment 
would decrease significantly. As political connections between related firms and 
government officials are lost after corruption is exposed, all the privileges enjoyed 
by related firms are expected to be terminated. Accordingly, the first hypothesis is 
as follows: 
H1a: Related family firms’ expropriation remains unchanged, while their 
performance, bank loans and investment will decrease once the corruption 




Alternatively, political connections built through corruption could be used as a 
mechanism for the controlling shareholders of Chinese family firms to expropriate 
minority shareholders. China is criticised for its weak legal system and law 
enforcement, as well as poor protection for minority shareholders (Allen et al., 
2005; Jiang et al., 2015), and therefore the high concentration ownership structure 
and large excess control right of controlling shareholders can facilitate their 
expropriation activities. Moreover, China suffers from weak property rights 
(Berkowitz et al., 2015), so family firms have incentives to expropriate minority 
shareholders instead of running the companies with long term goals and passing on 
to next generation because of the possibility of being taken over by SOEs under 
pressure from the controlling government (Liu et al., 2015). Furthermore, the strict 
one-child policy enforced since 1979 becomes an obstacle to succession which 
weakens the incentive of family firms to sustain the business over the long term. 
Therefore, the expropriation activities of related family firms are predicted to 
decrease, while their performance, bank loans and investment are likely to remain 
unchanged subsequent to the exposure of corruption scandals involving their 
related bureaucrats. The competing hypothesis is developed as follow:    
H1b: Related family firms’ expropriation will decrease, while their performance, 
bank loans and investment remain unchanged once the corruption scandals 




2.2.2 Responses of bribing and connected firms to the exposure of corruption 
scandals 
The most common way for family firms to establish political connections is to offer 
bribes (including cash, luxury gifts, entertainment and travel funds and so forth) 
(Lin et al., 2016). According to BBC News (2016), by the end of 2015, about 6.3 
billion RMB (approximately 1 billion USD) in bribes for corrupt bureaucrats has 
been identified since the anti-corruption campaign started at the end of 2012. 
Another channel for establishing connections with government officials is through 
personal connections of senior managers or large shareholders, e.g. by educational 
or previous working affiliations due to the cultural norm of ‘Guanxi’ in China (Fan 
et al., 2008; Fan et al., 2014). Considering the large amount of money involved and 
the risks associated with bribery, establishing political connections by direct 
bribery is most likely to be a purposeful activity, whereas political connections built 
through personal connections are considered to be long term and less purposeful. 
The present study therefore expects that ‘bribing family firms’ (family firms which 
have bribed corrupt bureaucrats) suffer a greater impact when corruption is exposed 
than ‘connected family firms’ (family firms’ whose senior managers or the top 10 
largest shareholders have educational or working affiliations with corrupt 
bureaucrats) 6 . This means the expropriation or performance, bank loans, and 
investment of bribing family firms will decrease more than connected family firms 
                                                          
6 The alternative explanation that the greater impact of bribing firms is due to corruption case per se 
is ruled out in the robustness test. 
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once their political connections are lost. The second hypothesis is developed as 
follows.  
H2: The impact of the exposure of corruption scandals on expropriation or 
performance, bank loans and investment is more pronounced for bribing family 
firms than for connected family firms. 
 
2.2.3 The impact of different locations and corruption intensity of industries 
on the responses to the exposure of corruption scandals 
China is gradually changing from a centrally planned system to a market-based 
economy. However, regional disparities are still stark because different provinces 
are in different stages of development. As a widely-acknowledged indicator, the 
Marketisation Index produced by the National Economic Research Institute (NERI) 
(Fan et al., 2011) assesses five aspects 7  of marketisation development in 31 
provinces in China. The Marketisation Index assigns a score of 0 to 10 to each 
province, with a high score indicating more marketisation and a low score 
indicating less marketisation. The province with high scores means that 
government intervention is relatively weak, resource allocation is more market-
oriented, non-SOEs occupy more market shares, and the legal environment is 
better, whereas the province with lower scores means the situation is the exact 
opposite (Wang et al., 2007). Existing literature has shown that non-SOEs have 
                                                          
7 The five aspects include government and market relationships, the development of non-SOEs, the 
development of the commodity market and factor markets, as well as market intermediaries and the 
legal environment for the market (Wang et al., 2007, p.33). 
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greater incentive to build political connections in regions in which market is less 
developed and the government has more power to allocate economic resources (Li 
et al., 2008; Chen et al., 2011). The present study, therefore, expects political 
connections to be more important for family firms in provinces of low 
marketisation than in provinces with high marketisation. Once related family firms 
lose their political connections due to the exposure of corruption scandals, the 
impact of a lost connection is therefore expected to be more profound for family 
firms located in low indexed provinces than for those in high indexed provinces. 
Moreover, corrupt bureaucrats would have more power to influence commercial 
activities under their jurisdictions (Liu et al., 2017), therefore the local related firms 
would benefit more from the established political connections. Once local related 
firms lose their political ties from the same region, they will suffer more than firms 
located in a province different from that of their related corrupt officials since 
government officials have limited resources and power beyond their jurisdictions. 
Therefore, once related family firms lose their political connections, the impact of 
a lost connection will be more profound for those firms located in the same province 
as their related corrupt officials. The hypothesise is established accordingly, 
H3a: The impact of the exposure of corruption scandals on expropriation, 
performance, bank loans and investment is more pronounced for related family 
firms that locate in provinces with low marketization, and related family firms that 




In addition, this study examines whether the responses to the loss of political 
connections differ across industries with different corruption intensity. For some 
industries, the political connection is perceived to be more important and is more 
easily established, like mining, utilities, transportation and social services (Li and 
Yamada, 2015). If firms in industries with higher corruptions intensity more 
heavily rely on political connections, losing the connections could mean less 
competitiveness compared to their peers in the industry. If this is the case, the loss 
of political connections could have a more profound impact on firms from 
industries with higher corruption intensity than those with lower corruption 
intensity. On the other hand, it would also be possible for firms from industries with 
high corruption intensity to suffer less from the loss of political connections if they 
can more easily re-establish their political connections. This may be possible as 
firms belonging to industries with high corruption intensity are more favoured by 
government officials (Li and Yamada, 2015). Based on the above, the following 
two hypotheses are tested.  
H3b: The impact of the exposure of corruption scandals on expropriation, 
performance, bank loans and investment is more pronounced for related family 
firms that belong to industries with high corruption intensity. 
H3c: The impact of the exposure of corruption scandals on expropriation, 
performance, bank loans and investment is less pronounced for related family firms 





2.3.1 The sample 
2.3.1.1 Corruption cases and related firms 
The cases of corruption which involved government officials at provincial or higher 
levels under investigation from 2009 to 2014 are manually collected. The reason to 
choose cases from 2009 is to avoid the impact of non-tradable share reform on 
firms’ behaviour. These cases are limited to those involving provincial or higher 
level bureaucrats because their exposure had a more profound impact on the 
business sector and the information about them is widely disclosed due to strong 
public concerns. More importantly, using the cases of high level corruption 
scandals mitigates the endogeneity problem because the arrest of high level 
bureaucrats is not directly associated with helping related firms but is most likely 
to be top down from the central government due to political struggles (Fan et al., 
2008; Fan et al., 2014). Overall, there are 79 corruption cases involving provincial 
or higher-level bureaucrats identified from 2009 to 2014.  
 
Secondly, two types of related firms, namely, ‘bribing firms’ and ‘connected firms’ 
are identified. For cases with legally effective judgements, the copy of the verdicts 
is searched to identify whether any of the listed non-SOEs are involved (senior 
managers or directors who have bribed corrupt officials are mentioned in the 
verdicts). For other cases, two well-known websites (Sina: www.sina.com and 
Baidu: www.baidu.com) and other available sources for information regarding the 
corruption cases are searched to identify any related firms that bribed corrupt 
officials. All the firms directly involved in the corruption cases are called ‘bribing 
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firms’ in this study. As well as the bribing firms, another type of related firm that 
is not directly involved in corruption, but where the senior managers or the top 10 
largest shareholders had working or educational affiliations with corrupt 
bureaucrats 8 are included. In this study, they are called ‘connected firms’. To 
identify connected firms, the Curriculum Vitae of all the corrupt bureaucrats are 
manually searched and then matched with information released by the China Stock 
Market & Accounting Research (CSMAR) sub-database ‘CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE’. Combined bribing and connected firms are called ‘related 
firms’, and the remaining firms are ‘unrelated firms’. 
 
2.3.1.2 Full sample and subsamples 
To facilitate the difference-in-difference method, the full sample in the study 
includes related firms and their matching firms9 (unrelated firms) from 2008 to 
2015 (the financial data of the sample firms will cover one year before and after the 
corruption cases were identified), which gives a total of 7254 firm-year 
observations. Financial firms and firms with missing relevant data are excluded 
from this study. All the financial data for this study comes from the CSMAR 
database.  
                                                          
8 Prior studies have proved the effectiveness of connection built through prior employment and 
school ties (Menon and Williams, 2004; Lennox, 2005; Guan et al., 2016). 
9 I select matching firms using the propensity score matching method, and find those that are as 





Separate regressions are used in this study to avoid the use of three-way interaction 
variables which simplifies the interpretation of the results. Four sets of subsamples 
are generated to enable the testing of the hypotheses. Firstly, the full sample is 
divided into sub-samples of ‘family firms’ and ‘non-family firms’. Secondly, sub-
samples of ‘bribing firms’ and ‘connected firms’ are identified to indicate firms 
which are directly involved in corruption scandals and those having personal 
relationships with corrupt government officials. Thirdly, sub-samples are generated 
according to whether firms are registered in provinces with high or low 
marketisation index, whether firms locate in the same province as their related 
government officials, and whether the firms belong to industries with high or low 
corruption intensity. Lastly, six sub-samples are generated within the category of 
family firms according to their different characteristics.  
 
2.3.2 Measurement of variables 
2.3.2.1 Political connections 
Related firms are defined as firms related to corrupt bureaucrats that are directly 
involved in corruption cases (bribing firms), or where the senior managers or top 
10 largest shareholders have working or educational affiliations with corrupt 
bureaucrats, but no involvement in the cases (connected firms). These related firms 
(both bribing firms and connected firms) are indicated by a dummy variable 
‘CORRUPTION’, which equals one if firms are related firms. A dummy variable 
‘POST’ is introduced to equal one for the post-event period, that is, for years 
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following the exposure of related corruption cases. The interaction term 
‘CORRUPT*POST’ (CORRUPTION*POST) is expected to capture the post-event 
changes in the behaviour of related firms, which is of most interest to us. For those 
firms having connection with more than one related official, they are defined as 
related firms as long as not all of their related officials have been arrested or under 
investigation. The underlying assumption is that the existing political connection 
can still provide protection or favourable treatment to the related firms. In this 
study, the political connection only includes connection with government officials 
at provincial or higher levels, and lower level officials are excluded as their 
dismissal could be due to the corruption behaviour per se which is against our 
underlying assumption that the ‘related firms’ should have no impact on the loss of 
political connection.  
 
2.3.2.2 Family firms 
There is inconsistency in defining family firms in the extant literature. For studies 
focusing on U.S. markets, family firms are identified as either an entrepreneur or a 
family member by either blood or marriage is the CEO, Chair, or a block holder 
without requiring any minimum threshold for ownership or control (Anderson and 
Reeb, 2003; Villalonga and Amit, 2006). However, for Chinese firms typically 
characterised by a highly concentrated ownership structure and combined 
ownership and control, one would be considered as a family firm if an ultimate 
controlling shareholder is an individual or a family with a minimum of 10%, 15%, 
20% or even 25% of control rights (Bunkanwanicha et al., 2013; Xu et al., 2013; 
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Liu et al., 2015). In this study, a firm is defined as a family firm if the founder 
or/and other members of their family by either blood or marriage owns at least 15% 
of control rights.  A dummy variable is introduced as ‘FAMILY’ for firms 
satisfying this definition. 10%, 20% and 25% thresholds are also used in the 
robustness tests. For those non-family firms in the study, they are controlled by 
collective organisations (such as township and village organisations), universities, 
unions, foreign owners, and diffused shareholders. Following Cheng et al. (2015), 
firms established collectively by different individuals or families are also included 
as non-family firms in this study since those firms are not typical ‘family firms’ 
that have unified and collective interests.   
 
2.3.2.3 Other variables 
A series of variables are used to measure firm behaviour. Firstly, related party 
transactions (RPTs) is used to measure the level of expropriation in the sample 
firms. Using data from the CSMAR and following the categories of RPTs in 
Cheung et al.’s (2006) study, the variable ‘EXPROPRIATION’ is calculated by 
adding all the related party transactions that are ‘a priori likely’ to result in 
expropriation of minority shareholders for the firm in a calendar year, and 
standardised by dividing by the total assets. The ‘ex ante potential’ expropriation 
transactions include the categories of asset acquisitions, asset sales, asset swaps, 
trading goods and services between the firms and their related parties. Secondly, 
two variables are used to measure firm performance in different dimensions. ‘ROA’ 
(return on assets), calculated as net income divided by total assets, is an accounting-
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based measurement for firm performance, while ‘Q’ (Tobin’s Q), a market-to-book 
value of a company’s assets, reflects a firm’s market-based performance. After the 
political disconnections, firms’ bank loans and investment expenditure in a given 
year are expected to change differently among the subsamples, ‘BANK LOAN’ 
and ‘INVESTMENT’ are therefore introduced to capture the post-event changes 
which are calculated as the sum of long-term and short-term loans deflated by total 
assets, and net capital expenditure scaled by total assets, respectively. In the 
regression analysis,  a series of control variables are included in the regression 
models to control for factors that may affect expropriation, performance, bank loans 
and investment decisions. The definitions and/or calculations of variables are 
shown in detail in Appendix 1. 
 
2.3.3 Research design and econometric model 
This study uses a natural experiment approach to yield credible difference-in-
difference estimators (Gippel et al., 2015). The disconnection between corrupt 
bureaucrats and related firms due to corruption scandal exposures is the exogenous 
treatment and related firms (bribing firms and connected firms) belong to the 
‘treatment group’. A ‘control group’ is generated by matching the propensity scores 
which matches firms that are as close as possible to the ‘treatment group’ in terms 
of growth, leverage, size, profitability (ROA) and industry affiliation (Fan et al., 
2008; Fan et al., 2014).  
 




= 𝛼𝛼0 + 𝛼𝛼1 × 𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛼𝛼2 × 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐼𝐼𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛼𝛼3 × 𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸
∗ 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐼𝐼𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛼𝛼4 × 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛼𝛼5 × 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐼𝐼 + 𝛼𝛼6
× 𝐼𝐼𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 + 𝜀𝜀. 
 
In this equation, the dependent variables are firms’ expropriation, performance, 
bank loans, and investment expenditure. The explanatory variable 
‘CORRUPT*POST’, being the key concern, will capture related firms’ post-event 
changes after losing political connections. In addition,  χ2 will be calculated based 
on the seemingly unrelated estimation (SUE)10 to determine whether there is any 
difference in the post-event changes between family firms and non-family firms 
and between the sub-samples of family firms. As well as a series of control 
variables, a set of year and industry dummy variables are also included to control 
for the year and industry fixed effects, and standard errors are clustered at the firm 
level for all the tests. 
 
In order to further test the different reactions towards political disconnection 
between family firms and non-family firms, the market reaction for all listed non-
SOEs after the ‘Eight-point Regulation’ was announced on December 4, 2012 is 
tested. The equation below is used for this test: 
                                                          
10 Seemingly unrelated estimation (SUE) enables me to compare the coefficients from two separate 
regressions from two independent samples.   
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𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸(−1, +1)/𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸(−2, +2)/𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸(−5, +5)
= 𝛼𝛼0 + 𝛼𝛼1 × 𝐹𝐹𝐸𝐸𝐼𝐼𝐸𝐸𝐿𝐿𝐼𝐼 + 𝛼𝛼2 × 𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 + 𝛼𝛼3 × 𝐹𝐹𝐸𝐸𝐼𝐼𝐸𝐸𝐿𝐿𝐼𝐼
∗ 𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 + 𝛼𝛼4 × 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛼𝛼5 × 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐼𝐼
+ 𝜀𝜀. 
 
The dependent variables are cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) over three-day, 
five-day and eleven-day event windows. The explanatory variable 
‘FAMILY*CORRUPT’ (FAMILY*CORRUPTION) will capture whether family 
control has any impact on market reactions to the loss of political connections. 
 
2.4 Empirical Results 
2.4.1 Descriptive statistics 
Table 2.1 shows the distribution of related firms by years and industries11 among 
total firms, family firms and non-family firms12. The results show that the overall 
percentage of related firms for all the non-SOEs in the Chinese listed markets has 
decreased since 2008, even before the start of Xi’s anti-corruption campaign in 
2012. After splitting the total firms into family firms and non-family firms, the 
result shows that the reduced related firms are mainly driven by the reduction of 
                                                          
11  Industry classification is according to ‘Guidelines for the Industry Classification of Listed 
Companies 2012 revision’, by China Securities Regulatory Commission. 
12 The sample used in the distribution of related firms includes all the listed non-SOEs to reflect the 
intensity of corruption in the Chinese markets, but the sample in our tests includes related firms and 
their matching firms only. 
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related family firms, while the reducing trend of related non-family firms is quite 
mild. Panel B shows the distribution of related firms by industries. The result 
reveals that certain industries have a very high percentage of related firms, for 
example, accommodation and catering industry (code H) 13 has 58.33%, mining 
(code B) is 54.22% and health and social work (code Q) is 53.33%. On the contrary, 
scientific research and technical service (code M), resident service, repair and other 
service (code O) and leasing and commercial service (code L) have the lowest 
percentage of related firms. However, the related-firms intensity shows a very 
different landscape between family firms and non-family firms. For example, all 
the related firms in heath and social work industry (code Q) are from family firms, 
which means the industry Q has the highest related-firms intensity for family firms, 
but the lowest for non-family firms. The construction industry (code E) has the 
highest intensity among non-family firms which is 62.12%, but it lies in the middle 
among family firm.
                                                          
13 The names of industries corresponding to each code are listed in Appendix 2. 
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Table 2.1 Distribution of related firms 
This table presents the distribution of related firms by years and industries among total firms, family firms and non-family firms. A 
firm is counted as a related firm if its political connection is built through either bribery (bribing firms) or personal connection 
(connected firms). ‘Total firms’ includes all the non-state-owned enterprises (non-SOEs) listed in the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock 
exchanges from 2008 to 201514. ‘Family’ refers to firms where their founder and/or other member of his family by either blood or 
marriage owns at least 15% of control right. ‘Non-family’ refers to non-family firms among listed non-SOEs. The name of each industry 
code is provided in Appendix 2.  
Panel A: Distribution by years 
 
Total firms Family firms Non-family firms 

























2008 719 331 46.04% 368 165 44.84% 351 166 47.29% 
2009 846 385 45.51% 483 216 44.72% 363 169 46.56% 
2010 1143 464 40.59% 747 285 38.15% 396 179 45.20% 
2011 1356 521 38.42% 931 341 36.63% 425 180 42.35% 
2012 1461 541 37.03% 1019 351 34.45% 442 190 42.99% 
2013 1501 545 36.31% 1066 361 33.86% 435 184 42.30% 
2014 1605 559 34.83% 1147 363 31.65% 458 196 42.79% 
2015 1592 548 34.42% 1145 360 31.44% 447 188 42.06% 
Total 10223 3894 38.09% 6906 2442 35.36% 3317 1452 43.77% 
                                                          




Panel B: Distribution by industries 
 



























A 181 66 36.46% 113 35 30.97% 68 31 45.59% 
B 166 90 54.22% 89 48 53.93% 77 42 54.55% 
C 7149 2491 34.84% 5022 1631 32.48% 2127 860 40.43% 
D 104 52 50.00% 35 15 42.86% 69 37 53.62% 
E 219 102 46.58% 153 61 39.87% 66 41 62.12% 
F 482 250 51.87% 299 149 49.83% 183 101 55.19% 
G 110 43 39.09% 50 22 44.00% 60 21 35.00% 
H 36 21 58.33% 15 9 60.00% 21 12 57.14% 
I 695 284 40.86% 497 167 33.60% 198 117 59.09% 
K 561 287 51.16% 337 176 52.23% 224 111 49.55% 
L 78 24 30.77% 41 18 43.90% 37 6 16.22% 
M 68 9 13.24% 50 9 18.00% 18 0 0.00% 
N 87 46 52.87% 61 36 59.02% 26 10 38.46% 
O 22 6 27.27% 18 6 33.33% 4 0 0.00% 
Q 15 8 53.33% 13 8 61.54% 2 0 0.00% 
R 68 34 50.00% 46 21 45.65% 22 13 59.09% 
S 182 81 44.51% 67 31 46.27% 115 50 43.48% 





Table 2.2 presents the summary statistics for all the variables in the tests, as well as 
the univariate tests for the main dependent variables. Panel A shows that family 
firms account for 60.34% in the full sample, which is consistent with the previous 
study (Liu et al., 2015). The figure reflects the popularity of family control in the 
Chinese stock markets. In the sample, the average percentage of annual related 
party transactions to total assets (EXPROPRIATION) is 16.15%. This high 
percentage shows how severe the problem of expropriation by controlling 
shareholders is among non-SOEs in China. The means of cumulative abnormal 
returns over three event windows (CAR (-1, +1), CAR (-2, +2) and CAR (-5, +5)) 
are all negative. They show that on average all non-SOEs react negatively to Xi’s 
anti-corruption campaign, which reflects the important role that political 
connections play for non-SOEs in China. The univariate tests shown in Panel B are 
conducted by splitting the sample into before and after the event year (the arrest of 
related corrupt officials), and the differences between related firms and non-related 
firms among total firms, family firms and non-family firms are examined. The 
results show that for non-family firms, the expropriation for related firms is 
significantly higher than that for non-related firms before the event date, while the 
difference becomes insignificant after the event date. For family firms, the 
differences in expropriation between related firms and non-related firms remain 
insignificant for both before and after the event date. For ROA, Tobin’s Q, Bank 
loan and Investment, the results are the opposite. For family firms, related firms 
have significantly higher ROA, Tobin’s Q, bank loan and investment opportunities 
before the event date, but the differences become insignificant or even significantly 
negative after the event date. For non-family firms, the differences between related 
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firms and non-related firms remain insignificant for both before and after event 
periods15. In general, the results in the univariate tests support the hypothesis H1a 
by showing that the political disconnections decrease non-family firms’ 




                                                          
15 One exception is for the investment among non-family firms. The difference between related 
firms and non-related firms is non-significant before the event year, but the investment 
opportunities for non-related firms become significantly larger than related firms after the event. 
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Table 2.2 Summary statistics and univariate test 
This table presents the summary statistics for all the variables used and the univariate test of main dependent variables in the tests. Panel A 
shows the summary statistics, the number of observations, mean, median, standard deviation and values at 25% and 75% percentile of each 
variable. All the continuous variables are winsorised at 1% and 99% of the distribution. Panel B presents tests of differences in the main 
dependent variables (‘EXPROPRIATION’, ‘ROA’, ‘Q’, ‘BANK LOAN’ and ‘INVESTMENT’) between related firms and non-related firms 
for both before and after the period of the event. A firm is counted as a related firm if its political connection is built through either bribery 
(bribing firms) or personal connection (connected firms). ‘FAMILY’ includes all the listed related family firms and their matching firms. 
‘NON-FAMILY’ includes all the listed related non-family firms and their matching firms. ‘FULL SAMPLE’ includes both ‘FAMILY’ and 
‘NON-FAMILY’. *, **, *** represent significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
Panel A: Summary statistics 
VARIABLE NAME No. Mean St.dev. 25th percentile Median 75th percentile 
EXPROPRIATION 7254 0.1615 0.2914 0.0015 0.0476 0.1927 
ROA 7254 0.0373 0.0709 0.0127 0.0368 0.0685 
BANK LOAN 7254 0.1533 0.1456 0.0167 0.1280 0.2433 
INVESTMENT 7254 0.0544 0.0546 0.0136 0.0381 0.0771 
Q 6914 2.7418 2.7269 1.1276 1.8994 3.3315 
CAR(-1,+1) 1189 -0.0098 0.0318 -0.0268 -0.0111 0.0063 
CAR(-2,+2) 1189 -0.0073 0.0462 -0.0326 -0.0107 0.0132 
CAR(-5,+5) 1189 -0.0321 0.0644 -0.0741 -0.0390 -0.0045 
FAMILY 7254 0.6034 0.4892 0.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
CORRUPTION 7254 0.5000 0.5000 0.0000 0.5000 1.0000 
BRIBING 7254 0.0892 0.2911 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
CONNECTED 7254 0.4108 0.4939 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 
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POST 7254 0.5028 0.5000 0.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
GROWTH 7254 0.2770 0.9623 -0.0478 0.1198 0.3086 
LEVERAGE 7254 0.4499 0.2745 0.2519 0.4279 0.6029 
ADVANTAGE 7254 3.4381 5.0512 0.9392 1.6479 3.4960 
REGIONAL GDP 7254 5.4092 2.2339 3.6630 5.2566 6.8255 
MEETING 7254 1.0429 0.5439 0.6931 1.0986 1.3863 
SIZE 7254 21.4591 1.1311 20.7026 21.4101 22.1873 
TANGIBILITY 7254 0.9336 0.0791 0.9188 0.9581 0.9810 
CASHFLOW 7250 0.1820 0.1547 0.0732 0.1339 0.2425 
BOARD SIZE 7218 2.1195 0.1882 1.9459 2.1972 2.1972 
INDEPENDENT 7218 0.3735 0.0529 0.3333 0.3333 0.4286 
OWNERSHIP 7045 29.5281 16.9574 15.8947 27.1270 41.2585 
EXCESS 7045 6.5821 8.0585 0.0000 2.6100 12.0056 
CEO SHARE 6923 9.7299 14.8478 0.0000 0.0282 17.8172 
       
Panel B: Univariate test 
 Before After 
 Related firms Non-related 
firms 
Difference Related firms Non-related 
firms 
Difference 
EXPROPRIATION       
FULL 0.1638 0.1502 0.0136* 0.1643 0.1533 0.0110 
FAMILY  0.1304 0.1251 0.0053 0.1410 0.1339 0.0071 
NON-FAMILY 0.2197 0.1742 0.0454*** 0.2012 0.1924 0.0088 
ROA       
FULL 0.0376 0.0341 0.0035* 0.0360 0.0412 -0.0052*** 
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FAMILY  0.0471 0.0424 0.0047* 0.0410 0.0468 -0.0058*** 
NON-FAMILY 0.0217 0.0262 0.0044 0.0281 0.0299 -0.0018 
Q       
FULL 2.5305 2.2010 0.3295*** 2.8913 2.9436 -0.0523 
FAMILY  2.5899 2.1045 0.4854*** 3.0153 3.0458 -0.0305 
NON-FAMILY 2.4295 2.2950 0.1345 2.6952 2.7346 -0.0394 
BANK LOAN       
FULL 0.1724 0.1606 0.0118** 0.1410 0.1351 0.0059* 
FAMILY  0.1666 0.1475 0.0191*** 0.1280 0.1270 0.0010 
NON-FAMILY 0.1820 0.1732 0.0088 0.1616 0.1514 0.0101 
INVESTMENT       
FULL 0.0580 0.0547 0.0033** 0.0442 0.0544 -0.0102*** 
FAMILY  0.0662 0.0626 0.0037* 0.0473 0.0576 -0.0101*** 





2.4.2 Main results 
2.4.2.1 Expropriation, performance, bank loans, and investment 
In this section, the regression analysis is carried out to explore the responses of 
family firms and non- family firms to the political disconnections due to exposed 
corruption scandals. The analysis begins by comparing the impact that exposed 
corruption has on the expropriation activities in family firms and non-family firms. 
Table 2.3 presents the results. The interaction term ‘CORRUPT*POST’ is a 
measure of post-event changes in related firms, and although its coefficient is not 
statistically significant for family firms it is significantly negative for non-family 
firms. This indicates that after losing political connections, expropriation activities 
by related family firms do not change significantly, whereas there is a 5.2% drop 
in expropriation activities for related non-family firms. From a seemingly unrelated 
estimation,   χ2 reveals that the difference in responses is statistically significant 
between family and non-family firms. Based on the way firms respond to the 
political disconnections, political connections do not appear to play a significant 
role in facilitating expropriation by family firms, but they are important for 
controlling shareholders to expropriate minority shareholders in non-family firms. 
Due to the weak legal system and law enforcement as well as poor protection for 
minority shareholders in China (Allen et al., 2005; Jiang et al., 2015), the ultimate 
controlling shareholders would have the incentive and ability to expropriate 
minority shareholders. However, for family firms,  expropriation incentives may 
have been restrained because of the pursuit of socialemotional wealth in family 
firms (Gomez-Mejia, 2007), that is to keep control of the firm, maintain and sustain 
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the family dynasty and reputation. This result is consistent with Hypothesis 1a and 
against Hypothesis 1b.  
 
The present study also scrutinises and compares the changes in firm performance, 
bank loan and investment expenditure between family firms and non-family firms 
after the corruption scandal exposures. Table 2.4 illustrates the results. Consistent 
with the expectations formed in Hypothesis 1a, the coefficients of 
‘CORRUPT*POST’ in Panel A are significantly negative for family firms, 
regardless of whether the dependent variable is an accounting measurement (ROA) 
or a market-based reflection (Q) of firm performance. The corresponding 
coefficients are not significant for non-family firms. Similarly, Panel B shows that 
the coefficients of ‘CORRUPT*POST’ on both ‘BANK LOAN’ and 
‘INVESTMENT’ are significantly negative for family firms, but insignificant for 
non-family firms. After losing their political connections, the performance of 
related family firms as well as their bank loans and investment expenditure decrease 
whereas for non-family firms they do not change significantly. These responses to 
the political disconnections suggest that family firms in China are more likely to 
make better use of their links to bureaucrats for value-added activities such as 
supporting firm performance and gaining bank loans and investment opportunities 
which supports the hypothesis H1a and rejects H1b. However, this is not the case 




Table 2.3 The impact of corruption scandal exposures on expropriation 
This table represents the regression results for the impact of corruption events on 
firms’ expropriation behaviour. ‘FAMILY’ includes all the listed related family 
firms and their matching firms. ‘NON-FAMILY’ includes all the listed related non-
family firms and their matching firms. The dependent variable 
‘EXPROPRIATION’ is the firm’s total annual amount of RPTs that fall into the 
category of ‘ex ante potential’ expropriation transactions divided by total assets. 
‘CORRUPTION’ is a dummy variable that is equal to one if firms belong to ‘related 
firms’. ‘POST’ is a dummy variable that is set to one for years following the year 
of corruption case exposures. ‘CORRUPT*POST’ is the interaction term between 
‘CORRUPTION’ and ‘POST’. Control variables are defined in Appendix 1. 
Standard errors are clustered at the firm level.  χ2 is calculated based on seemingly 
unrelated estimation with p-values in parentheses. *, **, *** represent significance 
at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
  FAMILY NON-FAMILY 
  EXPROPRIATION EXPROPRIATION 
CORRUPTION -0.0111 0.0436** 
 (0.3168) (0.0200) 
POST -0.0140 -0.0197 
 (0.2199) (0.3226) 
CORRUPT*PO
ST 0.0016 -0.0522** 
 (0.9134) (0.0409) 
EXCESS 0.0006 0.0021** 
 (0.2353) (0.0226) 
GROWTH 0.0077 0.0017 
 (0.2139) (0.8301) 
LEVERAGE 0.2306*** 0.1629*** 
 (0.0000) (0.0001) 
ADVANTAGE 0.0025** 0.0012 
 (0.0158) (0.1679) 
REGIONAL 
GDP 0.0002 -0.0107*** 
 (0.9233) (0.0010) 
MEETING 0.0530*** 0.1002*** 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) 
BOARD SIZE 0.0302 -0.0302 
 (0.1404) (0.3780) 
SIZE 0.0034 -0.0306*** 
 (0.5842) (0.0000) 
ROA -0.1863** 0.1760 
 (0.0485) (0.1864) 
OWNERSHIP -0.0007*** -0.0007 
 (0.0052) (0.1232) 
INTERCEPT -0.1565 0.5323*** 
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 (0.2051) (0.0005) 
YEAR YES YES 
INDUSTRY YES YES 
N 4266 2740 
adj. R-sq 0.1113 0.0799 
Seemingly Unrelated Estimation:  





Table 2.4 The impact of corruption scandal exposures on performance, bank loan and investment 
The regression results for the impact of corruption events on firms’ performance, bank loans and investment are reported in Panels A and B 
of Table 2.4, respectively. ‘FAMILY’ includes all the listed related family firms and their matching firms. ‘NON-FAMILY’ includes all the 
listed related non-family firms and their matching firms. The dependent variable in Panel A is the firm’s performance measured by ‘ROA’ 
and ‘Q’ (Tobin’s Q) representing the firm’s accounting and market performance, respectively. The dependent variable in Panel B is ‘BANK 
LOAN’ measured by annual bank loans divided by total assets and ‘INVESTMENT’ measured by net capital expenditure divided by total 
assets, respectively. ‘CORRUPTION’ is a dummy variable that is equal to one if firms belong to ‘related firms’. ‘POST’ is a dummy variable 
that is set to one for years following the year of corruption case exposures. ‘CORRUPT*POST’ is the interaction term between 
‘CORRUPTION’ and ‘POST’. Control variables are defined in Appendix 1. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level.  χ2 is calculated 
based on seemingly unrelated estimation with p-values in parentheses. *, **, *** represent significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, 
respectively. 
PANEL A 
  FAMILY   NON-FAMILY 
  ROA Q ROA Q 
CORRUPTION 0.0092*** 0.4150*** -0.0020 0.3330*** 
 (0.0006) (0.0000) (0.6290) (0.0053) 
POST 0.0077*** 0.0492 -0.0023 0.0608 
 (0.0038) (0.5705) (0.5897) (0.6457) 
CORRUPT*POST -0.0086** -0.3926*** -0.0047 -0.2015 
 (0.0114) (0.0009) (0.4106) (0.2646) 
GROWTH 0.0120*** 0.2538*** 0.0138*** 0.1764*** 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0025) 
LEVERAGE -0.1142*** -0.7540** -0.0929*** 1.3748*** 
 (0.0000) (0.0209) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
REGIONAL GDP 0.0005 0.0298 0.0025*** 0.0644** 
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 (0.2910) (0.1424) (0.0013) (0.0118) 
MEETING -0.0003 -0.0141 -0.0030 0.0871 
 (0.8687) (0.8151) (0.2434) (0.2870) 
BOARD SIZE 0.0137** 0.4549** 0.0199** 0.4262 
 (0.0191) (0.0432) (0.0247) (0.1559) 
SIZE 0.0119*** -1.1273*** 0.0122*** -1.6039*** 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
OWNERSHIP 0.0003*** 0.0071*** 0.0001 0.0015 
 (0.0000) (0.0009) (0.2193) (0.6187) 
CEO SHARE -0.0001 -0.0048** 0.0009*** 0.0048 
 (0.1572) (0.0199) (0.0024) (0.6185) 
INDEPENDENT -0.0080 2.0658*** 0.0285 3.5002*** 
 (0.6917) (0.0057) (0.3339) (0.0002) 
INTERCEPT -0.2046*** 22.9694*** -0.2661*** 31.6099*** 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
YEAR YES YES YES YES 
INDUSTRY YES YES YES YES 
N 4134 3966 2562 2432 
adj. R-sq 0.2431 0.4426 0.2244 0.5035 
Seemingly Unrelated Estimation:  
FAMILY AND NON-FAMILY(ROA): CORRUPT*POST=CORRUPT*POST  χ𝟐𝟐=0.35 (0.5516) 
FAMILY AND NON-FAMILY(Q): CORRUPT*POST=CORRUPT*POST  χ𝟐𝟐=3.05* (0.0806) 
 
PANEL B 
  FAMILY   NON-FAMILY 
  BANK LOAN INVESTMENT BANK LOAN INVESTMENT 
CORRUPTION 0.0069 -0.0022 0.0010 -0.0057** 
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 (0.2090) (0.4221) (0.8885) (0.0217) 
POST 0.0018 -0.0033 0.0049 0.0016 
 (0.7574) (0.2780) (0.5579) (0.6015) 
CORRUPT*POST -0.0204*** -0.0083** 0.0033 -0.0028 
 (0.0034) (0.0177) (0.7493) (0.4187) 
GROWTH 0.0055** -0.0015 0.0050* -0.0001 
 (0.0115) (0.1402) (0.0516) (0.9450) 
REGIONAL GDP -0.0039*** -0.0017*** -0.0032** -0.0022*** 
 (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0128) (0.0000) 
MEETING 0.0261*** 0.0086*** 0.0138*** 0.0072*** 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0037) (0.0000) 
BOARD SIZE 0.0030 0.0086* -0.0014 0.0172*** 
 (0.7395) (0.0648) (0.9280) (0.0001) 
SIZE 0.0349*** 0.0005 0.0279*** 0.0061*** 
 (0.0000) (0.5733) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
ROA -0.5348*** 0.0317** -0.5050*** 0.0597*** 
 (0.0000) (0.0424) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
OWNERSHIP -0.0005*** 0.0003*** -0.0003 0.0001 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.1015) (0.2822) 
TANGIBILITY 0.0953*** -0.0170 0.1498*** -0.0090 
 (0.0000) (0.1427) (0.0001) (0.4415) 
CASHFLOW -0.2969*** -0.0601*** -0.2723*** -0.0046 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.4663) 
LEVERAGE  -0.0521***  -0.0171*** 
  (0.0000)  (0.0000) 
INTERCEPT -0.5570*** 0.0747*** -0.4275*** -0.0857*** 
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 (0.0000) (0.0008) (0.0000) (0.0001) 
YEAR YES YES YES YES 
INDUSTRY YES YES YES YES 
N 4266 4266 2740 2740 
adj. R-sq 0.3817 0.0907 0.2712 0.1580 
Seemingly Unrelated Estimation:  
FAMILY AND NON-FAMILY(BANKLOAN): CORRUPT*POST=CORRUPT*POST  χ𝟐𝟐=3.69* (0.0548) 




2.4.2.2 Bribing family firms vs. connected family firms 
In the previous section, the post-event changes of related firms are tested, which 
include both bribing firms and connected firms. In this section, a further step is 
taken to test the changes between bribing firms and connected firms separately to 
determine whether the magnitude of these changes differs between the two groups 
within family firms.  
 
Tables 2.5 presents the regression results. As in the previous section, the focus is 
on the interaction terms ‘BRIBING*POST’ and ‘CONNECTED*POST’, which 
capture the post-event changes of bribing family firms and connected family firms, 
respectively. Consistent with the previous results for ‘CORRUPTION*POST’ in 
family firms, the coefficients of both ‘BRIBING*POST’ and 
‘CONNECTED*POST’ are significantly negative on firm performance, bank 
loans, and investments. These results indicate that the responses of related family 
firms are not only driven by bribing firms but also by connected firms.  
 
The different qualities of coefficients between ‘BRIBING*POST’ and 
‘CONNECTED*POST’ are presented in Tables 2.5, where  χ2 is calculated based 
on the seemingly unrelated estimation (SUE) and the p-values are in parentheses. 
By checking the significant coefficients of ‘BRIBING*POST’ and 
‘CONNECTED*POST’, the magnitudes of the post-event changes in bribing firms 
are significantly larger than those in connected firms. Consistent with the 
expectations developed in Hypothesis 2, these results indicate that after political 
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disconnection, the decreases in bribing family firms’ performance, bank loans and 
investment expenditure are greater than those faced by connected family firms. 
These results demonstrate that the impact of political connections established by 
direct bribery is greater than those established by personal connections16.  
  
                                                          
16 I conduct further robustness test to verify the difference is not due to corruption scandal per se. 
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Table 2.5 The impact of corruption scandal exposures on performance, bank loan and investment between bribing family 
firms and connected family firms 
The regression results for the impact of corruption events on family firms’ performance, bank loans and investment in bribing firms 
and connected firms are reported in this table. The sample ‘BRIBING’ includes all the listed family firms having connections with 
corrupt bureaucrats directly involved in corruption cases and their matching firms. The sample ‘CONNECTED’ includes all the listed 
family firms in which the senior managers or top 10 largest shareholders had work or educational affiliations with corrupt bureaucrats, 
but without involvement in the cases, and their matching firms. The dependent variables are the firm’s accounting performance ‘ROA’, 
market performance ‘Q’(Tobin’s Q),  ‘BANK LOAN’ measured by annual bank loans divided by total assets, and ‘INVESTMENT’ 
measured by net capital expenditure divided by total assets, respectively. The independent variables ‘BRIBING’ and ‘CONNECTED’ 
are dummy variables that are equal to one if firms belong to ‘bribing firms’ and ‘connected firms’, respectively. ‘POST’ is a dummy 
variable that is set to one for years following the year of corruption case exposures. ‘BRIBING*POST’ and ‘CONNECTED*POST’ 
are the interaction terms between ‘BRIBING’ and ‘POST’, and ‘CONNECTED’ and ‘POST’, respectively. Control variables (the same 
as in Table 2.4) are included but not reported to save space. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level.χ2 is calculated based on 
seemingly unrelated estimation with p-values in parentheses. *, **, *** represent significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, 
respectively. 
 ROA Q BANK LOAN INVESTMENT 
  BRIBING CONNECTED BRIBING CONNECTED BRIBING CONNECTED BRIBING CONNECTED 
BRIBING 0.0111*  0.6400***  0.0425**  0.0129**  
 (0.0724)  (0.0040)  (0.0103)  (0.0476)  
CONNECTED  0.0034  0.2293***  0.0047  -0.0033 
  (0.2074)  (0.0088)  (0.4329)  (0.2165) 
POST 0.0064 0.0019 0.0785 0.0406 -0.0436*** -0.0289*** -0.0172*** -0.0100*** 
 (0.2927) (0.5252) (0.7264) (0.6697) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0029) (0.0002) 
BRIBING*POST -0.0172*  -1.2082***  -0.0429**  -0.0231**  
 (0.0615)  (0.0004)  (0.0423)  (0.0180)  
CONNECTED*POST  -0.0065*  -0.4493***     -0.0177**       -0.0071* 
  (0.0792)  (0.0004)  (0.0213)  (0.0516) 
INTERCEPT -0.1141* -0.2035*** 17.3362*** 23.3033*** -0.5658*** -0.5115*** 0.0122 0.0780*** 
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 (0.0682) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.8247) (0.0004) 
CONTROL 
VARIABLES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
YEAR YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
INDUSTRY YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
N 662 3472 628 3338 678 3588 678 3588 
adj. R-sq 0.1416 0.2322 0.3621 0.4376 0.3069 0.3440 0.1242 0.0726 
χ2 3.92** (0.0478) 3.86** (0.0494) 3.05*(0.0808) 2.89*(0.0894) 
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2.4.2.3 Family firms in different provinces and industries 
Table 2.6 presents the regression results for the impact of exposed corruption on 
the performance, bank loans, and investment among subsamples categorised by 
province and industry characteristics of family firms. Panel A shows the results for 
the impact of corruption scandal exposures on related family firms located in 
provinces with different marketisation.  The significance of the coefficients for the 
independent variable of interest, ‘CORRUPT*POST’, is consistent with the 
previous results and for family firms in provinces with both high and low 
marketisation. This shows that regardless of their location, the performance, bank 
loans and investments of related family firms decreased significantly after 
corruption was exposed.  More importantly, the results reveal different magnitudes 
of changes for family firms located in high and low marketisation provinces (shown 
by the p value of   χ2 calculated on a seemingly unrelated estimation). The results 
support Hypothesis H3a by showing that the post-event changes of related family 
firms located in the provinces with low marketisation are significantly greater than 
those in provinces with high marketisation. These results are consistent with the 
view that political connections are more important and more prevalent in provinces 
with low marketisation. When related firms in provinces with low marketisation 
are no longer politically connected due to the exposure of corruption, the impact of 
loss on firm behaviour appears to be more noticeable.  
 
Panel B shows the results for the impact of corruption scandal exposures on related 
family firms that are differentiated by whether or not it is located in the same 
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province as related corrupt officials. The coefficients of the interested variable 
‘CORRUPT*POST’ are significantly negative for firms performance, bank loan 
and investment opportunities regardless of whether the firms locate in the same 
province as related corrupt officials or not17. However, the post-event changes for 
family firms located in the same province as corrupt officials are significantly larger 
than those family firms located in a province different from that of their related 
officials (shown by the p value of   χ2  calculated on a seemingly unrelated 
estimation). 
 
The impact of political disconnection on firms belonging to industries with 
different corruption intensity is further explored. Corruption intensity of the 
industry is derived from the percentage of related firms among total firms in ‘Table 
2.1 distribution of related firms by industry’. The corruption intensity ranking is 
provided in Appendix 2. The industry intensity ‘LOW’ includes family firms that 
belong to an industry whose corruption intensity is below median level, and 
‘HIGH’ includes family firms that belong to an industry whose corruption intensity 
is above median level. The results in Panel C show that when firms are from 
industries with higher corruption intensity, the impact of losing political connection 
is significantly negative for firms’ performance, bank loan and investment. For 
firms in industries with lower corruption intensity, the significantly negative impact 
is only observed for bank loan. Except for bank loan, the results of χ2 confirm that 
                                                          
17 There is one exception for firms located in a province different from that of their related officials. 
The coefficient of ‘CORRUPT*POST’ on INVESTMENT is negative but not significant. 
80 
 
the post-event changes of firms’ behaviour are significantly larger for family firms 
belonging to industries with higher corruption intensity which supports the H3b, 





Table 2.6 The impact of corruption scandal exposures on performance, bank loans and investment among subsamples 
categorised by province and industry characteristics in family firms 
This table presents the regression results for the impact of corruption events on family firms’ performance, bank loans and investment 
among subsamples categorised by province and industry characteristics. Panel A shows the results for family firms located in different 
provinces differentiated by marketisation. ‘LOW’ includes family firms registered in provinces which rank from 1st to 15th in the 
Marketisation Index list, and ‘HIGH’ includes family firms registered in provinces which rank from 16th to 31st   in the Marketisation 
Index list. Panel B presents the results for family firms located in the same (or different) provinces as their related corrupt officials. 
‘SAME’ includes family firms located in the same province as the related corrupt officials, and ‘DIFFERENT’ includes family firms 
located in a province different from that of the related corrupt officials. I have excluded those corrupt officials at the central level. Panel 
C is the results for family firms belonging to industry with different corruption intensity. ‘LOW’ includes family firms that belong to 
an industry that their corruption intensity is below median level, and ‘HIGH’ includes family firms that belong to an industry that their 
corruption intensity is above median level. Corruption intensity of the industry is derived from the Table 2.1 distribution of related 
firms by industry under the percentage of related firms among total firms. The corruption intensity ranking is provided in Appendix 2. 
The dependent variables are the firm’s performance measured by ‘ROA’ and ‘Q’ (Tobin’s Q) representing firm’s accounting and 
market performance, respectively, ‘BANK LOAN’ is measured by annual bank loans divided by total assets and ‘INVESTMENT’ is 
measured by net capital expenditure divided by total assets, respectively. ‘CORRUPTION’ is a dummy variable that is equal to one if 
firms belong to ‘related firms’. ‘POST’ is a dummy variable that is set to one for years following the year of corruption case exposures. 
‘CORRUPT*POST’ is the interaction term between ‘CORRUPTION’ and ‘POST’. Control variables (the same as in Table 2.4) are 
included but not reported to save space. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. χ2 is calculated based on seemingly unrelated 
estimation with p-values in parentheses. *, **, *** represent significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
Panel A Provinces differentiated by marketisation 
 ROA Q BANK LOAN INVESTMENT 
  LOW HIGH LOW HIGH LOW HIGH LOW HIGH 
CORRUPTION -0.0039 0.0111*** 0.3885 0.4589*** 0.0486*** 0.0006 -0.0100 0.0000 
 (0.5956) (0.0002) (0.1404) (0.0000) (0.0023) (0.9191) (0.1342) (0.9877) 
POST 0.0061 0.0079*** 1.0543*** 0.1238 0.0249 -0.0014 0.0080 -0.0040 
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 (0.3993) (0.0053) (0.0014) (0.1790) (0.1830) (0.8248) (0.4023) (0.2170) 
CORRUPT*POST -0.0276*** -0.0097*** -1.0345** -0.5249*** -0.0715*** -0.0133* -0.0259** -0.0116*** 
 (0.0035) (0.0082) (0.0125) (0.0000) (0.0004) (0.0782) (0.0146) (0.0022) 
INTERCEPT -0.0792 -0.2294*** 20.6460*** 22.7563*** -0.5536*** -0.5697*** 0.0530 0.0913*** 
 (0.2637) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.2912) (0.0003) 
CONTROL VARIABLES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
YEAR YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
INDUSTRY YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
N 627 3507 596 3370 658 3608 658 3608 
adj. R-sq 0.1501 0.2764 0.2757 0.4531 0.3073 0.3909 0.1146 0.0964 
χ2 3.47*(0.0626) 3.17*(0.0750) 7.74***(0.0054) 2.82*(0.0929) 
 
Panel B Whether located in the same province as related corrupt officials  
 ROA Q BANK LOAN INVESTMENT 





CORRUPTION 0.0155*** 0.0090*** 0.5259*** 0.6018*** 0.0260** -0.0022 -0.0050 -0.0028 
 (0.0011) (0.0026) (0.0021) (0.0000) (0.0142) (0.7307) (0.3461) (0.3787) 
POST 0.0151*** 0.0060* 0.2918 0.9754*** 0.0175 0.0007 -0.0083 -0.0091*** 
 (0.0054) (0.0516) (0.1370) (0.0000) (0.1533) (0.9194) (0.1630) (0.0025) 




 (0.0005) (0.0883) (0.0004) (0.0553) (0.0006) (0.0890) (0.0021) (0.1018) 
INTERCEPT -0.1380*** -0.2186*** 19.2209*** 21.9635*** -0.6339*** -0.5067*** 0.0668* 0.0684*** 
 (0.0002) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0915) (0.0097) 
CONTROL 
VARIABLES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
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YEAR YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
INDUSTRY YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
N 1330 2716 1279 2605 1371 2805 1371 2805 
adj. R-sq 0.2542 0.2097 0.4176 0.2828 0.4555 0.3539 0.1064 0.0636 
χ2 3.15*(0.0758) 3.91*(0.0880) 3.88**(0.0488) 2.90*(0.0886) 
 
 
Panel C Industries differentiated by corruption intensity 
 ROA Q BANK LOAN INVESTMENT 
  LOW HIGH LOW HIGH LOW HIGH LOW HIGH 
CORRUPTION 0.0093*** 0.0018 0.5016*** 0.7055*** 0.0041 -0.0148 -0.0039 0.0066 
 (0.0004) (0.7462) (0.0000) (0.0019) (0.4459) (0.2759) (0.1653) (0.2558) 
POST 0.0068** 0.0066 0.8817*** 0.2885 0.0049 -0.0123 -0.0022 -0.0021 
 (0.0173) (0.3090) (0.0000) (0.2683) (0.4070) (0.4323) (0.4809) (0.7565) 
CORRUPT*POST -0.0039 -0.0184** -0.1490 -1.0858*** -0.0176** -0.0308* -0.0051 -0.0194** 
 (0.2686) (0.0156) (0.3427) (0.0004) (0.0168) (0.0911) (0.1837) (0.0130) 
INTERCEPT -0.2397*** -0.0967** 22.2463*** 24.1590*** -0.5786*** -0.5361*** 0.0016 0.0387 
 (0.0000) (0.0387) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.9489) (0.3663) 
CONTROL VARIABLES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
YEAR YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
INDUSTRY YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
N 3314 820 3173 793 3401 865 3410 856 
adj. R-sq 0.2784 0.2140 0.2206 0.4767 0.4052 0.2793 0.1035 0.1015 
χ2 3.47*(0.0626) 9.21***(0.0024) 0.46(0.4958) 2.96*(0.0855) 
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2.4.3 Additional analysis 
2.4.3.1 Market reaction to the introduction of Xi’s anti-corruption campaign 
To provide further evidence for Hypothesis H1a which tests the different impact of 
losing political connections on the behaviour of family firms and non-family firms, 
the market reaction for all listed non-SOEs after the ‘Eight-point Regulation’ was 
announced on December 4, 2012 is examined18. The cumulative abnormal returns 
(CARs) are used to capture the different market reactions. CAR (-1,+1), CAR(-
2,+2) and CAR(-5,+5) are calculated by the accumulated abnormal returns over 
three-day, five-day and eleven-day event windows, respectively. 
 
Table 2.7 presents the results. the interaction term between ‘FAMILY’ and 
‘CORRUPTION’ is included to capture the CARs for related family firms. The 
significantly negative coefficients of ‘FAMILY*CORRUPT’ over all three event 
windows exhibit stronger negative reactions to the announcement by investors in 
family firms. This result could also reflect the different roles that political 
connections play in family firms and non-family firms. As discussed, family firms 
appear to use political connections to foster their performance, and for access to 
bank loans and investment opportunities where the end value is more likely to 
                                                          
18 I admit the test can not fully capture the market reaction to the start of Xi’s anti-corruption 
campaign as not all the investors are aware of the possibility of losing political connection due to 
the campaign itself. Therefore, it is possible that reactions from a sub-set of investors are omitted. 




influence the interests of all shareholders. Given Xi’s anti-corruption campaign as 
a possible cause of weakening the positive influence of political connections, it 




Table 2.7 The impact of family control on market reaction to the introduction 
of Xi’s anti-corruption campaign 
This table presents the regression results for the impact of family control on 
cumulative abnormal returns for all the listed non-SOEs around the announcement 
of the Eight-point Regulation on December 4, 2012 (commencement of anti-
corruption campaign). ‘CAR (-1,+1)’, ‘CAR(-2,+2)’ and ‘CAR (-5,+5)’ are the 
cumulative abnormal returns over three-day, five-day and 11-day event windows 
around December 4, 2012. ‘FAMILY’ is a dummy variable that is set to one if firms 
belong to family firms. ‘CORRUPTION’ is a dummy variable that is equal to one 
if firms belong to ‘related firms’. ‘FAMILY*CORRUPT’ is the interaction term 
between ‘FAMILY’ and ‘CORRUPTION’.  Control variables are defined in 
Appendix 1. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level, and p-values are in 
parentheses. *, **, *** represent significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, 
respectively. 
  CAR(-1,+1) CAR(-2,+2) CAR(-5,+5) 
FAMILY -0.0018 -0.0038 0.0014 
 (0.4851) (0.2993) (0.7834) 
CORRUPTION 0.0048 0.0038 0.0090 
 (0.1439) (0.4164) (0.1686) 
FAMILY*CORRUPT -0.0067* -0.0090* -0.0144* 
 (0.0864) (0.0923) (0.0640) 
EXCESS -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 
 (0.4825) (0.5122) (0.6043) 
GROWTH 0.0003 0.0001 0.0001 
 (0.7645) (0.9145) (0.9521) 
LEVERAGE 0.0043 0.0103 -0.0020 
 (0.4165) (0.1373) (0.8372) 
ADVANTAGE 0.0001 -0.0000 -0.0001 
 (0.6516) (0.8443) (0.7796) 
REGIONAL GDP 0.0004 -0.0001 0.0008 
 (0.4130) (0.8632) (0.4831) 
MEETING 0.0006 0.0029 0.0036 
 (0.7831) (0.3423) (0.3953) 
BOARD SIZE -0.0062 -0.0033 0.0010 
 (0.1901) (0.6063) (0.9136) 
SIZE 0.0037*** 0.0040*** 0.0109*** 
 (0.0006) (0.0039) (0.0000) 
ROA 0.0136 0.0284 -0.0010 
 (0.5119) (0.3239) (0.9784) 
OWNERSHIP -0.0001 0.0000 -0.0000 
 (0.2045) (0.8639) (0.7807) 
INTERCEPT -0.0896*** -0.1013*** -0.2560*** 
 (0.0001) (0.0007) (0.0000) 
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YEAR NO NO NO 
INDUSTRY YES YES YES 
N 1189 1189 1189 
adj. R-sq 0.0457 0.0988 0.0664 
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2.4.3.2 Different types of family firms 
The previous results show the responses of family firms to the political 
disconnections in terms of their expropriation behaviour, performance, bank loans 
and investment expenditure. In this section, whether the responses to the 
disconnections vary among the sub-samples of family firms that are categorised 
based on their characteristics is further explored. 
 
The results are shown in Table 2.8 and 2.9. The sample of family firms has been 
re-classified into six sub-samples depending on whether they are still run by the 
founders, have been privatised from SOEs or were established by entrepreneurs in 
the first place, and whether more than one family member is involved in ownership 
or/and management. Focusing on the interaction term ‘CORRUPT*POST’, which 
captures related family firms’ post-event changes, Table 2.8 shows that only in 
family firms that are still run by their founders (FOUNDER), were established by 
entrepreneurs in the first place (NEWLY ESTABLISHED), and have more than 
one family member involved in the firm (INVOLVED), their expropriation 
behaviour does not change significantly after the corruption was exposed, which is 
consistent with the overall behaviour of family firms in the main test. However, 
family firms that are no longer run by their founders (NON-FOUNDER), have been 
privatised from SOEs (PRIVATISED), or where only one family member is 
involved in ownership or/and management (NON-INVOLVED), have the 
coefficients of ‘CORRUPT*POST’ significantly negative. This shows that, after 
losing their political connections due to corruption scandal exposures, the 
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expropriation activities of these types of family firms drop significantly by 9.70%, 
8.48% and 3.15%, respectively.  
 
Panels A to D of Table 2.9 report the regression results for the impact that exposed 
corruption has on firm performance, bank loans and investments of six sub-samples 
of family firms that are categorised by their characteristics. All the regression 
results yield consistent outcomes. The coefficients of ‘CORRUPT*POST’ are only 
significantly negative for the subsamples of FOUNDER, NEWLY 
ESTABLISHED and INVOLVED and therefore only the performance of those 
family firms (‘ROA’ and ‘Q’), bank loans and investment expenditures decrease 
significantly after losing their political connections subsequent to the exposure of 
related corruption.  With the sub-samples of NON-FOUNDER, PRIVATISED and 
NON-INVOLVED, the removal of political connections does not seem to have a 
significant impact on firm performance, bank loans and investment activities. These 
results show that the overall responses of related family firms to exposed corruption 
are mainly driven by family firms that are still run by their founders, or initially 
established by entrepreneurs, and have more than one family member involved in 




Table 2.8 The impact of corruption events on expropriation among subsamples categorised by family firm characteristics 
This table represents the regression results for the impact of corruption events on family firms’ expropriation behaviour among the 
subsamples categorised by family firm characteristics. ‘FOUNDER’ includes the listed related family firms that are still run by their 
founders, and their matching firms. ‘NON-FOUNDER’ includes the listed related family firms that are no longer run by their founders 
and their matching firms. ‘NEWLY ESTABLISHED’ includes the listed related family firms that were non-SOEs at the time of IPO, 
and their matching firms. ‘PRIVATISED’ includes the listed related family firms that were SOEs at the time of IPO and later privatised 
to non-SOEs, and their matching firms. ‘INVOLVED’ includes the listed related family firms that have more than one family member 
involved in ownership or/and management, and their matching firms. ‘NON-INVOLVED’ includes the listed related family firms that 
have only one family member involved in ownership or/and management, and their matching firms. The dependent variable 
‘EXPROPRIATION’ is the firm’s total annual amount of RPTs that fall into the category of ‘ex ante potential’ expropriation 
transactions divided by total assets. Control variables (the same as in Table 2.3) are included but not reported to save space. Standard 
errors are clustered at the firm level with p-values in parentheses. *, **, *** represent significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, 
respectively. 












CORRUPTION -0.0225* 0.0063 -0.0059 -0.0382 -0.0194 -0.0056 
 (0.0615) (0.7940) (0.5490) (0.2197) (0.3112) (0.6928) 
POST -0.0098 0.0091 -0.0079 0.0130 -0.0359* 0.0088 
 (0.4079) (0.7466) (0.4264) (0.7117) (0.0788) (0.5619) 
CORRUPT*POST 0.0246 -0.0970*** 0.0189 -0.0848* 0.0388 -0.0315* 
 (0.1269) (0.0040) (0.2017) (0.0529) (0.1214) (0.0856) 
INTERCEPT -0.5471*** 0.3142 -0.2167 0.0702 0.1877 -0.3058** 
 (0.0000) (0.1734) (0.1404) (0.7631) (0.2336) (0.0322) 
CONTROL VARIABLES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
YEAR YES YES YES YES YES YES 
INDUSTRY YES YES YES YES YES YES 
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N 3083 1182 3431 815 1417 2784 
adj. R-sq 0.1390 0.0816 0.1462 0.0507 0.1334 0.1070 
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Table 2.9 The impact of corruption events on performance, bank loans and investment among subsamples categorised by 
family firm characteristics 
The regression results for the impact of corruption events on firms’ performance, bank loans and investment among the subsamples 
categorised by family firm characteristics are reported in Panels A, B, C and D of Table 2.9, respectively. ‘FOUNDER’ includes the 
listed related family firms that are still run by their founders, and their matching firms. ‘NON-FOUNDER’ includes the listed related 
family firms that are no longer run by their founders and their matching firms. ‘NEWLY ESTABLISHED’ includes the listed related 
family firms that were non-SOEs at the time of IPO, and their matching firms. ‘PRIVATISED’ includes the listed related family firms 
that were SOEs at the time of IPO and later privatised to non-SOEs, and their matching firms. ‘INVOLVED’ includes the listed related 
family firms that have more than one family member involved in ownership or/and management, and their matching firms. ‘NON-
INVOLVED’ includes the listed related family firms that have only one family member involved in ownership or/and management, 
and their matching firms. The dependent variable of Panels A and B is the firm’s performance measured by ‘ROA’ and ‘Q’ (Tobin’s 
Q) representing the firm’s accounting and market performance respectively. The dependent variable of Panels C and D is ‘BANK 
LOAN’ measured by annual bank debt divided by total assets and ‘INVESTMENT’ measured by net capital expenditure divided by 
total assets, respectively. Control variables (the same as in Table 2.4) are included but not reported to save space. Standard errors are 
clustered at the firm level withp-values in parentheses. *, **, *** represent significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
PANEL A 
ROA             
  FOUNDER NON-FOUNDER NEWLY ESTABLISHED PRIVATISED INVOLVED NON-INVOLVED 
CORRUPTION 0.0073*** 0.0132** 0.0088*** 0.0102 0.0098** 0.0090*** 
 (0.0087) (0.0454) (0.0013) (0.1960) (0.0118) (0.0062) 
POST 0.0079*** 0.0067 0.0098*** -0.0045 0.0104*** 0.0063* 
 (0.0022) (0.3839) (0.0004) (0.5886) (0.0040) (0.0824) 
CORRUPT*POST -0.0074** -0.0116 -0.0083** -0.0069 -0.0126** -0.0053 
 (0.0388) (0.1616) (0.0176) (0.4822) (0.0150) (0.2263) 
INTERCEPT -0.2534*** -0.0888 -0.2416*** -0.0856 -0.2189*** -0.1920*** 
 (0.0000) (0.1107) (0.0000) (0.2384) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
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CONTROL VARIABLES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
YEAR YES YES YES YES YES YES 
INDUSTRY YES YES YES YES YES YES 
N 3024 1110 3363 753 1384 2509 
adj. R-sq 0.2687 0.2264 0.2521 0.2568 0.2395 0.2361 
 
PANEL B 
Q             
  FOUNDER 
NON-







CORRUPTION 0.3797*** 0.6276*** 0.5686*** -0.1992 0.3320*** 0.5871*** 
 (0.0000) (0.0065) (0.0000) (0.4170) (0.0043) (0.0000) 
POST 0.0861 1.3098*** 0.2604*** -0.3104 0.1558 0.9751*** 
 (0.3052) (0.0000) (0.0006) (0.3159) (0.2138) (0.0000) 
CORRUPT*POST -0.3789*** -0.4903 -0.5591*** 0.0443 -0.5020*** -0.2455 
 (0.0020) (0.1268) (0.0000) (0.9026) (0.0049) (0.1484) 
INTERCEPT 
18.0880**
* 29.6033*** 19.5157*** 30.3982*** 19.6772*** 22.2873*** 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
CONTROL VARIABLES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
YEAR YES YES YES YES YES YES 
INDUSTRY YES YES YES YES YES YES 
N 2907 1059 3231 718 1339 2486 
adj. R-sq 0.4556 0.3658 0.4604 0.5075 0.4647 0.3085 
 
PANEL C 














CORRUPTION 0.0117* -0.0040 0.0081 0.0016 0.0005 0.0117* 
 (0.0632) (0.7249) (0.1554) (0.9043) (0.9558) (0.0880) 
POST 0.0054 -0.0130 0.0046 -0.0332** 0.0096 -0.0010 
 (0.3869) (0.3374) (0.4309) (0.0315) (0.2941) (0.8868) 
CORRUPT*POST -0.0252*** -0.0008 -0.0189*** -0.0273 -0.0471*** -0.0124 
 (0.0014) (0.9575) (0.0096) (0.1556) (0.0000) (0.1576) 
INTERCEPT -0.5675*** -0.5788*** -0.5646*** -0.4281*** -0.5032*** -0.5542*** 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0002) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
CONTROL VARIABLES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
YEAR YES YES YES YES YES YES 
INDUSTRY YES YES YES YES YES YES 
N 3083 1182 3431 815 1417 2784 
adj. R-sq 0.3903 0.3614 0.4169 0.2553 0.4029 0.3780 
 
PANEL D 












CORRUPTION -0.0009 -0.0076 -0.0039 -0.0028 -0.0134** -0.0014 
 (0.7754) (0.1261) (0.1920) (0.6439) (0.0103) (0.6554) 
POST -0.0031 -0.0066 -0.0027 -0.0127* -0.0080 -0.0058* 
 (0.3515) (0.2914) (0.4050) (0.0762) (0.1101) (0.0994) 
CORRUPT*POST -0.0068* -0.0023 -0.0070* 0.0039 -0.0111* -0.0027 
 (0.0851) (0.7214) (0.0621) (0.6277) (0.0717) (0.5195) 
INTERCEPT 0.0938*** -0.0245 0.0666** 0.0310 0.0965* 0.0417 
 (0.0020) (0.5706) (0.0159) (0.5255) (0.0503) (0.1341) 
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CONTROL VARIABLES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
YEAR YES YES YES YES YES YES 
INDUSTRY YES YES YES YES YES YES 
N 3083 1182 3431 815 1417 2784 
adj. R-sq 0.1708 0.1321 0.1579 0.1489 0.0923 0.1514 
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2.4.4 Alternative explanations and robustness tests 
2.4.4.1 Excluding the effect of corruption scandal per se 
Thus far, a substantial amount of evidence has been presented to support hypothesis 
H1a that the performance, bank loans and investments of related family firms 
decrease significantly whereas expropriation by related non-family firms declines 
significantly after the exposure of corruption. However, these results may be due 
to the corruption scandals per se because the expropriation activities, performance, 
bank loans and investment expenditure may have decreased because the related 
firms, banks, and other related parties became more concerned about their 
reputation after the exposure of corruption. In order to address this concern, the 
sample period is limited to the years before corruption was exposed, and regress 
the main dependent variables on the dummy variable ‘CORRUPTION’ and 
identical control variables as in the main tests. The study expects that only related 
non-family firms will have more expropriation activities, whereas the performance, 
bank loans and investment of related family firms will be higher than non-related 
family firms. The result19 verifies the expectation by showing that the coefficient 
of ‘CORRUPTION’ is significantly positive on expropriation among non-family 
firm but not among family firms. The results suggest that political connections only 
facilitate the controlling shareholders of non-family firms to expropriate minority 
shareholders. Moreover, the coefficients of ‘CORRUPTION’ are significantly 
                                                          
19 The results for test are not reported to save space, but they can be provided upon request. 
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positive on performance, bank loans and investment within family firms but not 
non-family firms. In addition, the same strategy is used to prove that the different 
post-event changes between bribing firms and connected firms are not driven by 
the corruption scandals per se. Consistent with the expectation, the results show 
that the expropriation activities conducted by bribing firms are more than connected 
firms among non-family firms before the events. At the same time, it also shows 
that bribing family firms’ performance, bank loan and investment are higher than 
connected family firms. Therefore, the bigger impact of political disconnections 
built through direct bribery than those built through personal connection is not due 
to the corruption scandal per se, but consistent before and after the events. Overall, 
the results rule out the alternative explanation for the main results by showing that 
the impact of political connections on firm behaviour is consistent before and after 
these events. 
 
2.4.4.2 Good and bad performers located in provinces with higher 
marketisation 
In the previous section, the results show that the impact of a lost connection is more 
profound for family firms located in provinces with lower marketisation than those 
in provinces with higher marketisation. However, the less profound result in 
provinces with higher marketisation may be driven by the possibility that a great 
number of firms outperform in the province with high marketisation because of the 
better business environment in those provinces, and those firms are easily 
targeted/favoured by corrupt officials. Therefore, they may have less incentive to 
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establish political connections, and the loss of political connection has less impact 
on their behaviour. Therefore, the sample of high marketisation is further split into 
firms with good performance (with ROA higher than the mean), and firms with bad 
performance (with ROA lower than the mean). If the coefficient of 
‘CORRUPT*POST’ for firms located in provinces with lower marketisation is 
larger than those for both good and bad performers in provinces with higher 
marketisation, the alternative explanations could be ruled out that it is the 
performance not the marketisation of the province that drives the results. The results 
in Table 2.11 show that the loss of political connections has a more profound impact 
on firms’ performance, bank loan and investment in firms located in provinces with 
lower marketisation compared with both good and bad performers in provinces 




Table 2.10 The comparisons between firms located in the provinces with lower marketisation with both good and bad 
performers in the provinces with higher marketisation 
This table presents the regression results for the impact of corruption events on family firms’ performance, bank loans and investment 
between firms located in the provinces with lower marketisation and both good and bad performers in the provinces with higher 
marketisation. Panel A shows the results for firm performance, while Panel B shows the results for bank loan and investment 
opportunities. ‘LOW’ includes family firms registered in provinces which rank from 1st to 15th in the Marketisation Index list, 
‘HIGH/BAD’ includes family firms registered in provinces which rank from 16th to 31st   in the Marketisation Index list, and having 
their ROA lower than the mean ROA, ‘HIGH/GOOD’ includes family firms registered in provinces which rank from 16th to 31st   in 
the Marketisation Index list, and having their ROA higher than the mean ROA. The dependent variables are the firm’s performance 
measured by ‘ROA’ and ‘Q’ (Tobin’s Q) representing firm’s accounting and market performance, respectively, ‘BANK LOAN’ is 
measured by annual bank loans divided by total assets and ‘INVESTMENT’ is measured by net capital expenditure divided by total 
assets, respectively. ‘CORRUPTION’ is a dummy variable that is equal to one if firms belong to ‘related firms’. ‘POST’ is a dummy 
variable that is set to one for years following the year of corruption case exposures. ‘CORRUPT*POST’ is the interaction term between 
‘CORRUPTION’ and ‘POST’. Control variables (the same as in Table 2.4) are included but not reported to save space. Standard errors 
are clustered at the firm level. χ2 is calculated based on seemingly unrelated estimation with p-values in parentheses. *, **, *** 
represent significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
PANEL A: ROA and Tobin’s Q 
  ROA Q 
 LOW HIGH/BAD HIGH/GOOD LOW HIGH/BAD HIGH/GOOD 
CORRUPTION -0.0039 0.0065** 0.0088*** 0.3885 0.3777*** 0.4200*** 
 (0.5956) (0.0499) (0.0014) (0.1404) (0.0045) (0.0010) 
POST 0.0061 0.0083** 0.0002 1.0543*** 0.1286 0.0387 
 (0.3993) (0.0169) (0.9494) (0.0014) (0.3635) (0.7791) 
CORRUPT*POST -0.0276*** -0.0075* -0.0081** -1.0345** -0.4104** -0.4303** 
 (0.0035) (0.0790) (0.0289) (0.0125) (0.0179) (0.0128) 
INTERCEPT -0.0792 -0.2132*** 0.0712** 20.6460*** 25.1262*** 18.9679*** 
 (0.2637) (0.0000) (0.0152) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
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CONTROL VARIABLES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
YEAR YES YES YES YES YES YES 
INDUSTRY YES YES YES YES YES YES 
N 627 1532 1975 596 1459 1911 
adj. R-sq 0.1501 0.1661 0.1080 0.2757 0.5207 0.4493 
χ2  3.88**(0.0489) 3.95**(0.0468)  3.03*(0.0818) 2.78*(0.0952) 
 
PANEL B: Bank loan and investment opportunities 
 
  BANK LOAN INVEST 
 LOW HIGH/BAD HIGH/GOOD LOW HIGH/BAD HIGH/GOOD 
CORRUPTION 0.0486*** -0.0051 0.0070 -0.0100 -0.0002 0.0001 
 (0.0023) (0.6021) (0.2598) (0.1342) (0.9708) (0.9878) 
POST 0.0249 0.0004 0.0010 0.0080 -0.0076 -0.0020 
 (0.1830) (0.9686) (0.8773) (0.4023) (0.1019) (0.6342) 
CORRUPT*POST -0.0715*** -0.0222* -0.0140* -0.0259** -0.0117** -0.0115** 
 (0.0004) (0.0850) (0.0926) (0.0146) (0.0383) (0.0272) 
INTERCEPT -0.5536*** -0.7826*** -0.2658*** 0.0530 0.0572* 0.1293*** 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.2912) (0.0921) (0.0004) 
CONTROL VARIABLES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
YEAR YES YES YES YES YES YES 
INDUSTRY YES YES YES YES YES YES 
N 658 1601 2007 658 1601 2007 
adj. R-sq 0.3073 0.3248 0.3620 0.1146 0.0703 0.1107 
χ2  4.52**(0.0335) 7.34***(0.0067)  1.58(0.2093) 1.69(0.1934) 
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2.4.4.3 Market reaction to the corruption exposure events 
In the previous section, the market reaction to the start of Xi’s anti-corruption 
campaign (the announcement of ‘Eight-point Regulation’) has been examined, and 
proved that related family firms have a more negative CARs which shows the more 
pessimistic reactions by family firms. The cumulative abnormal returns of related 
firms on their specific event date which is the first day when the corruption scandal 
of the related official was announced to the public are further explored. A dummy 
variable ‘FAMILY’ is used to explore whether the market reaction is different 
between family firms and non-family firms. The result in Table 2.12 shows that the 
coefficients of ‘FAMILY’ are all significantly negative over all three event 
windows which echo the argument that investors react more negatively towards the 
loss of political connections of family firms. Only the cumulative abnormal returns 
for related firms are considered based on the assumption that only those affected 
firms will have abnormal returns. There are two caveats to this test. First, some of 
the event dates are very close, therefore the results may be biased because of the 
confounding effect. Second, the specific event date of some cases may not be 




Table 2.11 Market reaction to the corruption exposure events 
This table presents the regression results for the market reaction to the corruption 
exposure events. ‘CAR (-1,+1)’, ‘CAR(-2,+2)’ and ‘CAR (-5,+5)’ are the 
cumulative abnormal returns over three-day, five-day and 11-day event windows 
around the corruption exposure events. ‘FAMILY’ is a dummy variable that is set 
to one if firms belong to family firms. Control variables are defined in Appendix 1. 
Standard errors are clustered at the firm level, and p-values are in parentheses. *, 
**, *** represent significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
  CAR(-1,+1) CAR(-2,+2) CAR(-5,+5) 
FAMILY -0.0176*** -0.0145* -0.0181* 
 (0.0096) (0.0871) (0.0690) 
EXCESS 0.0002 0.0005 0.0010 
 (0.6818) (0.3369) (0.1328) 
GROWTH 0.0005 -0.0033 -0.0037 
 (0.8444) (0.1381) (0.2656) 
LEVERAGE 0.0025 0.0206 0.0329 
 (0.8676) (0.2817) (0.1235) 
ADVANTAGE 0.0002 -0.0001 -0.0009 
 (0.7347) (0.8150) (0.1801) 
REGIONAL GDP 0.0002 -0.0004 -0.0015 
 (0.8993) (0.8426) (0.5692) 
MEETING 0.0038 0.0009 0.0129 
 (0.5058) (0.9031) (0.1481) 
BOARD SIZE -0.0102 -0.0080 -0.0046 
 (0.4795) (0.6703) (0.8317) 
SIZE -0.0026 -0.0060 -0.0058 
 (0.3839) (0.1032) (0.2029) 
ROA -0.0642 -0.0415 -0.0523 
 (0.2327) (0.5282) (0.4652) 
OWNERSHIP -0.0001 -0.0001 0.0001 
 (0.6037) (0.5778) (0.7832) 
INTERCEPT 0.0655 0.1081 0.0738 
 (0.3267) (0.1746) (0.4542) 
YEAR YES YES YES 
INDUSTRY YES YES YES 
N 421 421 421 





2.4.4.4 Other robustness tests 
In order to further verify the results, alternative definitions of family firms are 
applied. As well as using the threshold of 15% control rights, 10%, 20% and 25% 
thresholds are used, and the same conclusions are reached. An alternative approach 
for categorising firms into high and low marketised groups is also adopted. In 
addition to using the median index score as a cut-off point in Table 2.6, the bottom 
five and top five provinces based on the index ranking are selected following Lin 
et al.’s (2016) method, so by repeating the analysis based on the alternative 
categorisation method, consistent results are obtained. Then, subsamples of low and 
high profitability firms (based on ROA and Tobin’s Q) are generated to rule out the 
possibility that the results are driven by the endogenous factor of profitability 
because doubt exists that only profitable companies could establish political 
connections by offering bribes or hiring senior managers with personal connections 
to government officials. The regression analysis carried out on the new subsamples 
of firms with high and low profitability shows consistent results in terms of the 
signs and significance of the coefficients on ‘CORRUPT*POST’. This eliminates 
any doubts about the potential confounding effect of profitability which could 
affect a firm’s ability to connect politically therefore the composition of firms in a 
treatment group20. Lastly, I split the non-family firms according to the ownership 
below or above 15% to identify the impact of blockholder on their expropriation 
                                                          
20The results for this section (other robustness tests) are not reported to save space, but they can be 
provided upon request. 
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behavior. Both subsamples provide consistent results, that is the expropriation 
behaviour of non-family firms regardless of having blockholder or not has 
decreased after the corruption scandal exposures.  
 
2.5 Conclusion 
By adopting a natural experiment approach using corruption cases involving 
higher-level bureaucrats from 2009 to 2014, how political connections affect family 
firms and non-family firms is examined by showing how their behaviour changes 
following the political disconnections after the exposure of corruption scandals. 
The results show that expropriation activities by related family firms do not change 
significantly after firms lose their political connections, but there is a significant 
reduction in expropriation by related non-family firms. However, the performance, 
bank loans and investment expenditure of family firms declined significantly after 
losing their political connections whereas non-family firms are not affected very 
much at all. These results are consistent with the view that family firms build 
political connections for better performance, access to external financing, and more 
investment opportunities, which in turn benefits minority shareholders. To further 
support the argument, the way that investors in family and non-family firms react 
to the announcement of Xi’s anti-corruption campaign is examined, and the results 
show that family firms experience more negative CARs at the start of the anti-
corruption movement. This result reflects a more pessimistic market reaction 
towards the potential political disconnections in family firms.  How the channels 
used to build political connections influence the behaviour of family firms after 
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political disconnections is also examined. The results show that family firms which 
built political connections through direct bribery experience a larger impact of 
absent political connections than firms which established connections through 
personal relationships. The different impact of political disconnection for firms 
located in provinces with different marketisation, firms located in the same 
provinces as related officials and firms belonging to industries with different 
corruption intensity is further explored. The results show that firms located in the 
provinces with lower marketisation, firms located in the same provinces as their 
related corrupt officials and firms from industries with higher corruption intensity 
suffer more from the loss of political connections. 
 
Lastly, to explore the underlying reasons behind the response of family firms to the 
political disconnections, their characteristics are considered. The results show that 
after losing their political connections, expropriation activities decline for family 
firms that are no longer run by their founders or were privatised from SOEs, or with 
only one family member involved in ownership or/and management. Similarly, for 
family firms still run by their founders or initially established by entrepreneurs, and 
with more than one family member involved in the firm, firm performance (‘ROA’ 
and ‘Q’), bank loans and investment expenditures decrease significantly after 
losing their political connections.  
 
Overall, the present study provides evidence that political connections in China 
have a differential impact on family and non-family firms because while political 
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connections are beneficial for family firms on average, they seem detrimental to 
non-family firms as the interests of minority shareholders are sacrificed. Within 
family firms, political connections appear to be counterproductive when they are 
no longer run by the founder, or were privatised from SOEs rather than established 




To re-establish political connection with CSR reporting: Evidence from non-
SOEs in China 
 
3.1 Introduction 
Political strategy is important for firms’ development and growth worldwide 
(Faccio, 2006). Governments control critical resources that impact the competitive 
position of firms (Schuler and Rehbein, 1997), for example through granting bank 
loans (Fan et al., 2008), or providing adverse impact. 
 
The present study uses the sample of Chinese listed non-state-owned enterprise 
(non-SOEs) to explore whether CSR disclosure is an alternative way for firms to 
rebuild political legitimacy after losing political connections due to the exposure of 
corruption scandals. Following Marquis and Qian (2014), the present study views 
political legitimacy as a strategic resource for firms to gain greater access to 
government resources. The extant studies on political strategy focusing on 
developed economies find that firms take political activities, including lobbying, 
contributing to political action committees (PACs) and participating in key political 
issues, to shape government policy in ways favourable to the firm (Hillman 2003; 
Hillman et al., 2004). For developing markets, companies establish political 
connection in a more direct way, for example by offering bribery to governmental 
actors, or hiring senior managers and board members with government working 
experience or having personal relationship with government officials (Fan et al., 
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2007; Chen et al., 2011). However, scholars also contend that government could 
use signaling process to create norms and standards for firms; firms’ strategic 
response to government signals becomes a way to shape its political legitimacy as 
the government will view the firm’s action as being in accordance with norms and 
laws (Dobbin et al., 1993; Dobbin and Sutton, 1998; Marquis and Qian, 2014). 
After the proposal of ‘harmonious society’ by the former Chinese president Hu 
Jintao in 2005, corporate social responsibility became an important agenda, and 
various governmental actors started to issue guidance and recommendations on 
corporate social responsibility activities and reporting. Chinese firms would 
conduct CSR initiatives to establish political legitimacy, especially after losing 
their previous connection with the government. The study has paid special attention 
to CSR disclosure, not the investment of CSR activities because although Chinese 
government advocates the CSR activities, only CSR disclosure becomes a mandate. 
Therefore, it is likely that firms have an incentive to respond to government’s 
advocacy by merely disclosing CSR report which is less costly and more efficient. 
So, disclosing CSR report is more likely to be an efficient mechanism for firms to 
use to re-build their political connection. 
 
China offers a good laboratory setting for the study. Firstly, the Chinese 
government has strong power for resources allocation (Cull and Xu, 2003; Chen et 
al., 2011), which combined with the weak formal institutional infrastructure, makes 
firms rely heavily on informal mechanism for rent seeking like networks (so-called 
‘Guanxi’) (Peng and Heath, 1996; Zhao and Li, 2013). Therefore, compared with 
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SOEs, who have an inborn relationship with government, Chinese non-SOEs have 
a greater incentive to establish political legitimacy through various methods. 
Previous studies have found that the most common practice is to offer bribery to 
government officials or hire senior managers or board members with government 
working experience or having personal relationship with government officials by 
affiliation (Fan et al., 2007 and 2008; Chen et al., 2011; Cull et al., 2015). However, 
due to the illegitimate nature of corruption, there is a risk of losing the political 
connection if firm’s related officials are involved in any exposed misconduct as 
they will then be under investigation or be arrested (Pan and Tian, 2017). During 
the 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of China (CCPC), President Xi 
Jinping launched a high-profile campaign that aims to terminate corruption by both 
‘tigers and flies’ (which means both high level government officials and lower level 
civil servants). By the end of 2015, there were more than 133 government officials 
at provincial or higher level who were arrested or under investigation after the anti-
corruption campaign (Jiancha Daily, 2015). The present study takes advantage of 
these corruption cases to examine how firms respond in terms of their tendency to 
disclose CSR report after the unexpected loss of political connections. Secondly, 
since 2006 the Chinese government has constantly signaled to the market that CSR 
is an appropriate and desired activity. Especially after the strong suggestions to 
disclose CSR report by Shanghai Stock Exchange (SSE) and Shenzhen Stock 
exchange (SZSE), Chinese listed firms start to actively participate in CSR 
initiatives and disclosure. Those governmental advocacy provides an opportunity 
to explore whether responding to government signals to disclose CSR report is an 
alternative way for firms, especially non-SOEs who are supposed to have less 
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responsibility for social welfare, to rebuild political legitimacy after losing their 
previous connection with government officials due to scandal exposure. 
 
Taking advantage of the corruption scandals exposed during the period from 2009 
to 2014, the present study uses difference-in-difference (DiD) approach to examine 
the impact of losing political connection due to corruption scandal exposure on the 
likelihood of disclosing CSR report. The results indicate that the firms losing their 
political connection unexpectedly due to corruption scandals are more likely to 
disclose their CSR report. This result is verified by Probit model, bootstrapping and 
dynamic effects.  
 
Furthermore, the sample is split according to different levels of financial constraint, 
provinces with different marketisation and industries with the different competitive 
environment to examine the heterogeneous effect of losing political connections on 
CSR disclosure. The results show that the impact of losing political connection on 
firms’ incentive to disclose CSR report is more pronounced for those firms who are 
more financially constrained, located in provinces with lower marketisation, and in 
industries with higher competition. Once firms lose their political connections due 
to corruption exposure, their privilege will be suspended. Firms that rely more on 
the connections to get external financing (more financially constrained), are easier 
to get preferential treatments due to stronger government intervention (in provinces 
with lower marketisation), and are eager to maintain and gain market 
competitiveness (in industries with higher competition) will have more incentive to 
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rebuild political legitimacy. The degree of political capital reliance determines their 
eagerness to re-establish political legitimacy after losing their political connection. 
 
A three-step mediation model is used to explore the mechanisms through which 
losing political connection influences a firm’s CSR disclosure. The present study 
first investigates whether the loss of political connection reduces the economic 
benefits (i.e. bank loan, subsidy and tax benefit) received by those corruption 
related firms. Then, it explores whether the reduction of economic benefits 
increases the overall operational costs. Finally, it examines whether the increased 
cost of operation motivates firms to disclose their CSR report despite less profit to 
invest in CSR. The results indicate that the loss of political connection reduces the 
economic benefits obtained by corruption related firms, which in turn increases 
their costs of operations. As a strategic response to the unexpected loss of political 
capital, firms are motivated to disclose their CSR report to re-build political 
legitimacy.  
 
A paper closely related to the present study is Li and Cheng (2020). Using data on 
non-SOEs listed on both Shanghai Stock Exchange and Shenzhen Stock Exchange 
from 2003 to 2012, Li and Cheng (2020) examine the effects of losing political 
connection due to the sudden death of politically connected independent directors. 
They find that after losing their political capital, non-SOEs will boost their capital 
expenditures by 28% to mitigate the negative impact of the lost political connection. 
Their evidence suggests that non-SOEs use capital investment as a substitute for 
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political capital. Although the present study and Li and Cheng’s study both 
investigate how non-SOEs respond to the loss of political connection, their study 
uses the sudden deaths of politically connected independent directors as the loss the 
political connection with only 92 identified firms (treatment group), while the 
present study takes advantage of the corruption case exposure and identify 557 
corruption related firms during the sample period. So, this study captures a larger 
and broader impact from the loss of political connection as losing political 
connection is triggered by the corruption scandal exposures. Furthermore, instead 
of examining the alternative strategy to maintain market competitiveness by 
increasing investment, the present study focuses on the firms’ effort to rebuild their 
political strategy by strategically responding to government signals. Another 
relevant study is conducted by Pan and Tian (2020), who also take advantage of 
corruption scandals in China to explore the changes in investment and efficiency 
after the loss of political connection. While their focus is on the investment 
expenditure and efficiency, our focus is on the possibility of firms to disclose more 
non-financial information after the corruption scandal exposure. The purpose is to 
explore whether CSR disclosure is a mechanism for firms to re-establish the 
political connection, rather than examine the impact of the loss of political 
connection on firms’ behaviour as in Pan and Tian (2020). 
 
The present study makes several contributions to the literature on both political 
connection and corporate social responsibility. Firstly, it provides new evidence on 
how firms respond to the loss of political connection. A growing number of recent 
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literature has focused on the consequence of losing the political connection, 
including having less financing access (Fan et al., 2008), declining investment 
opportunities (Pan and Tian, 2017), and losing market competitiveness in M&A 
markets (Liu et al., 2016). However, the strategic response of firms after the loss of 
political connection has received less attention. Kim (2018) examines listed U.S. 
firms, and finds that after the related politician surprisingly exits from Congress, 
firms will increase their capital expenditures, R&D spending, and patent creations. 
Similarly, Li and Cheng (2020) focus on the Chinese market, and achieve consistent 
results, indicating that the firms losing their political connection due to the sudden 
death of independent director will increase their physical capital expenditure by 
28%, which has a larger magnitude compared with Kim’s findings that show a 10% 
increase in the U.S. The study contributes to this line of research by examining the 
firms’ response to losing political connection due to corruption scandal exposure. 
The present study covers a broader scope of firms and highlights the alternative 
mechanism to rebuild political connections. Secondly, the present study also 
contributes to the research on corporate political strategy. While most studies have 
focused on the different mechanisms of corporate political strategy in the context 
of developed market (Hillman, 2003), studies focusing on emerging markets 
confine their scope of political strategy to political connection only, i.e. establishing 
connection with government through personal relationship with government 
officials (Fan et al., 2007; Berkman et al., 2010; Chen et al., 2011). The present 
study expands the scope of political strategy in emerging markets beyond political 
connection by proving that firms could establish political legitimacy through 
strategically responding to government signals. Specifically, the present study 
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examines whether firms are more likely to disclose their CSR report after losing 
their political connections to rebuild their political legitimacy.  
 
The following section presents the hypothesis development. Section 3 illustrates 
the methodology by introducing the sample, the key variables and the econometric 
models. Section 4 presents the empirical results and interpretations, and Section 5 
provides the concluding remarks.  
 
3.2 Hypothesis development 
Political capital is considered beneficial to firm value worldwide as governments 
normally control critical resources that impact the competitiveness of firms 
(Schuler and Rehbein, 1997). Studies have indicated that firms actively participate 
in managing their relationship with governmental actors to get access to bank loan 
(Cull and Xu, 2003), reduce cost of equity (Boubakri et al., 2012), and obtain 
government contracts (Amore and Bennedsen, 2013). Therefore, Chinese non-
SOEs have great incentive to establish political connection by offering bribery or 
hiring senior manager and board members having personal connection with 
government officials as they do not have an inborn relationship with the 
government. However, there is a possibility of losing the political connection due 
to the uncertainty of their connected officials’ government position (eg. arrested or 
under investigation due to the corruption scandal). Studies focusing on China find 
that the loss of political connection will have a detrimental effect on firms value 
due to declining external financing (Fan et. al., 2008), less investment opportunities 
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(Pan and Tian, 2017), and losing competitiveness in M&A market (Liu et al., 2016). 
Therefore, firms losing their political connection would endeavour to rebuild their 
political legitimacy with alternative ways to continually enjoy the benefits it could 
bring.  
 
Research on corporate political activities in developed countries finds that firms are 
more likely to engage in political strategies if the government takes an important 
role in firms’ immediate environment which could impact their essential business 
environment that include main stakeholders, eg. suppliers, customers, and even 
competitors (Schuler et al., 2002). However, scholars find that corporate political 
strategies are different in emerging countries where the governments have more 
power, and there is lack of sound legal and political infrastructure (Peng and Health, 
1996). Firms can strategically respond to government strategies to build political 
legitimacy and therefore enjoy favourable treatment to gain market competitiveness 
(Marquis and Qian, 2014).  
 
The awareness of CSR emerged in the US market back in the 1950s (Werbel and 
Carter, 2002), and KLD has ranked companies’ CSR performance since 1995 (Cai 
et al., 2011). However, it has only been about 10 years since the Chinese 
government recognised the necessity of encouraging CSR. Studies focusing on 
developed markets find that CSR initiatives could bring numerous benefits to firms, 
for example, easier access to external financing and reduced cost of capital (Cheng 
et al., 2014), higher productivity of employees and reduced employees’ turnover 
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(Roberts and Dowling, 2002), as well as better firm reputation and brand value 
(Menon and Kahn, 2003). Nevertheless, Chinese firms only started investing in 
CSR activity and accelerated the pace of CSR reporting after government advocacy. 
Moreover, unlike capitalist countries, the economic performance is not the only 
consideration for Chinese politician’s promotion; the determination and effort to 
align with central government strategy is very important. High level government 
officials also have the incentive to promote corporate social responsibility after the 
proposal of ‘harmonious society’ by former president Hu Jintao in 2005. For those 
firms who are eager to re-build political legitimacy after losing their political 
connection due to corruption scandals, CSR disclosure could be employed as a way 
to show their loyalty and obedience to the government in order to seek rent. 
Although there is a dramatic increase in the number of listed firms disclosing their 
CSR report, the quality of the reports is still quite low in terms of the international 
standards (UNPRI, 2019). Thus, although Chinese firms may follow government 
strategies regarding CSR, not all of them are doing so for the purpose of being 
socially responsible, but it may just be a symbolic move to respond to government 
signalling to gain political legitimacy. Therefore, the present study proposes that 
firms losing their political connection due to corruption scandal exposures relating 
to their connected government officials are more likely to use CSR disclosures as 
a way to rebuild their political legitimacy. By issuing CSR report, such firms create 
goodwill with government actors and therefore enjoy those resources that were 
previously available but lost due to the loss of political connection. Accordingly, 
the first hypothesis is as follows, 
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H1: Firms losing their political connections after the exposure of corruption 
scandals are more likely to issue CSR reports. 
 
The sheer volume of financial constraints literature has proved the profound impact 
of financial constraints on firms’ value in both developed and developing 
economies (Stein, 2003; Li et al. 2008; Poncet et al. 2010; Cull et al., 2015). It is 
well acknowledged that firms in emerging markets tend to face more severe 
financial constraints than those firms in developed economies, and financial 
constraint is claimed to be one of the biggest obstacles for firms’ development (Cull 
et al., 2015). Moreover, governments in developing countries are normally more 
powerful and play a vital role in allocating financial resources. Therefore, state-
owned enterprises (SOEs) and firms with political connections are given priority 
during the allocation process (Ayyagari et al., 2012). China has been criticised for 
its misallocation of credit, especially by the predominantly large banks which 
favour firms with government connections (Huang, 2003; Cull et al., 2015). Private 
firms in China are eager to build political legitimacy to mitigate the friction and 
enjoy the privileges in obtaining external financing and lower costs of capital. 
Therefore, firms losing their political connections due to the corruption exposure 
will lose their advantageous position for external financing. In order to maintain 
their competitive advantage, they are more likely to rebuild the legitimacy by 




H2a: After losing their political connections, firms with higher financial 
constraints are more likely to issue CSR reports. 
 
The regional disparities in China are prevalent as different provinces are in different 
stages of the transformation to a market-based economy from a centrally planned 
system. Marketisation Index produced by the National Economic Research Institute 
(NERI) (Fan et al., 2011) assesses five aspects21 of marketisation development in 
31 provinces in China. The province with high scores means that government 
intervention is relatively weak, resource allocation is more market-oriented, non-
SOEs occupy more market shares, and the legal environment is better, whereas the 
province with lower scores means the situation is the exact opposite (Wang et al., 
2007). Studies have indicated that non-SOEs have greater incentive to build 
political connections in regions in which market is less developed and the 
government has more power to allocate economic resources (Li et al., 2008; Chen 
et al., 2011). Therefore, once non-SOEs lose their political connections due to the 
exposure of corruption scandals, non-SOEs located in province with low 
marketisation have greater incentive to rebuild the political legitimacy by issuing 
CSR report to continually enjoy the rent seeking from government. Here is the next 
hypothesis. 
                                                          
21 The five aspects include government and market relationships, the development of non-SOEs, the 
development of the commodity market and factor markets, as well as market intermediaries and the 
legal environment for the market (Wang et al., 2007, p.33). 
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H2b: After losing their political connections, firms located in provinces with lower 
marketisation are more likely to issue CSR reports. 
 
Political connections could bring numerous benefits to the connected firms, for 
example receiving subsidies and bailout when facing financial distress (Faccio, 
2010), more external financing (Fan et al., 2008; Gropp et al., 2011), and more 
investment opportunities (Chen et al., 2009). These explicit and implicit favourable 
treatments provide a competitive advantage for corruption related firms compared 
with their counterparts in the same industry. For those industries with higher 
competition, losing political connection has a more detrimental effect on firms’ 
performance. It requires firms to keep their access to valuable resources to maintain 
their position if firms operate in an environment with fierce competition and small 
marginal advantage. Therefore, firms belonging to the industry with higher 
competition are more eager to rebuild the connections after losing their political 
connection due to scandal exposures to maintain the competitive advantage in the 
industry. Here is the next hypothesis. 
H2c: After losing their political connections, firms belonging to the industry with 
higher competition are more likely to issue CSR reports. 
 
3.3 Methodology 
3.3.1 The sample 
3.3.1.1 Corruption cases and corruption related firms 
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In order to test the hypotheses, corruption cases involving government officials at 
provincial or higher level investigated in the years 2009 to 2014 are collected 
manually. The cases are limited to those involving provincial or higher level 
bureaucrats as their exposure has had a more profound impact on the business sector 
and the information about them is well disclosed due to wide public concern. More 
importantly, using the cases of high-level corruption scandals mitigates the 
endogeneity problem in that the arrest of bureaucrats is directly associated with 
helping corruption related firms per se. All the cases exposed after the anti-
corruption campaign which started in December 2012 were obtained from the 
Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI) official website. The cases 
before December 2012 were identified from the Legal Section of Xinhua News 
website, which is a government-sponsored media. Additional corruption cases were 
extracted from two well-known websites: Sina (www.sina.com) and Baidu 
(www.baidu.com). Overall, there are 79 corruption cases involving provincial or 
higher-level bureaucrats identified from 2009 to 2014.  
 
Then two types of corruption related firms are identified, namely, ‘bribing firms’ 
and ‘connected firms’. For the cases that have legally effective judgements,  a copy 
of the verdicts was searched to identify whether any of the listed non-SOEs has 
been involved (senior managers or directors who have ever bribed the corrupt 
officials are mentioned in the verdicts). For other cases, the above-mentioned 
websites and other available sources for information disclosed about the corruption 
cases were searched to identify corruption related firms that have ever bribed the 
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corrupt officials. All the firms directly involved in corruption cases are called 
‘bribing firms’ in the present study. The present study covers another kind of related 
firm, not directly involved in corruption cases, but in which the senior managers or 
top 10 largest shareholders had working or educational affiliations with the corrupt 
bureaucrats. Such firms are called ‘connected firms’ in this study. To identify 
connected firms, the Curriculum Vitae of all the corrupt bureaucrats is matched 
with the information released by the CSMAR sub-database ‘CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE’.22 Bribing and connected firms combined are called ‘corruption 
related firms’, and the remaining firms are ‘unrelated firms’. 
 
3.3.1.2 Full sample 
Using the difference-in-difference method, instead of covering all the listed non-
SOEs on the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges, the full sample in the study 
only includes corruption related firms and their matching firms23 (unrelated firms) 
from 2010 to 2015 (our sample includes one year after the corruption scandal 
exposure to test the likelihood of disclosing CSR report after losing political 
connection), which gives a total of 3940 firm-year observations. Financial firms 
and firms with missing relevant data will be excluded from this study. All the 
                                                          
22 The sub-database of CSMAR, the China Listed Firm’s Corporate Governance Research Database, 
discloses information on the top 10 shareholders and senior managers detailing their previous 
working experience and educational background. 
23 I select matching firms using the propensity score matching method, and find those that are as 
close as possible to the ‘corruption related firms’ in terms of size, leverage, size, market to book 
ratio, and profitability (ROA). I also control for industry and year to find the matching firms.  
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financial data for this study comes from the China Stock Market & Accounting 
Research (CSMAR)24 database, which is the most widely used database for studies 
focusing on Chinese capital markets.  
 
3.3.2 Measurement of key variables 
3.3.2.1 Corruption 
Corruption related firms are defined as firms having connections with corrupt 
bureaucrats directly involved in corruption cases (bribing firms), or in which the 
senior managers or top 10 largest shareholders have working or educational 
affiliations with corrupt bureaucrats, but no involvement in the cases (connected 
firms). These corruption related firms (both bribing firms and connected firms) are 
indicated by a dummy variable ‘CORRUPTION’, which equals one if firms are 
corruption related firms. Furthermore, a dummy variable ‘POST’ will be 
introduced, which equals one for the post-event period, that is, for years following 
the exposure of related corruption cases. The interaction term ‘CORRUPT*POST’ 
(CORRUPTION*POST) is expected to capture the tendency of disclosing CSR 
report after the event, which is of most interest to the present study.  
 
3.3.2.2 CSR 
                                                          
24 Specifically, the data used for this study is collected from the following sub-databases of CSMAR: 
China Listed Corporate Governance Research Database; China Listed Company Shareholder 




The present study introduces a dummy valuable ‘CSR’ to capture whether the firm 
has CSR disclosure in the given year for the main test. For the robustness tests, all 
the mandatory CSR disclosure is deleted, and a continuous variable ‘CSR SCORE’ 
is introduced. ‘CSR SCORE’ is captured by the overall CSR scores from rating 
agency Runling (also called RKS: www.rksratings.cn). Like Kinder, Lydenberg, 
and Domini & Co., Inc. (KLD), Runling is an independent and leading rating 
agency in China. The scores are given based on firms’ CSR reports as well as other 
information like firms’ websites and media releases which aim to reflect firms’ 
actual CSR efforts as well as the substantiveness of their CSR reports (Marquis and 
Qian, 2014; Luo et al., 2017). Runling follows international standard ISO62000 and 
adapts to the Chinese context. Its scores are given from four dimensions: 
macrocosm, content, technique and industry25, with almost 80 subdimensions that 
cover firms’ CSR activities comprehensively. The score ranges from 0 to 100 with 
30% of macrocosm, 45% of content, 15% of technique and 10% of industry.  
 
3.3.3 Research design and econometric model 
                                                          
25  Macrocosm covers CSR strategy, corporate governance and related parties; Content covers 
economic performance, employment relations, human rights, environment, fair trading, customer 
and community; Technique covers areas related to the quality of the report itself; and Industry covers 
specific indicators for different industries. Compared with the seven qualitative issue areas of KLD 
(community, corporate governance, diversity, employment relation, environment, human rights and 
product), we can see that diversity and product are missing in Runling’s rating system, while CSR 
strategy, related parties, economic performance, fair trading and customer are emphasised by 
Runling. Due to the premature stage of CSR reporting in China, the technique dimension is included 
to evaluate the quality of the report per se. 
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The present study adopts a difference-in-difference estimation. To be specific, the 
break of connections between corrupt bureaucrats and corruption related firms due 
to corruption scandal exposures is the exogenous treatment. The ‘treatment group’ 
is corruption related firms (bribing firms and connected firms), and the propensity 
score matching method is used to find a ‘control group’. Matching firms that are as 
close as possible to the ‘treatment group’ in terms of size, leverage, market to book 
ratio, and profitability (ROA) are selected. Industry and year are also controlled to 
find the matching firms. By employing a DiD approach, the present study tries to 
minimize the biases in the post-period comparison between the treatment group and 
control group that could result from unobserved permanent differences between 
those groups, as well as the pre-existing trend over time in the treatment group.  
 
Logit model and the equation below is used as the baseline model to test the 
hypotheses: 
𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐸𝐸 = 𝛼𝛼0 + 𝛼𝛼1 × 𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛼𝛼2 × 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐼𝐼𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛼𝛼3 × 𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸
∗ 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐼𝐼𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛼𝛼4 × 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛼𝛼5 × 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐼𝐼 + 𝛼𝛼6
× 𝐼𝐼𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 + 𝜀𝜀 
 
In the equation, the dependent variable is the dummy variable ‘CSR’. The 
explanatory variable ‘CORRUPT*POST’ is the key concern, to capture the 
tendency of disclosing CSR report for the corruption related firms after the event. 
In addition to a series of control variables, a set of year and industry dummy 
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variables is included to control for the year and industry fixed effects. White’s 
(1980) heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors are used for all the tests. 
 
3.4 Empirical results 
3.4.1 Summary statistics 
Table 3.1 reports the summary statistics and univariate test for the key variables 
used in the present study. In the sample over the period from 2010 to 2015, 23% of 
listed firms disclose their CSR activities. The proportion of listed firms disclosing 
CSR activities increases significantly in contrast to the ratio reported by Marquis 
and Qian (2014). They find that only 16% of listed firms report their CSR 
performance from 2006 to 2009. This result is consistent with the impact of the 
signals sent from the government that promotes CSR reporting and activities. 
Furthermore, it shows that Chinese listed firms are stepping up the pace of their 
CSR activities, especially reporting. However, the quality of CSR reporting varies 
significantly. The average CSR score rated by Runling is 38 out of 100. The lowest 
and highest CSR scores are about 15 and 90, respectively. Thus, although Chinese 
firms appear to follow government signals regarding CSR reporting, it is clear that 
not all of them are doing so in a substantive way. The result implies that firms’ 
incentive to disclose CSR activities in China may not be to differentiate themselves 
from poor CSR performing firms. It could be that firms try to respond to 
government signal and build legitimacy with the government as a political strategy. 
In the matched sample, 61% of firms either directly bribe government officials 
involving in corruption scandals, or establish connection with related officials 
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through personal connection. The sample mean of tax is 1% of total assets and mean 
of government subsidy is about 12% of total profit. Firms hold much higher short 
term debt than long term debt. This is consistent with previous findings that long 
term debt financing is rare in China (Fan et al., 2008). The total operating expenses 
count 97% of total operating revenue.26 This result indicates the high operating cost 
among Chinese listed firms.  
For the univariate test, the possibility to disclose CSR report for corruption related 
firms is smaller than non-corruption related firm before the scandal exposure. 
However, the possibility to disclose CSR report for corruption related firms 
becomes significantly larger than non-corruption related firms which verifies our 
main results27. 
 
                                                          
26 I use the figures from CSMAR, total costs of enterprise during its operation divide by the sum of 
all income arising from operation business of the company. 
27 The univariate test is not as significant as our main test because of the omission of some important 
control variables.  
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Table 3.1 Summary statistics and univariate test 
This table presents the summary statistics for all the variables used and the univariate test of main dependent variables in the tests. Panel A 
shows the summary statistics, the number of observations, mean, median, standard deviation and values at 25% and 75% percentile of each 
variable. All the continuous variables are winsorised at 1% and 99% of the distribution. Panel B presents tests of differences in the main 
variables between related firms and non-related firms for both before and after the period of the event.  
Panel A: Summary statistics 
  No. Mean  Std dev. P25 P50 P75 
CSR 3940 0.23 0.42  -  -  -  
CSR SCORE 886 37.56 11.92 29.94 35.07 42.46 
TAX 3940 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 
SUBSIDY 3940 0.12 0.27 0.00 0.03 0.11 
S-DEBT 3940 0.11 0.12 0.00 0.07 0.17 
L-DEBT 3940 0.04 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.05 
T-DEBT 3940 0.15 0.14 0.02 0.12 0.24 
COST 3940 0.97 0.35 0.85 0.93 0.99 
CORRUPTION  3940 0.61 0.49 0.00 1.00 1.00 
BRIBING 3940 0.16 0.36 0.00 0.00 0.00 
CONNECTED 3940 0.53 0.50 0.00 1.00 1.00 
POST 3940 0.58 0.49 0.00 1.00 1.00 
SIZE 3940 20.85 1.46 19.97 20.84 21.68 
LEVERAGE 3940 0.44 0.24 0.25 0.44 0.60 
MB 3940 4.31 4.14 2.12 3.16 5.00 
ROA 3940 0.04 0.06 0.01 0.04 0.07 
GROWTH 3940 -0.25 3.93 -0.44 0.06 0.39 
ST 3940 0.06 0.23 0.00 0.00 0.00 
INDEPENDENT 3940 0.37 0.05 0.33 0.33 0.43 
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MONITOR 3940 0.55 0.86 0.02 0.16 0.69 
DUAL 3940 0.28 0.45 0.00 0.00 1.00 
 
Panel B: Univariate test 
  BEFORE AFTER 
 CORRUPTION NON-CORRUPTION DIFFERENCE CORRUPTION NON-CORRUPTION DIFFERENCE 
CSR  0.23 0.29 -0.06*** 0.23 0.19 0.04** 
TAX 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 
S-DEBT 0.11 0.11 0.00 0.10 0.12 -0.02*** 
L-DEBT 0.04 0.04 0.00 0.05 0.04 0.01** 
T-DEBT 0.16 0.15 0.01 0.14 0.16 -0.02*** 
COST 0.96 0.96 0.00 0.96 0.98 -0.02 
SIZE 20.83 20.85 -0.02 20.9 20.76 0.14** 
LEVERAGE 0.44 0.43 0.01 0.45 0.43 0.02* 
MB 4.52 4.90 -0.39* 4.33 3.69 0.65*** 
ROA 0.05 0.05 0.00 0.04 0.04 0.00 
GROWTH -0.11 -0.27 0.16 -0.26 -0.39 0.13 
ST 0.06 0.04 0.03** 0.06 0.06 0.00 
INDEPENDENT 0.37 0.37 0.01** 0.38 0.37 0.01*** 
MONITOR 0.60 0.56 0.04 0.56 0.44 0.12*** 




3.4.2 Results of regression analysis 
3.4.2.1 The impact of losing political connection on CSR disclosure 
Table 3.2 presents the main results of the study. Column 1 shows a significant and 
negative coefficient on ‘CORRUPTION’ for the likelihood of disclosing CSR 
activities. This result indicates that the treatment firms, corruption related firms, are 
less likely to disclose CSR report before losing their political connections than their 
counterparts. In contrast, the coefficient of ‘POST’ is significant and negative. This 
result shows that the benchmark firms, the control firms, are less likely to report 
their CSR activities than treatment firms, subsequent to the corruption scandals. 
More importantly, the interaction between ‘CORRUPTION’ and ‘POST’, 
‘CORRUPT*POST’, is statistically significant and positively correlated with the 
likelihood of CSR reporting. The result suggests that, compared to the control 
firms, corruption related firms experience an increase in CSR reporting after they 
lose their political connections due to the corruption scandals exposure. This result 
is consistent with the expectation and supports the hypothesis H1. In Column 2, 
those variables that may correlate with the CSR disclosure decisions are controlled 
to mitigate concerns regarding omitted variables. The coefficient of 
‘CORRUPT*POST’ is still positive and statistically significant at 1% significance 
level. To ensure the inferences made about the estimated coefficients are robust, 
the present study utilises bootstrapped standard errors in the logistic regression 
model in Column 3 by resampling the N units with replacement from the original 
sample of N units for 1000 times. The result is consistent with the previous findings, 
and the interaction term positively and significantly associates with the likelihood 
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of disclosing CSR report at 1 % level. In Column 4, as a further robustness check, 
the present study repeats the estimation by using a Probit model to ensure the results 
are not sensitive to the selection of the distributional assumption. The result is 
consistent and robust. The coefficient of ‘CORRUPT*POST’ is positive and 
statistically significant.  
 
To investigate the effect of losing connections with government officials on the 
CSR disclosure over time, the present study introduces seven event-year indicator 
variables: ‘BEFORE2’, ‘BEFORE1’, ‘EVENT YEAR’, ‘AFTER1’, ‘AFTER2’, 
‘AFTER3’ and ‘AFTER4.’ The dummy variable, BEFORE‘i’ (AFTER‘i’) equals 
1 if firm-year observations are i years prior to (after) the loss of connection with 
corrupt government officials. The ‘EVENT YEAR’ equals 1 for the year when a 
corruption scandal is exposed. The interactions between those event-year dummy 
variables with the ‘CORRUPTION’ are also included. If the loss of political 
connections with government officials incentivises corruption related firms to 
disclose CSR activities as a strategy to re-build the political connection and create 
legitimacy with government, it is expected to observe positive and significant 
coefficients of interaction terms between post-event-year and ‘CORRUPTION’, 
but insignificant coefficients of interactions between prior-event-year and 
‘CORRUPTION.’  Column 5 of Table 3.2 tabulates the results. The interaction 
terms between post-event-year indicators and ‘CORRUPTION’ are only significant 
and positively correlated to CSR report disclosure starting from 2 years after 
corruption scandal exposures. All the interaction terms between prior-event-year 
131 
 
and ‘CORRUPTION’ are statistically insignificant. This finding supports the 
argument that firms tend to re-establish their connections with the government by 
disclosing CSR activities and contributing to the long term goal of the Chinese 
Communist Party, ‘building a harmonious society’, two years after their connected 
officials are arrested. The insignificant interaction terms between prior-event-year 
and ‘CORRUPTION’ also support the parallel trend assumption underlying the 
DiD model by showing that the positive relationship between corruption and CSR 
disclosure does not exist before the event. The F-test also suggests that all the 
coefficients of these interaction terms are not significantly different from zero.28  
 
The coefficients of control variables are consistent with previous literature 
(Marquis and Qian, 2014; Luo et al., 2017). Larger firms (‘SIZE’), better performed 
firms (‘ROA’), high growth firms (‘GROWTH’) and firms having more 
independent directors (‘INDEPENDENT’) are more likely to disclose their CSR 
activities. However, higher debt financing reduces a firm’s incentive to disclose 
CSR activities which is shown by the negative coefficient of Leverage. 
Furthermore, special treated firms (‘ST’) are less likely to disclose CSR reporting.    
 
                                                          
28 The result is available on request from the author.  
132 
 
Table 3.2 The impact of corruption scandal on the likelihood of disclosure CSR report 
This table presents the results of the impact of losing political connection as a result of corruption scandal on CSR disclosure. Column (1) 
uses Logit model without any control variables, column (2) shows the result after controlling for other factors that may impact the likelihood 
of CSR disclosure. Column (3) shows the result using bootstrapped standard errors by resampling the N units with replacement from the 
original sample of N units for 1000 times. Column (4) shows the results conducted from Probit model, while Column (5) shows the impact 
of corruption on CSR disclosure over time. See Appendix 1 for variable definitions. *, **, *** represent significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% 
levels, respectively. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  CSR CSR CSR CSR CSR 
CORRUPTION -0.35* -0.52** -0.52*** -0.28*** -0.59** 
 (0.10) (0.04) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) 
POST -0.63*** -0.53*** -0.53*** -0.31***  
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  
CORRUPT*POST 0.58** 0.56** 0.56*** 0.32***  
 (0.02) (0.04) (0.01) (0.01)  
BEFORE2     -0.39 
 
    (0.18) 
BEFORE1     -0.51* 
 
    (0.08) 
EVENT YEAR     -0.63** 
 
    (0.02) 
AFTER1     -0.91*** 
 
    (0.00) 
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AFTER2     -1.10*** 
 
    (0.00) 
AFTER3     -1.29*** 
 
    (0.00) 
AFTER4     -1.30*** 
 
    (0.00) 
CORRUPTION×BEFORE2     -0.01 
 
    (0.99) 
CORRUPTION×BEFORE1     0.05 
 
    (0.88) 
CORRUPTION×EVENT YEAR     0.21 
 
    (0.50) 
CORRUPTION×AFTER1     0.53 
 
    (0.10) 
CORRUPTION×AFTER2     0.78** 
 
    (0.04) 
CORRUPTION×AFTER3     1.14** 
 
    (0.01) 
CORRUPTION×AFTER4     1.33*** 
 
    (0.01) 
SIZE  0.89*** 0.89*** 0.49*** 0.89*** 
 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
LEVERAGE  -1.17** -1.17*** -0.56*** -1.24*** 
 
 (0.04) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
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MB  0.04 0.04** 0.02** 0.04** 
 
 (0.18) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) 
ROA  5.41*** 5.41*** 2.88*** 5.11*** 
 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
GROWTH  0.03* 0.03* 0.02* 0.02* 
 
 (0.09) (0.08) (0.06) (0.10) 
ST  -1.13*** -1.13** -0.56*** -1.15*** 
 
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.00) (0.00) 
INDEPENDENT  1.86 1.86** 1.03** 1.91** 
 
 (0.19) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) 
MONITOR  0.04 0.04 0.03 0.04 
 
 (0.64) (0.36) (0.37) (0.48) 
DUAL  0.05 0.05 0.04 0.06 
 
 (0.77) (0.62) (0.49) (0.58) 
CONSTANT  0.37 -18.40*** -18.40*** -10.18*** -18.26*** 
 (0.48) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
INDUSTRY  YES YES YES YES YES 
YEAR YES YES YES YES YES 
N 3940 3940 3940 3940 3940 








3.4.2.2 The heterogeneous effect of losing political connections on CSR 
disclosure 
The results in the previous section indicate that firms are more likely to disclose 
their CSR report after losing their political connection which infers that CSR 
disclosure could become a strategy for firms to rebuild their political legitimacy. 
To mitigate the negative influence of losing political connection subsequent to the 
exposure of corruption scandals, firms have a strong incentive to disclose their CSR 
activities and comply with government CSR policies. This section explores the 
heterogeneous effect of losing political connections on CSR disclosure, namely 
whether the impact of losing political connections from corruption scandals on CSR 
disclosure is more pronounced in firms with greater needs of political capital. If the 
disclosure of CSR is driven by the loss of political connection, a greater likelihood 
of CSR reporting is expected for firms with higher demand of political connection 
and stronger incentive to maintain their competitive advantages. To investigate this 
argument, the present study analyses the conditional effects of losing political 
connections based on the firm’s level of financial constraints, the development of 
the local market and the level of industrial competition the firm faces.  
 
The present study first investigates whether the corruption related firms are more 
likely to disclose their CSR activities if they suffer from more severe financial 
constraints. Previous studies have already proved that CSR could significantly 
mitigate firms’ financial constraints (Dhaliwai et al., 2011; El Gohoul et al., 2011; 
Goss and Robert, 2011). For example, better socially responsible performers could 
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have lower bank call rate and longer loan term (Goss and Robert, 2011). As 
previously discussed, due to the less developed financial market and bank 
discrimination, private firms in China face severe financial constraint which 
significantly hampers their development. Connecting with local government can 
mitigate this friction and provide connected firms with privileges in access to the 
external financial market and lower costs of capital (Li et al., 2008; Cull et al., 
2015). Therefore, for those firms that eagerly to maintain the competitive 
advantage, it is expected that financially constrained firms are more likely to 
disclose CSR report and respond to government signal after losing connections with 
corrupted government officials.  
 
To test this hypothesis the KZ index from Kaplan and Zingales (1997) is used to 
measure the financial constraints. 29 Following Cheng et al. (2014), the present 
study averages the KZ index for each firm over the years before the corruption 
scandal is exposed (pre-corruption scandal period). Then the sample is split into 
two groups based on the median of the average KZ index. The firms are more (less) 
financially constrained if their averaged KZ index over the pre-corruption scandal 
period is higher (lower) than the median. The result is tabulated in Columns 1 and 
2 of Table 3.3. Column 1 (2) of Table 3.3 shows the results of firms who are more 
                                                          







+ 3.139𝐿𝐿𝐸𝐸𝐼𝐼𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑡 + 0.383𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡, where 
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1
 is cash flow over lagged assets; 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1
is cash 
dividends over lagged assets; 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1
 is cash balance over lagged assets; 𝐿𝐿𝐸𝐸𝐼𝐼𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑡is leverage; and 𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡is the market 
value of equity. 
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(less) financially constrained having averaged KZ index higher (lower) than the 
median. The interaction term, ‘CORRUPT*POST’, is only significant for firms that 
are more financially constrained. This finding is consistent with the expectation 
(H2a), and shows that the impact of corruption scandals on CSR disclosure is more 
pronounced in financially constrained firms. 
 
Secondly, it is expected that the impact of losing political connection on CSR 
disclosure is more pronounced for firms located in less developed provinces. 
Previous studies find that the value and influence of political capital are more 
pronounced in less developed regions (Li et al., 2008; Chen et al., 2011). Since the 
preferential treatments and comparative advantages are easier to obtain in areas 
with less developed financial system and more government intervention, firms in 
these areas would have a stronger intention to invest in political capital. Therefore, 
it is expected that the unexpected loss of political connections motivates affected 
firms to find substitutes for their lost political capital, especially in the province 
with a lower degree of marketisation.  
 
The present study employs the provincial level of marketisation index provided by 
the National Economic Research Institute (NERI) (Fan et al., 2011) to measure the 
extent of regional institutional development. It classifies the firms according to their 
location of headquarters and considers a firm’s location in a less developed 
province if its marketisation index is less than the median. Column 3 and 4 of Table 
3.3 present the results for those firms located in less developed provinces and 
138 
 
developed provinces, respectively. Consistent with the hypothesis 2b, the present 
study finds that the coefficient of the interaction term is only significant for those 
firms located in less developed provinces.  
 
Thirdly, the industry competition enhances a firm’s demand for re-building their 
political capital through CSR disclosure subsequent to the corruption scandals. As 
previously discussed, industry competition tends to drive down firms’ profits to a 
normal rate of return. However, those preferential treatments arising from political 
connections, such as grants, subsidies and favourable contract from the 
government, enable firms to better survive in a competitive environment. By 
disclosing CSR report, the firms could strategically respond to the government 
signal, and at the same time attract public attention and improve their reputation. 
The disclosure itself is less costly compared with CSR investment like donations 
and environmental friendly production which is more likely to be adopted by firms 
belonging to industries with high competition that values cost saving. Therefore, to 
maintain their competitive advantages, firms belonging to a higher level of 
competition industry are hypothesised to have a stronger incentive to re-build their 
political legitimacy by disclosing their CSR report to respond to government 
advocacy.  
 
To test the argument, the present study measures the level of industry competition 
by using the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI). The HHI is a well-accepted 
measurement of industry competition in economics. It is calculated by squaring the 
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market share of each firm competing in an industry and then summing the resulting 
numbers. A higher (lower) HHI represents low (high) competition. Following 
Zhang et al. (2010), the present study defines a firm as being in high competition 
industry if the HHI is less than 0.1. The results are presented in Columns 5 and 6 
of Table 3.3. The interaction term, CORRUPT*POST, is significant and positively 
correlated with the likelihood of reporting CSR activities among the high industry 
competition subsample, while it is insignificant in firms among low competition 
industries. This finding supports the hypothesis H2c that higher level of industry 
competition incentivises firm to disclose CSR report for maintaining their political 
legitimacy after the corruption scandal exposure.  
 
Overall the results in Table 3.3 support the hypotheses H2a, H2b and H2c and are 
consistent with the argument that the impact of losing political connections on 
firms’ incentive to disclose CSR report is more pronounced for the firms with 
greater demand in political capital, namely financially constrained firms, firms 
locating in less developed provinces, and firms in highly competitive industries.    
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Table 3.3 The conditional effect of corruption scandal on CSR disclosure 
This table investigates whether the impact of the corruption scandal on CSR disclosure is more pronounced with firms that have a 
greater demand for political connections. See Appendix 1 for variable definitions. *, **, *** represent significance at the 10%, 5% and 
1% levels, respectively. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 












  CSR CSR CSR CSR CSR CSR 
CORRUPTION -0.84** -0.16 -0.67** -0.31 -0.62** 0.17 
 (0.04) (0.62) (0.04) (0.41) (0.02) (0.76) 
POST -0.62*** -0.31 -0.54** -0.34 -0.69*** 0.27 
 (0.01) (0.16) (0.01) (0.13) (0.00) (0.52) 
CORRUPTION×P
OST 0.92** 0.12 1.09*** -0.19 0.70** -0.12 
 (0.02) (0.76) (0.00) (0.64) (0.02) (0.86) 
SIZE 0.86*** 0.86*** 0.87*** 0.97*** 0.81*** 1.35*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
LEVERAGE -1.40* -0.55 -1.38* -1.13 -0.84 -2.74** 
 (0.07) (0.55) (0.09) (0.20) (0.18) (0.03) 
MB 0.04 0.03 0.01 0.06 0.00 0.13*** 
 (0.28) (0.54) (0.71) (0.24) (0.92) (0.01) 
ROA 3.66 6.84*** 2.48 9.82*** 6.49*** 3.90 
 (0.15) (0.01) (0.26) (0.00) (0.00) (0.20) 
GROWTH 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.04* 0.03 0.01 
 (0.23) (0.19) (0.25) (0.08) (0.11) (0.69) 
ST -1.02** -1.08* -1.26** -1.40* -1.18** -1.24 
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 (0.04) (0.08) (0.02) (0.10) (0.02) (0.19) 
INDEPENDENT 2.88 0.90 4.26** -1.68 2.00 0.91 
 (0.13) (0.70) (0.04) (0.44) (0.22) (0.76) 
MONITOR 0.01 0.08 0.22 0.06 0.00 0.27 
 (0.94) (0.58) (0.12) (0.65) (0.98) (0.23) 
DUAL 0.17 -0.06 0.05 0.17 0.15 -0.57 
 (0.50) (0.82) (0.86) (0.51) (0.44) (0.14) 
CONSTANT -17.67*** -18.10*** -18.67*** -19.99*** -18.64*** -28.12*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
INDUSTRY YES YES YES YES YES YES 
YEAR YES YES YES YES YES YES 
N 2149 1791 1847 2093 3137 803 





3.4.2.3 The channel through which losing political connection influences a 
firm’s CSR disclosure  
This section explores the potential mechanisms through which the loss of political 
connections influences firms’ CSR disclosure decisions. Studies find that 
politically connected firms receive various benefits from local governments 
including better access to the financial market, receiving direct government 
support, and favourable tax treatment (Zhang et al., 2010; Wu et al., 2012; Cull et 
al., 2015). These benefits significantly reduce the firms’ operational costs and help 
them to maintain competitive advantages compared to their counterparts. If 
politically connected firms unexpectedly lose their connection with local 
government officials subsequent to the exposure of the corruption scandal, the 
economic benefits they receive will be reduced, which consequently increases the 
overall cost of operations. The present study hypothesises that in order to maintain 
their competitive advantages in the market those affected firms would try to re-
build their political legitimacy through disclosing CSR activities and complying 
with government new regulation.  
 
Inspired by Li and Cheng (2020), the present study employs three steps to verify 
the channel. First, it investigates whether the exposure of corruption scandals 
reduces the economic benefits received by those politically connected firms. 
Second, it analyses whether the reduction of economic benefits increases the overall 
cost of operation. Finally, it examines whether the increased cost of operation 
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incentivises firms to disclose their CSR report after losing their connection with 
government officials. Tables 3.4, 3.5 and 3.6 present the results.  
 
Consistent with the prediction, as shown in Table 3.4, in contrast to their 
counterparts, corruption related firms receive significantly lower government 
subsidies, less short term debt and higher tax subsequent to the exposure of 
corruption scandals30. In addition, I find that the coefficient of ‘CORRUPT*POST’ 
is insignificant for the long term debt presented in Column 4 of Table 3.4. This 
result indicates that connecting with government officials mainly enables firms to 
raise more short term debt than long term debt.  
 
                                                          




Table 3.4 The impact of corruption scandal on economic benefits 
This table presents the impact of losing political connection from a corruption scandal on the firm’s ability to access economic benefits. See 
Appendix 1 for variable definitions. *, **, *** represent significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  TAX SUBSIDY  S-DEBT L-DEBT T-DEBT 
CORRUPTION -0.00* 0.01 0.00 -0.00 0.00 
 (0.05) (0.41) (0.63) (0.98) (0.66) 
POST -0.00 0.02 0.02** -0.00 0.01* 
 (0.38) (0.14) (0.01) (0.41) (0.08) 
CORRUPT*POST 0.01 -0.06*** -0.03** 0.01 -0.02* 
 (0.15) (0.01) (0.01) (0.23) (0.10) 
SIZE 0.00*** 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (0.01) (0.22) (0.19) (0.70) (0.38) 
LEVERAGE -0.00 0.02 0.23*** 0.06*** 0.30*** 
 (0.14) (0.46) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
MB 0.00*** -0.00 0.00 -0.00** -0.00 
 (0.00) (0.35) (0.48) (0.02) (0.64) 
ROA 0.07*** -0.77*** -0.20*** 0.02 -0.17*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.44) (0.01) 
GROWTH -0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 
 (0.19) (0.72) (0.37) (0.78) (0.50) 
ST -0.00 0.01 -0.03*** -0.01 -0.04*** 
 (0.58) (0.70) (0.00) (0.46) (0.01) 
INDEPENDENT 0.00 0.02 -0.02 0.06** 0.04 
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 (0.47) (0.80) (0.71) (0.05) (0.45) 
MONITOR 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00** -0.01** 
 (0.92) (0.46) (0.17) (0.03) (0.03) 
DUAL -0.00 -0.02 0.01* -0.00 0.01 
 (0.13) (0.11) (0.08) (0.55) (0.30) 
CONSTANT -0.01** 0.11 -0.01 -0.00 0.01 
 (0.04) (0.27) (0.91) (0.95) (0.94) 
INDUSTRY YES YES YES YES YES 
YEAR YES YES YES YES YES 
N 3940 3940 3940 3940 3940 
adj. R-sq 0.22 0.12 0.30 0.26 0.33 
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Table 3.5 shows the results on whether those reduced economic benefits increase 
the operational costs. As shown in the column (1), ‘TAX’ is significantly positive 
on operational cost, while ‘SUBSIDY’ and total debt (‘T-DEBT’) significantly 
reduce the cost of production. However, after all those variables are included, the 
negative impact of ‘SUBSIDY’ on operational cost becomes insignificant.  
 
Finally, the present study investigates whether a firm has a stronger incentive to 
disclose CSR report when facing a greater cost of operation, subsequent to the 
corruption scandals. The results are presented in Table 3.6. As shown in columns 
(1) and (2), coefficients on the variable ‘COST’ are negative, consistent with the 
common wisdom that an increase in operational costs reduces the profits that could 
be used for CSR activity and reporting. However, the coefficient on the interaction 
term, ‘CORRUPT*COST’, is only significantly positive for the period after the 
exposure of corruption scandals, and its magnitude is greater than that of the 
variable ‘COST’. The results show that a rise in operational cost restrains the ability 
to disclose CSR report for an average firm, and firms losing their political 
connections are more likely to disclose their CSR report to strategically respond to 
government advocacy.  
 
Overall, the results in Tables 3.4, 3.5 and 3.6 are consistent with the expectation. 
They indicate that the loss of political connection reduces the economic benefits 
obtained by corruption related firms, which in turn increases their costs of 
operations. The results are consistent with the view that as a strategic response to 
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the unexpected loss of political capital, firms tend to align their CSR policies with 
the goal of government, and are incentivised to disclose their CSR report even with 




Table 3.5 The impact of economic benefits on production costs 
This table presents the impact of the economic benefits of being related on 
operational costs. See Appendix 1 for variable definitions. *, **, *** represent 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  COST COST COST COST 
CORRUPTION 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 
 (0.41) (0.41) (0.36) (0.38) 
POST 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
 (0.69) (0.71) (0.52) (0.52) 
CORRUPT*POST -0.04 -0.04 -0.04* -0.04 
 (0.13) (0.11) (0.07) (0.11) 
TAX 3.04***   2.60** 
 (0.00)   (0.01) 
SUBSIDY   -0.03*  -0.00 
  (0.08)  (0.90) 
T-DEBT   -0.26*** -0.24*** 
   (0.00) (0.01) 
SIZE -0.09*** -0.09*** -0.09*** -0.09*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
LEVERAGE 0.41*** 0.40*** 0.50*** 0.50*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
MB -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.40) (0.56) (0.47) (0.35) 
ROA -2.08*** -1.81*** -1.86*** -2.09*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
GROWTH -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
ST 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02 
 (0.50) (0.47) (0.61) (0.61) 
INDEPENDENT -0.10 -0.11 -0.11 -0.10 
 (0.32) (0.31) (0.29) (0.32) 
MONITOR -0.01 -0.01 -0.01* -0.01* 
 (0.16) (0.15) (0.09) (0.09) 
DUAL  -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
 (0.46) (0.33) (0.41) (0.50) 
CONSTANT 2.70*** 2.70*** 2.69*** 2.69*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
INDUSTRY YES YES YES YES 
YEAR YES YES YES YES 
N 3940 3940 3940 3940 
adj. R-sq 0.41 0.40 0.41 0.42 
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Table 3.6 The impact of the corruption scandal and operational costs on the 
likelihood of disclosure CSR report 
This table presents the impact of being related to corrupt government officials and 
operational costs on the likelihood of disclosing CSR report. See Appendix 1 for 
variable definitions. *, **, *** represent significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, 
respectively. 
  (1) (2) 
 POST = 0 POST = 1 
  CSR CSR 
CORRUPTION  1.49 -2.23** 
 (0.31) (0.04) 
COST -1.63 -1.93** 
 (0.27) (0.05) 
CORRUPTION×COST -2.29 2.45** 
 (0.18) (0.04) 
SIZE 0.83*** 0.96*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
LEVERAGE -0.66 -1.30*** 
 (0.37) (0.01) 
MB 0.06* 0.01 
 (0.06) (0.72) 
ROA 1.73 5.03** 
 (0.52) (0.01) 
GROWTH 0.02 0.03 
 (0.34) (0.21) 
ST -1.37** -0.96* 
 (0.03) (0.06) 
INDEPENDENT -0.12 3.77*** 
 (0.95) (0.00) 
MONITOR 0.10 -0.06 
 (0.41) (0.40) 
DUAL  -0.01 0.06 
 (0.95) (0.68) 
CONSTANT -14.97*** -19.24*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
INDUSTRY YES YES 
YEAR YES YES 
N 1647 2293 





3.4.2.4 Robustness tests 
A series of tests are performed to check the robustness of the results, and the results 
are presented in Table 3.7. Firstly, Column 1 shows the results after deleting 
mandatorily disclosed firms. In 2008, the SSE and the SZSE issue the ‘Notice 
concerning listed companies preparation for 2008 annual reports’. This notice 
mandates a subset of firms to issue CSR reports along with their 2008 annual 
reports. This new regulation significantly reshapes the CSR disclosure practice 
among Chinese listed firms, and may be confound with the influence of losing 
political connection on the firms’ incentive to report their CSR activities. 
Therefore, the observed relationship between the loss of political connection and 
CSR disclosure could be driven by this mandate if corruption related firms are also 
more likely to be subject to this new regulation. To rule out this potential concern, 
the firms that are mandated to disclose their CSR activities over the sample period 
are excluded and the result is tabulated in Column 1 of Table 3.7. The result still 
holds.  
 
Secondly, although the present study has provided evidence on the positive 
relationship between the loss of political connection and CSR disclosure, it is 
possible that the results are dominated by the bribing firms which means it is due 
to the corruption scandal per se instead of the loss of political connection. In other 
words, firms only choose to disclose their CSR report if they are directly related to 
the corruption scandal. To test this alternative explanation, the impact among 
bribing firms and connected firms is examined separately. The results in column 
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(2) and (3) indicate that the coefficients of ‘CORRUPT*POST’ are significantly 
positive among both bribing and connected firms which rules out the impact of 
corruption scandal per se. 
 
Finally, the results could be driven by reputation concerns. To mitigate the damage 
of reputation due to corruption scandals, corruption related firms may have the 
incentive to invest substantively in CSR activities and communicate their effort to 
the public. So, the possibility is that the increased likelihood to disclose CSR report 
is the result of better CSR performance, rather than re-establishing political 
legitimacy. To mitigate this concern, whether the loss of political connection leads 
to better CSR performance is investigated. If this alternative interpretation holds, it 
means that corruption related firms have significantly better CSR performance than 
their counterparts subsequent to the exposure of corruption scandals. The results 
are presented in Column 4 of Table 3.7 where the dependent variable is CSR score. 
The coefficient of ‘CORRUPT*POST’ is not significantly positive. This result 
supports the argument that corruption related firms strategically employ CSR 
disclosure to gain political legitimacy from the government, rather than repair their 
reputation due to the exposure of corruption scandals. Overall, the results in Table 
3.7 are consistent with the main argument and rule out some possible alternative 





Table 3.7 Robustness tests 
This table presents the robustness tests for the impact of corruption scandal on CSR 
disclosure/ CSR performance). See Appendix 1 for variable definitions. *, **, *** 
represent significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  CSR CSR CSR CSR SCORE 
CORRUPTION  -0.97***   2.17 
 (0.00)   (0.19) 
POST -0.70*** -0.60*** -0.30*** -0.99 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.33) 
CORRUPTION×POST  0.89**   2.01 
 (0.02)   (0.30) 
CONNECTED   -0.50***   
  (0.00)   
CONNECTED×POST  0.50**   
  (0.03)   
BRIBING    -0.42*  
   (0.10)  
BRIBING×POST   0.81***  
   (0.01)  
SIZE 0.50*** 0.89*** 0.87*** 2.77*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
LEVERAGE -0.55 -1.06*** -1.13*** -2.19 
 (0.39) (0.00) (0.00) (0.64) 
MB -0.02 0.01 0.03* -0.01 
 (0.48) (0.66) (0.06) (0.96) 
ROA 5.44** 7.10*** 5.63*** -19.23 
 (0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.12) 
GROWTH 0.05*** 0.02 0.02* 0.12 
 (0.01) (0.14) (0.09) (0.37) 
ST -0.41 -0.90** -1.14*** 1.58 
 (0.28) (0.01) (0.00) (0.59) 
INDEPENDENT 3.52* 1.33 1.68** 0.24 
 (0.07) (0.15) (0.04) (0.98) 
MONITOR 0.12 0.02 0.04 0.71 
 (0.29) (0.76) (0.41) (0.38) 
DUAL 0.18 0.07 0.04 0.88 
 (0.44) (0.53) (0.67) (0.52) 
CONSTANT -11.37*** -18.19*** -18.24*** -30.81** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.03) 
INDUSTRY  YES YES YES YES 
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YEAR YES YES YES YES 
N 3159 3940 3940 886 





Taking advantage of high profile corruption scandal exposures, the present study 
uses the sample of Chinese listed non-SOEs that disclose their CSR reports during 
the period of 2010 to 2015 and their matching firms to examine the impact of losing 
political connection on the likelihood of disclosing CSR report. The results show 
that firms are more likely to respond to government signals to re-build their political 
legitimacy by disclosing their CSR report after losing their political connections. 
Moreover, the results show that the impact is more pronounced among firms having 
a greater demand for political capital, namely firms having severe financial 
constraints, firms locating in provinces with low marketisation and firms belonging 
to the industry with high competition. It also explores the channel through which 
losing political connection affects CSR disclosure, and finds that corruption related 
firms are motivated to disclose their CSR report as an alternative political strategy 
despite the increased operational costs after losing the economic benefits enjoyed 
due to the pre-existing political connections. 
 
Overall, the present study adds new evidence on the firm’s political strategy, 
namely their responses after they lose their political connections. Although there 
are numerous benefits political connection can bring to the firms, there is a risk of 
losing it considering its illegitimate nature. Therefore, firms are motivated to take 
an alternative approach to build political legitimacy. In the context of China, the 
results suggest that firms strategically respond to the government’s advocacy of 
being socially responsible to seek rent instead of contributing to the external 
155 
 
stakeholders. These findings have implications for the government that it should 
closely monitor the CSR performance of the firms to recognise a symbolic move 






Chapter 4: Mandatory CSR Disclosure and CEO Pay Performance 
Sensitivity: Evidence from a quasi-natural experiment in China 
 
4.1 Introduction 
Corporate social responsibility (CSR) has become an important corporate topic 
over the last decades. For example, Fortune Global 500 companies spend an 
average of 19.9 billion US dollars annually on activities associated with CSR 
between the years of 2011 and 2013 (EPG, 2015). Meanwhile, there is an inevitable 
trend that companies endeavour to communicate their sustainability efforts and 
CSR achievements to the public. The trend largely manifests itself in terms of 
voluntary disclosure by individual companies, but in some cases the disclosure is 
mandatory due to regulations. As a mechanism to communicate CSR engagement 
to the public, mandatory CSR disclosure is different from voluntary CSR 
disclosure. First, voluntary disclosure is a choice made by firms, who always 
maximize their interests when making their choice. As such, firms may only select 
those disclosures to their benefits/advantages. However, mandatory disclosure is 
not a choice made by firms; those firms subject to the mandate have no choice but 
to respond passively to the disclosure requirements imposed by the authority, even 
though some disclosure may reveal information that they may not want to reveal. 
Second, on an ex ante basis, it is not clear whether and how mandatory disclosure 
might affect companies. On the one hand, the increased information transparency 
arising from mandatory disclosure provides incentives for firms to engage more 
actively in socially responsible activities in future. On the other hand, different from 
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voluntary initiatives, mandatory disclosure may just be a symbolic action or gesture 
firms take in response to government requirements, especially when there is an 
absence of specific disclosure guidelines and assurance of the adoption as is the 
case in China. Therefore, it is interesting to investigate whether and how mandatory 
CSR has an impact on firms’ behaviour. 
 
There are primarily two competing arguments for or against corporate social 
responsibility. The first argument is based on agency theory emphasising 
shareholder wealth maximisation. Friedman (1970) argues that the responsibility 
of managers is to maximise shareholder wealth, and any actions that go beyond for 
social good is simply a manifestation of the agency problem, i.e. managers use 
corporate resources for CSR activities to accomplish his own values or agendas at 
the expense of shareholder wealth.  In line with this argument, Barnea and Rubin 
(2010), and Masulis and Reza (2015) further show that managers tend to overinvest 
in CSR activities for the purposes of improving personal reputation and maintaining 
social networks, which consequently decreases firm value and sacrifices 
shareholders’ interests. On the contrary, Freeman (1984) proposes the stakeholder 
theory contending that managers should consider the interests of various 
stakeholders because the long-term survival and prosper of the firm cannot continue 
without the support of stakeholders. Specifically, CSR could help firm reduce cost 
of capital and get access to finance (El Gohoul et al., 2011; Cheng et al., 2014), 
improve employee productivity, attract and retain talents (Greening and Turban, 
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2000; Roberts and Dowling, 2002), and enhance brand value and firm reputation 
(Menon and Kahn, 2003; Linthicum et al., 2010).  
 
In this study, I take advantage of the mandatory requirement of CSR disclosure for 
a group of Chinese listed firms in 2008 to examine the impact of mandatory CSR 
disclosure on CEO pay performance sensitivity to shed some light on the debate. 
This mandatory requirement did not apply to all but a selected group of listed firms, 
specifically to firms that belong to ‘Corporate Governance Sector’, firms that listed 
shares overseas, and firms in the financial sector listed on Shanghai Stock 
Exchange, as well as those belonging to ‘Shenzhen 100 Index’ on Shenzhen Stock 
Exchange, creating an ideal situation where both selected group (treatment group) 
and non-selected group (control group) can be clearly identified, allowing this study 
to apply Difference-in Difference (DiD) methodology to identify the causal 
relationship between CSR disclosure and CEO pay-performance sensitivity. 
Specifically, the question of whether mandatory CSR could bring benefit to a firm 
by aligning CEO compensation with firm performance is addressed. It is 
noteworthy that the mandate is about CSR disclosure, which does not necessarily 
require firms to invest in CSR real activities. Following Chen et al. (2018), it is 
posited that mandatory disclosure could impact firm’s CSR activities because the 
increased transparency could facilitate government and other interested groups to 
understand disclosure firms’ CSR engagement, so the interested groups could either 




CEO compensation has a significant economic impact on shareholders and the 
economy (Bebchuk and Fried, 2005), and the sky-high compensation of CEO has 
attracted a lot of attention and public anger. According to Focke et al. (2017), the 
ratio of aggregate top-five executives pay to corporate net income in the US 
between 1992 and 2010 is about 10%. Under the optimal contracting hypothesis, 
boards are supposed to design CEO compensation with efficient incentives to 
address the agency problems and maximise shareholder wealth, but it is challenged 
by more recent studies claiming that agency problem is to some extent inherent to 
CEO compensation (Bebchuk and Fried, 2005; Amzaleg et al., 2014). Under the 
managerial power hypothesis, a substantial studies have shown that CEOs have 
higher compensation when they have more power in the firm which becomes a 
considerable cost to the firm (Core et al., 1999; Li et al., 2008; Conyon and He, 
2016). In this study, the impact of CSR on CEO pay performance sensitivity is 
investigated instead of CEO pay itself because the evidence on the relationship 
between CSR and CEO pay alone is not sufficient to conclude whether CSR is 
beneficial to the firm (i.e. shareholders) or CEO only. The positive impact of CSR 
on CEO pay may be due to either the increased firm performance because of CSR 
engagement (thus increasing CEO pay as a result of better financial performance), 
or CEO taking advantage of CSR to gain personal benefit. The negative impact of 
CSR on CEO pay could be due to either decreased financial performance as CSR 
becomes an excess cost (then decreasing CEO pay as a result of worse financial 
performance), or due to better aligning CEO pay and firm performance by 




China offers a good laboratory setting for the study on the impact of mandatory 
CSR disclosure. In December 2008, the Shanghai Stock Exchange (SSE) 
announced that those firms that belong to ‘Corporate Governance Sector’, firms 
that were listed overseas, and firms in the financial sector should disclose their CSR 
report along with their annual report from 2008. Later, the Shenzhen Stock 
Exchange (SZSE) applied the same policy to those firms that belong to ‘Shenzhen 
100 Index’. While the vast majority of the CSR disclosure around the world is 
initiated voluntarily by companies, only a small number of countries have made 
CSR disclosure mandatory. Although the mandatory CSR disclosure has been 
examined in other countries, the setting in China is interesting and unique in several 
ways. First, compared with Denmark and South Africa that CSR report has been 
widespread before the mandatory regulation (Ioannou and Serafeim, 2017), there 
were only a few voluntary disclosures in the Chinese market before the 2008 
mandate, suggesting that Chinese firms are less likely to disclose their CSR report 
for other reasons (e.g. peer pressure effect) besides mandatory requirement. 
Second, the number of firms that are subject to the mandate in China is much larger 
and more representative compared to Finland and Sweden where the sample covers 
only state-owned enterprises. Specifically, ‘Corporate Governance Sector’ listed 
on SSE includes 230 listed firms with the best governance practice, and ‘Shenzhen 
100 Index’ has the top 100 listed companies according to total market capitalisation 
(Chen et al., 2018). Second, as mentioned earlier, the 2008 mandate in China did 
not specify the disclosure requirements clearly, leaving firms with some 
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opportunities to manipulate their disclosure. It would be interesting to see if 
mandatory disclosure of this kind is still effective. Third, China has long been 
criticised for weak corporate governance and inadequate disclosure and 
transparency. As an important non-financial disclosure, CSR report is supposed to 
provide information on economic, environmental, social and governance 
performance. Although critics argue that mandatory disclosure is lack of credibility 
and relevance, and therefore conveys little information in a developed country 
setting where there is no shortage of voluntary disclosures (Owen et al., 2001; Hess, 
2007), it is worthwhile exploring whether mandatory CSR disclosure could 
complement other information to increase the transparency of the firm in the 
context of China.  
 
Using a sample of Chinese listed firms during the period from 2005 to 2012, 
difference-in-difference (DiD) approach is adopted to examine the impact of 
mandatory CSR disclosure on CEO pay performance sensitivity. Using 2005 to 
2008 as pre-mandate period, and 2009 to 2012 as post-mandate period (four years 
prior to and four years after the adoption of the mandate, respectively), the result 
shows that CEO pay performance sensitivity has increased significantly among 
firms that are mandatorily required to disclose their CSR report after adopting the 
mandate. 
 
In order to explore the channels through which mandatory CSR disclosure affects 
CEO pay performance sensitivity, the sample is split according to whether CEOs 
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take dual roles as both CEO and chair of the board, whether CEOs are politically 
connected, and whether CEOs’ tenure is longer because these dimensions reveal 
the relative power of CEOs. The results show that the positive relationship between 
mandatory CSR disclosure and CEO pay performance sensitivity is more 
pronounced in sub-samples of CEOs having dual roles, and/or CEOs with political 
connections, and/or CEOs having longer tenure in the firm. The sample is also split 
into SOEs and non-SOEs. The result shows that the positive impact of CSR on CEO 
pay performance sensitivity is only significant among SOEs. As the conflict of 
interests between managers and shareholders is more severe among SOEs, the 
increased alignment between CEO pay and firm performance due to mandatory 
CSR disclosure would be more profound among SOEs. Overall, the above results 
suggest that the incremental information from the CSR report offers an opportunity 
to better supervise CEOs’ power, and therefore mitigates agency problems. 
 
While a number of extant studies have explored the relationship between CSR and 
CEO pay, this study is different from theirs in the following ways. First, most of 
these studies focus on the U.S. markets (Cai et al., 2011; Jian and Lee, 2015; Karim 
et al., 2015; Hong et al., 2018; Mo et al., 2018; Ongsakul et al., 2019), while the 
focus of this study is on the Chinese market. The awareness of CSR emerged in the 
US market back in the 1950s (Werbel and Carter, 2002), and KLD has ranked 
companies’ CSR performance since 1991 (Cai et al., 2011). However, it has been 
almost 20 years later that the Chinese government first recognised the necessity of 
encouraging CSR in 2008. After that, they started to develop the framework of CSR 
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reporting. This indicates that CSR development is under very different stages 
between the US and China. Moreover, CSR reporting or disclosure in the US 
market is generally voluntary, while the CSR reporting or disclosure is largely 
advocated and mandatorily required by authorities in China. Thus, this present 
study complements the literature by focusing on an emerging market that has 
institutional environment different from that of the US. In other words, the different 
stage of CSR development in China, as well as the mandatory nature of CSR 
disclosure, distinguishes this study from the previous studies. Second, although 
previous literature has examined the relationship between CSR and CEO pay itself 
(Cai et al., 2011; Karim et al., 2015; Jian and Lee, 2015), their results cannot 
conclude whether CSR could benefit the firm or CEO only as the increased 
(decreased) CEO pay could be either because of the increased (decreased) financial 
performance as a result of CSR or CEO taking advantage to gain personal benefit 
(excess CEO power having been constrained)31. This present study examines the 
impact of CSR on CEO pay performance sensitivity instead to show whether CSR 
could align the interests of managers and shareholders to benefit the firm in general.  
 
                                                          
31Exceptions include Miles and Miles (2013) and Mo et al., (2018). But these studies are either with 
econometric problems or with a different research focus. The results from Miles and Miles (2013) 
are not convincing because they treat firms’ financial performance and CEO pay as dependent 
variables in two separate regression models without controlling for the possibility that firm 
performance and CEO pay are simultaneously determined. As such, their results may be simply 
subject to simultaneity bias. Moreover, they examine the impact of CSR and firm performance on 
CEO pay separately without considering the interaction effect between CSR and CEO Pay. 
Although Mo et al. (2018) have examined the impact of CSR on CEO pay performance sensitivity, 
their research focus is the impact of CSR on downward stickiness in CEO compensation. 
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A paper closely related to this study is Chang et al (2018). Using a sample of listed 
firms in the Shanghai Stock Exchange from 2009 to 2013, Chang et al. (2018) 
mainly examine the impact of CSR on firm performance. They also examine the 
impact of CSR on the top management team’s pay performance sensitivity as a 
further test to support their main findings. The authors use SSE (Shanghai Stock 
Exchange) Social Responsibility Index that covers top 100 good CSR firms each 
year as the proxy for CSR. Note that this index only considers top 100 CSR 
performers, meaning that a large number of good CSR performers listed on 
Shenzhen Stock Exchange are not included in the analysis, and their sample does 
not distinguish between mandatory disclosure and voluntary disclosure. In addition, 
the SSE social responsibility Index is based on ‘social contribution value per share’, 
which is disclosed voluntarily by listed firms. As such, the index is likely subject 
to the self-selection bias problem as firms may choose (not) to disclose CSR 
information voluntarily at good (bad) times. Moreover, Hong and Jin (2014) point 
out some potential data quality issue with the index such as lack of consistency in 
the calculation of ‘social contribution value per share’, and lack of supervision of 
the disclosure, etc.   
 
This study contributes to the literature in several ways. First, while prior studies 
examine the impact of CSR on firm behaviour from the perspectives of overall 
financial performance (Chen and Wang, 2011; Wang and Qian, 2011; Lau et al., 
2016; Kao et al., 2018), access to finance (Cheng et al., 2014), tunnelling activity 
(Chen et al., 2018), information asymmetry (Hung et al., 2013), and dividend policy 
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(Cheung et al., 2018; Ni and Zhang, 2019); this study pays special attention to the 
CEO pay performance sensitivity. After examining the relationship between CSR 
and CEO pay performance sensitivity, the results provide direct evidence that 
mandatory CSR is beneficial to firms in China as it helps align CEO pay and firm 
performance. Second, different from the majority of the previous studies that focus 
on voluntary CSR, the focus of this study is mandatory CSR disclosure in China32. 
Although firms passively disclose their CSR report due to the mandate, this study 
shows that mandatory disclosure is still effective for delivering more information, 
and restraining CEO power as a consequence. Contributing to a growing strand of 
literature taking advantage of mandatory CSR disclosure requirement in China 
(Hung et al., 2013; Chen et al., 2018; Wang et al., 2018; Liu and Tian, 2019), this 
study shows that even without the assurance of the adoption, mandatory CSR 
disclosure improves CEO pay performance sensitivity. Last, by splitting the sample 
according to the relative power of CEOs, the different impact of CSR on CEO pay 
performance sensitivity among those subsamples is found. Therefore, besides the 
positive relationship between mandatory CSR and CEO pay performance 
sensitivity, the mechanism that mandatory CSR impacts firm behaviour, namely 
                                                          
32 A strand of literature has examined the impact of CSR in the context of China (Chen and Wang, 
2011; Du, 2015; Li et al., 2015; Chen et al., 2018; Huang et al., 2019; Liao et al., 2019), however 
they treat mandatory and voluntary CSR disclosures uniformly which may yield unreliable results 




restraining CEO power is identified, which has been hardly mentioned in previous 
studies.  
 
The remainder of the study is organised as follows. Section 2 presents the 
hypothesis development. Section 3 illustrates the methodology by introducing the 
data, the variables and the econometric models. Section 4 presents the empirical 
results and interpretations, and Section 5 provides the concluding remarks.  
 
4.2 Hypothesis development 
A large body of literature examines the impact of CSR on firm value, but the results 
have contradictory findings. One strand of literature argues that CSR unnecessarily 
increases a firm’s cost, and therefore deteriorates its performance (Friedman, 1970; 
McWilliams and Siegel, 2001; Jensen, 2002). Predominantly drawn on agency 
theory, studies contend that using corporate resources to conduct CSR activities 
results in significant managerial benefits but at the cost of shareholders’ interests. 
In contrast, other scholars have argued that CSR could become a strategic tool to 
minimise transaction costs and potential conflict of interests among stakeholders 
which eventually increases firm value (Deng et al., 2013; Arouri and Pijourlet, 
2017; Ferrell et al., 2016; Lins et al., 2017). Specifically, CSR could help firm 
reduce cost of capital and get access to finance (El Gohoul et al., 2011; Cheng et 
al., 2014), improve employee productivity, attract and retain talents (Greening and 
Turban, 2000; Roberts & Dowling, 2002), and enhance brand value and firm 
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reputation (Menon & Kahn, 2003; Linthicum et al., 2010). However, probably due 
to data constraint, the literature is largely concerned with voluntary CSR in 
developed countries, where firms initiate CSR activities and self-select to 
communicate CSR information to the public. These voluntary disclosure choices 
may render the results subject to self-selection bias or endogeneity problem. 
 
A nascent literature in recent years has paid special attention to the mandatory CSR 
disclosure. Using a cross-country dataset, Ioannou and Serafeim (2017) examine 
the consequences of mandatory corporate sustainability reporting in China, 
Denmark, Malaysia, and South Africa. They find that even in the absence of 
specific guidelines or standards for the disclosure of the CSR reports, firms seek to 
enhance disclosure credibility and comparability. Hence, increased transparency is 
contended to be effective and increase firm value as a consequence. In the same 
vein, Hung, et al. (2013) and Wang et al. (2018) find that mandatory CSR disclosure 
in China mitigates information asymmetry by constraining earning management 
and helping investors assess firm’s political or social risk after taking advantage of 
the 2008 CSR disclosure mandate. Furthermore, Chen et al. (2018) claim that 
mandatory CSR disclosure generates positive externalities to society (i.e. decrease 
industrial wastewater and SO2 emission), but Chinese firms suffer from decreased 
profitability subsequent to the mandate. 
 
CEO compensation has a significant economic impact on shareholders’ wealth, i.e. 
the value of the firm. The high and dramatic rise in CEO pay could impose 
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substantial costs on shareholders, and the discrepancy between CEO compensation 
and firm performance distorts the incentive components of compensation that are 
supposed to lead managers’ effort to maximise shareholders’ wealth. According to 
Tosi et al. (1999), the distortion between CEO pay and firm performance reflects 
the power imbalance between CEOs and shareholders. Later, Grabke-Rundell and 
Gomez-Mejia (2002) propose a managerial power model that emphasises CEOs’ 
ability to influence pay decision that causes excess pay problems.  
 
In this study, I posit that the mandatory CSR disclosure in China would increase 
CEO pay performance sensitivity. First, CSR disclosure could improve information 
transparency, hence better monitor CEO power. Prior studies have proved that 
firms with superior CSR performance are willing to publicly disclose their CSR 
strategies which contain information about corporate performance in economic, 
environmental, social and governance dimensions. As a result, the CSR disclosure 
would enhance information transparency and may lead to changes in the internal 
control system (Cheng et al., 2014). China has long been criticised for excessive 
power of CEOs and inadequate disclosure and transparency (Liu, 2006; Zou et al., 
2008; Wu et al., 2018). Mandatory CSR report could therefore become a 
complementary resource of information to the public which would provide an 
opportunity for outsiders to monitor CEO’s power as well as improve the 
management of corporate asset (Ioannou and Serafeim, 2017), particularly the cash 
allocation to CEO compensation. Second, the economy in China is largely policy-
driven, therefore it is critical for firms to respond to government policies and build 
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legitimacy to gain government support (Marquis and Qian, 2014). To strategically 
respond to the government’s signal of establishing a ‘harmonious society’, firms 
would endeavour to engage in more CSR activities even though CSR investment is 
not implicitly required by the mandate. As a consequence, even though firms are 
not voluntarily involved in the CSR engagement, those initiatives are likely to 
attract media and analysts’ attention (Dhaliwai et al., 2011& Hung et al., 2013). 
Therefore, the CEO’s power could be better supervised and verified by 
stakeholders, and the CEO’s excess pay (the part that is not contingent to firm 
performance) is more likely to be controlled. Third, although CSR has been proved 
to improve CEOs’ reputation and social networks at the cost of shareholders in 
other countries (Barnea and Rubin, 2010; Masulis and Reza, 2015), it is less likely 
to be the case in China. If CSR is a good way for CEOs to gain personal benefits 
(e.g. to gain reputation), the decision for CSR engagement and the subsequent 
disclosure would be voluntarily made by CEOs rather than mandatorily required by 
the government. It follows that CEOs in China are unlikely to obtain personal 
benefit from CSR engagement in China. Therefore, it is hypothesised that 
mandatory CSR disclosure would more likely result in increased transparency of 
the firm, and become a mechanism to restrain CEO power and better align CEO 
pay with firm performance. Accordingly, the first hypothesis is developed as 
follows: 





CEO taking dual roles refers to the situation in which a CEO serves as both the 
CEO and the chair of the board. As a result, the CEO could evaluate their own 
performance (Jensen, 1993; Wu et al., 2018). Accompanied by Chinese 
underdeveloped financial markets and ill-defined legal system (Chen et al., 2011), 
the incentive of the CEO to use his power to influence his compensation is 
enhanced. Previous studies also have shown that CEO with political connections 
are strategically important for firms to gain government support and political 
legitimacy, and therefore CEOs with political connections are considered more 
powerful to bargain for their compensation (Chen et al., 2011; Wu et al., 2018). 
Moreover, some studies show that longer CEO tenure could enable CEOs to have 
stronger power of influencing board of directors and circumventing monitoring 
mechanisms (Chen et al., 2011& Vo and Canil, 2016). Thus, CEOs with longer 
tenure are expected to have more ability to manipulate their annual pay. By 
increasing the information transparency and stakeholder supervision, mandatory 
CSR disclosure is hypothesised to have a more profound impact on firms with CEO 
duality, political connections, and longer tenure. Here is the second hypothesis. 
H2: The positive impact of mandatory CSR disclosure on CEO pay performance 
sensitivity is more pronounced in firms with CEOs taking dual roles, CEOs with 
political connections, and CEOs with longer tenure. 
 
As Shleifer (1998) argues, the conflict of interests between shareholders and 
managers is more intense among SOEs than non-SOEs because the diffused nature 
of the real shareholders of SOEs, i.e. the national citizens, makes it less likely to 
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have complete contracts with managers which makes it harder to constrain the 
conflict of interests between managers and shareholders. Accompanied with the 
strong intervention of government to the SOEs, extant literature has proved that the 
CEO pay performance sensitivity is lower in SOEs than in non-SOEs (Firth et al., 
2007). However, after the disclosure of the CSR report, more information is 
distributed and more attention is drawn from the public. The link between CEO pay 
and firm performance is expected to be better monitored and supervised. Therefore, 
the function of CSR to monitor the CEO’s power could be more significant in SOEs 
than in non-SOEs. The third hypothesis is developed as follows. 
H3: The positive impact of mandatory CSR disclosure on CEO pay performance 
sensitivity is more pronounced in SOEs than non-SOEs. 
 
4.3 Methodology 
4.3.1 The sample 
All the financial data is obtained from the China Security Market and Accounting 
Research (CSMAR) database. The sample consists of all Chinese firms listed on 
the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges from 2005 to 2012. The data starts in 
2005 because individual CEO compensation data has been disclosed to the public 
since 2005. The years from 2005 to 2008 is defined as the pre-mandate period, and 
2009 to 2012 as the post-mandate period. The firms that voluntarily disclose their 
CSR report are excluded because they have a confounding impact on the mandatory 
disclosure effect. Financial firms and B-share firms, as well as the firm-year 
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observations with missing data for the variables used in the model are also 
excluded, which gives a total of 8341 firm-year observations for the main tests33.  
 
4.3.2 Measurement of variables 
4.3.2.1 CEO pay performance sensitivity 
In this study, CEO pay is defined as the reported sum of salary, bonus and 
allowance which is consistent with prior literature (Firth et al., 2007; Lin et al., 
2011; Hu et al., 2013; Conyon and He, 2016). The long-term incentives34, such as 
stock options and restricted stocks have been excluded because of the scarcity of 
such grant in China as well as the inefficiency of the Chinese stock markets35. 
Perquisites are also excluded from the definition because of the potential self-
selection problem. Because perks disclosure is not mandatory in China, it is 
possible that only those without excessive perks choose to disclose this information 
(Conyon and He, 2016). 
 
                                                          
33 However, the observation decreases to 8017 because 324 singleton observations are dropped after 
using firm fixed effects and firm-year interactive fixed effects specifications where those fixed 
effects are nested within clusters (standard errors are clustered at firm level for all the tests). 
34In robustness test, the long-term incentives are included in CEOs’ compensation. Following Cao 
et al. (2018), total pay is examined as the sum of salary, bonus, allowance and the value of long-
term incentives (stock and option). The value of long term incentives is calculated as multiplying 
the number of shares and stock options by the closing stock price at the end of the year. The results 
are reported in column (1) table 4.8. 
35 The inefficiency of the markets makes many firms terminate their long-term incentives due to the 
large stock price fluctuation, as well as the divergence between stock price and firm performance 
(Sun and Guan, 2012). 
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To capture the pay performance sensitivity, return on assets (‘ROA’) is used as the 
independent variable. An accounting-based measurement is used instead of a 
market-based measure 36  because compared with stock returns, ROA is under 
greater control by CEO and is more likely to capture the alignment of CEO pay 
with his effort to maximise the profit. Previous studies also provide evidence that 
Chinese firms rely heavily on accounting-based measurements to determine CEO 
pay (Firth et al., 2007; Wu et al., 2018). In this study, ROA is lagged to year t-1 to 
better capture the contingency of CEO pay on firm performance 37 (Firth et al., 
2007; Cao et al., 2018).  
 
4.3.2.2 Mandatory and post-mandate period identification  
In this study, a dummy variable MANDATORY is introduced to indicate whether 
the firm is subject to the mandatory CSR disclosure requirement. Specifically, they 
are firms that belong to ‘Corporate Governance Sector’, firms that listed shares 
overseas, and firms in the financial sector listed on Shanghai Stock Exchange, as 
well as those belonging to ‘Shenzhen 100 Index’ on Shenzhen Stock Exchange. In 
order to have the same post-mandate period for the treatment firms, I have restricted 
the treatment firms to those mandatorily disclosing their CSR report as of 2008. 
Years from 2005 to 2008 are defined as the pre-mandate period because the 
                                                          
36 I have also conducted robustness test to replace ROA (accounting based) measurement with 
Tobin’s Q (market based) measurement to capture the CEO pay performance sensitivity. The result 
is reported in Table 4.8 column (2).  
37 I also use non-lagged ROA in the robustness test. 
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announcement of the mandatory requirement was in December 2008, and the 
mandate took effect in April 2009. So, the dummy variable POSTMAN is equal to 
1 for years from 2009 to 2012. 
 
4.3.2.3 Other variables 
In the regression analysis, a series of control variables are included in the regression 
models to control for factors that may affect CEO pay. CEO’s age (‘AGE’), gender 
(‘GENDER’), and educational background (‘EDUCATION’) are included as those 
CEO’s personal characteristics determine his/her value and power in the company, 
therefore influence their pay (Li et al., 2008; Chen et al., 2011; Focke et al., 2017; 
Cao et al., 2018; Wu et al., 2018). Remarkably, CEO’s political connection (‘PC’), 
dual roles of CEO and chairman of the board (‘DUALITY’), and tenure 
(‘TENURE’) are also included since those indicators reflect CEO’s power to 
negotiate and obtain personal interests which have the potential to lead to excess 
CEO pay (Firth et al., 2007; Chen et al., 2011; Wu et al., 2018). A number of 
corporate governance indicators are controlled for the regression model. The more 
frequently held general shareholder meetings (‘MEETING’), the greater number of 
directors in the boards (‘BOARDSIZE’), the higher percentage of independent 
board of directors (‘INDEPENDENT’) indicate better supervision of the CEO 
which could restrain unreasonable pay (Firth et al., 2007; Chen et al., 2011; Lin et 
al., 2011). Meanwhile the percentage of shares held by controlling shareholders 
(‘OWNERSHIP’) and the excess control right of controlling shareholders 
(‘EXCESS’) reflects the power of controlling shareholders over manager team 
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which could influence CEO pay (Hu et al., 2013). Besides, some important firm 
attributes, firm’s size (‘SIZE’), its debt ratio (‘LEVERAGE’) and growth 
opportunity (‘GROWTH’) are also included in the regression model. The 
definitions and/or calculations of variables are shown in detail in Appendix 1. 
 
4.3.3 Research design and econometric model 
A Difference-in-Difference (DiD) approach is adopted to compare the changes in 
CEO pay performance sensitivity among treatment firms (firms that are subject to 
the mandatory requirement to disclose their CSR report) with control groups (firms 
that are not subject to the mandatory requirement) during the sample period. In 
order to test the hypotheses, the following model is utilised,  
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶(𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐼𝐼) = 𝛼𝛼0 + 𝛼𝛼1 × 𝐼𝐼𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐼𝐼𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐼𝐼 + 𝛼𝛼2 × 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐼𝐼𝐸𝐸 + 𝛼𝛼3 × 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 +
𝛼𝛼4 × 𝐼𝐼𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐼𝐼𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐼𝐼 ∗ 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐼𝐼𝐸𝐸 + 𝛼𝛼5 × 𝐼𝐼𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐼𝐼𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐼𝐼 ∗ 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛼𝛼6 × 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐼𝐼𝐸𝐸 ∗
𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1+𝛼𝛼7 × 𝐼𝐼𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐼𝐼𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐼𝐼 ∗ 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐼𝐼𝐸𝐸 ∗ 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛼𝛼8 ×
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝐹𝐹𝐸𝐸 + 𝜀𝜀.                                                                           (1) 
 
The variable of interest in this model is the coefficient on the three-way interaction 
term, 𝛼𝛼7 , which captures the different changes of the CEO pay performance 
sensitivity after the mandate among treatment firms and control firms. OLS, firm 
fixed effect, year fixed effect and firm-year interactive fixed effect models are 




As a robustness test, propensity score matching (PSM) procedure is implemented 
to select comparable firms which do not release their CSR reports into the sample 
to mitigate the concern that the control group is not randomly selected. The control 
firms (those firms that do not release CSR reports) are selected so that they are as 
close as possible to treatment firms (those firms that release their CSR reports) in 
terms of growth, leverage, size, industry affiliation and whether it belongs to SOEs 
or non-SOEs. The nearest neighbour matching technique with replacement is used, 
which gives a total of 3100 observations. To further verify the results, the sample 
is split into observations before and after the mandatory requirement, and the 
following model is estimated, 
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶(𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐼𝐼) = 𝛼𝛼0 + 𝛼𝛼1 × 𝐼𝐼𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐼𝐼𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐼𝐼 + 𝛼𝛼2 × 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛼𝛼3 ×
𝐼𝐼𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐼𝐼𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐼𝐼 ∗ 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1+𝛼𝛼4 × 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝐹𝐹𝐸𝐸 + 𝜀𝜀.                      (2) 
 
The interested variable is the coefficient, 𝛼𝛼3,  which captures the impact of 
mandatory disclosure on CEO pay performance sensitivity. After comparing the 
significance or/and magnitude of the coefficients, whether the changes of the CEO 
pay performance sensitivity is different between treatment group and control group 
after the mandate in 2008 can be verified. 
 
To explore the channels through which mandatory CSR affects CEO pay and pay-
performance sensitivity, the sample is firstly split into subsamples based on whether 
CEOs take dual roles (DUAL vs. NON-DUAL), have political connections (PC vs. 
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WITHOUT-PC), and have longer tenure (LONG vs. SHORT)38. Those subsamples 
reflect the different strength of power CEOs could have to negotiate and manipulate 
their compensation, and examining whether mandatory CSR disclosure has a 
different impact on CEO pay performance sensitivity among those subsamples 
could reveal whether restraining CEO power is a channel through which mandatory 
CSR influences the CEO compensation sensitivity. The sample is also divided into 
SOEs and non-SOEs to explore whether the impact of mandatory CSR varies under 
different ownership structure. All the above tests are based on model (1). As the 
firm-year interactive fixed effects model is a generalized version of standard fixed 
effects model in terms of controlling for both time-invariant firm characteristics 
and years, I focus on this estimation method for all the following tests. The equality 
of the coefficient across subsamples is confirmed with a Chow-test. 
 
4.4 Empirical Results 
4.4.1 Descriptive statistics 
Table 4.1 shows the descriptive statistics for the variables used in the main tests39. 
Note that all the continuous variables are winsorised at 1% and 99% of the 
distribution. The number of observations, mean, median, standard deviation and 
                                                          
38 CEO is regarded as having long tenure if his tenure is longer than the mean value of the sample. 
39 I have also conducted univariate tests for all the main variables in the test between firms that are 
mandatorily required to disclose their CSR report (Mandate) and firms that are not required to do 




interquartile values (at 25% and 75% percentiles) of each variable are reported. The 
average CEO pay is 448,815 in the sample starting from 2005 to 2012, while it is 
only 85,000 for the year 2000 as reported by Firth et al. (2007). It is clear that CEO 
pay increased dramatically from 2000 to 2012. The mean of MANDATORY is 
18.82% which shows that less than 20% of firms are mandatorily required to 
disclose their CSR report in 2008. For CEOs’ relative power related variables, less 
than 20% of CEOs take dual roles (‘DUAL’) as both CEO and chair of the board, 
while only 13.43% of CEOs have political connections (‘PC’), and the average 
CEO tenure (‘TENURE’) is about 2 years, which is quite short compared with the 
average of 7.2 years for U.S. firms from 2006 to 2014 (Guay et al., 2019). For other 
personal characteristics, the average age of CEO (‘AGE’) is about 50 and 95% are 
male CEOs (‘GENDER’). The mean education level (‘EDUCATION’) is more 




Table 4.1 Summary Statistics 
This table presents the summary statistics for the variables used in the tests. Number 
of observations, mean, median, standard deviation and values at 25% and 75% 
percentile of each variable are reported. All the continuous variables are winsorised 
at 1% and 99% distribution.  
VARIABLE NAME No. Mean St.dev 25th percentile Median 75th percentile 
CEO PAY 8341 448,815 403,048 190,300 337,600 560,300 
MANDATORY 8341 0.1882 0.3909 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
POSTMAN 8341 0.5625 0.4961 0.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
ROAt-1 8341 0.0376 0.0648 0.0148 0.0390 0.0664 
SOE 8341 0.5143 0.4998 0.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
DUAL 8341 0.1970 0.3977 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
PC 8341 0.1343 0.3410 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
TENURE 8341 1.9986 1.7187 0.6667 1.5833 2.5833 
SIZE 8341 21.5798 1.2174 20.7501 21.4250 22.2176 
LEVERAGE 8341 0.4832 0.2375 0.3151 0.4876 0.6335 
GROWTH 8341 0.3920 1.4560 -0.0686 0.0967 0.3556 
EXCESS 8341 6.1802 8.2213 0.0000 0.0000 12.0394 
OWNERSHIP 8341 29.6042 17.2313 16.1980 27.3300 41.4500 
MEETING 8341 2.8284 1.3920 2.0000 3.0000 4.0000 
INDEPENDENT  8341 0.3619 0.0504 0.3333 0.3333 0.3750 
BOARD SIZE 8341 9.1899 1.8660 9.0000 9.0000 9.0000 
AGE 8341 47.2331 6.1772 43.0000 47.0000 51.0000 
GENDER 8341 0.9433 0.2313 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 




4.4.2 Main results 
4.4.2.1 Mandatory CSR disclosure and CEO pay performance sensitivity 
In this section, regression analysis is used to explore the different changes in CEO 
pay performance sensitivity after the mandate between treatment firms and control 
firms. Table 4.2 shows the results. This study adopts OLS, firm fixed effect to 
control for time-invariant firm level characteristics, year fixed effect to control for 
the difference among different years, and interactive firm-year fixed effects to 
control for both firm and year unobserved heterogeneity. Regardless of the choice 
of the models, the results are consistent that the coefficients of the three-way 
interaction MANDATORY*POSTMAN*ROAt-1 are significantly positive.  This 
shows that the changes of CEO pay performance sensitivity after the mandate is 
more pronounced among those firms that are mandatorily required to disclose their 
CSR report, supporting the hypothesis 1 that mandatory CSR disclosure improves 
CEO pay performance sensitivity.  
 
Consistent with previous studies, I find that CEOs taking the dual role as both CEO 
and chair of the board and CEOs having longer tenure tend to have larger 
compensation, however, the political connection does not bring extra pay to the 
CEOs in the sample. Moreover, age plays a very important role for CEO 
compensation because the coefficient of age is significantly positive at 1% level for 
all the models, while the impact of being a male CEO on CEO pay in the sample is 
positive but not significant. Meanwhile, CEOs’ education has a positive impact on 
their pay, but only significant under OLS and year fixed effect models. 
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Table 4.2 The impact of Mandatory CSR disclosure on CEO pay performance sensitivity 
This table represents the regression results for the impact of Mandatory CSR disclosure on CEO pay performance sensitivity. The sample is 
all firms listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges during the period from 2005 to 2012. See Appendix 1 for variable definitions. 
Standard errors are clustered at the firm level, and p-values are in parentheses.*, **, *** represent significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels 
respectively.  
 
OLS FIRM FE YEAR FE INTERACTIVE 
Dependent variable: ln(CEO PAY) 
  
 FIRM-YEAR FE 
MANDATORY 0.2152*** NA 0.2259*** NA 
 (0.0005)  (0.0003)  
POSTMAN 0.6527*** 0.2971*** NA NA 
 (0.0000) (0.0000)   
ROAt-1 2.1517*** 1.1848*** 2.1223*** 0.9078*** 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
MANDATORY*POSTMAN -0.2102*** -0.1387*** -0.2142*** -0.1442*** 
 (0.0007) (0.0068) (0.0006) (0.0035) 
MANDATORY* ROAt-1 0.8062 1.1617** 0.4290 0.9577* 
 (0.3473) (0.0437) (0.6182) (0.0819) 
POSTMAN* ROAt-1 0.3701 -0.5682** 0.4785 -0.2053 
 (0.2462) (0.0138) (0.1326) (0.3598) 
MANDATORY*POSTMAN* ROAt-1 2.1579** 2.0437** 2.1755** 2.2348** 
 (0.0412) (0.0239) (0.0378) (0.0117) 
DUAL 0.1595*** 0.0780** 0.1658*** 0.0897** 
 (0.0000) (0.0445) (0.0000) (0.0154) 
PC -0.0330 0.0221 -0.0256 0.0237 
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 (0.3656) (0.4480) (0.5005) (0.3973) 
TENURE 0.0486*** 0.0518*** 0.0507*** 0.0484*** 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
SIZE 0.2382*** 0.3391*** 0.2422*** 0.2225*** 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
LEVERAGE -0.2165*** -0.3528*** -0.1572** -0.3517*** 
 (0.0025) (0.0000) (0.0287) (0.0000) 
GROWTH -0.0008 -0.0066 0.0123 -0.0065 
 (0.9259) (0.2854) (0.2069) (0.2808) 
EXCESS -0.0014 -0.0032 -0.0018 -0.0008 
 (0.4366) (0.1360) (0.3183) (0.6874) 
OWNERSHIP -0.0048*** -0.0031*** -0.0052*** 0.0011 
 (0.0000) (0.0032) (0.0000) (0.3096) 
MEETING 0.0202 0.0195 0.0231 -0.0008 
 (0.3040) (0.1099) (0.2535) (0.9506) 
INDEPENDENT -0.0012 0.4493* -0.0589 0.1999 
 (0.9964) (0.0504) (0.8178) (0.3679) 
BOARD SIZE 0.1694** -0.0171 0.0986 0.1025 
 (0.0222) (0.8337) (0.1806) (0.1971) 
AGE 0.4332*** 0.7617*** 0.4045*** 0.4886*** 
 (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0002) (0.0000) 
GENDER 0.0713 0.0496 0.0280 0.0772 
 (0.2453) (0.4647) (0.6569) (0.2383) 
EDUCATION 0.1464*** 0.0603 0.1629*** 0.0126 
 (0.0001) (0.2343) (0.0000) (0.7946) 
INTERCEPT 4.7304*** 2.2163*** 5.5262*** 5.6876*** 
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 (0.0000) (0.0003) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
FIRM FE NO YES NO YES 
YEAR FE NO NO YES YES 
N 8341 8017 8341 8017 
R-sq 0.3792 0.7636 0.3546 0.7795 
Note: NA = Not Applicable. The variable MANDATORY under firm fixed effect, POSTMAN under year fixed effect and both MANDATORY and 
POSTMAN under interactive firm-year fixed effect have been dropped due to multicollinearity problem
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4.4.2.2 Channel Analysis 
The above analysis shows that mandatory CSR disclosure has a significantly 
positive impact on CEO pay performance sensitivity. In this section, whether CEO 
power is the channel through which mandatory CSR impacts CEO pay performance 
sensitivity is explored. First, the full sample is split according to whether CEOs 
take dual roles as both CEO and chair of the board, whether CEOs are politically 
connected, and whether CEOs’ tenure is longer than the mean value in the sample. 
The results in Table 4.3 show that the positive impact of mandatory CSR disclosure 
on CEO pay performance sensitivity is significant among all subsamples except for 
firms with CEOs’ not taking dual roles and firms having CEOs with short tenure. 
Regardless of the significance of the three-way interaction term, the results show 
that the coefficients among firms having a power CEO (CEOs taking dual roles, 
having the political connection and having longer tenure) are larger than those firms 
with a weaker CEO. This result is further verified by the F statistics from Chow-
test. The above findings support the hypothesis 2 by showing that the impact of 
mandatory CSR disclosure on CEO pay performance sensitivity is more profound 
among firms with severe agency problems, i.e. among firms having more power 





Table 4.3 Channel analysis of the impact of Mandatory CSR disclosure on CEO pay performance sensitivity 
This table represents the regression results for the impact of Mandatory CSR disclosure on CEO pay performance sensitivity among 
subsamples. ‘DUAL’ includes listed firms whose CEO is also the chair of the board. ‘NON-DUAL’ includes listed firms whose CEO 
is not the chair of the board. ‘PC’ includes listed firms whose CEO is politically connected. ‘WITHOUT-PC’ includes listed firms 
whose CEO is not politically connected. ‘LONG’ includes listed firms that their CEOs’ tenure is equal to or more than 2 years (the 
mean of the tenure in our sample). ‘SHORT’ includes listed firms that their CEOs’ tenure is less than 2 years. See Appendix 1 for 
variable definitions. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level, and p-values are in parentheses. *, **, *** represent significance at 
the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
 
DUAL NON-DUAL PC WITHOUT-
PC 
LONG SHORT 
Dependent variable: ln(CEO PAY) 
  
    
MANDATORY NA NA NA NA NA NA 
       
POSTMAN NA NA NA NA NA NA 
       
ROAt-1 0.6270* 0.9861*** 0.8598 0.8604*** 1.2407*** 0.8662*** 
 (0.0929) (0.0000) (0.1810) (0.0000) (0.0042) (0.0000) 
MANDATORY*POSTMAN -0.2278 -0.1143** -0.1157 -0.1248** -0.2018** -0.1348** 
 (0.2307) (0.0196) (0.2956) (0.0204) (0.0135) (0.0173) 
MANDATORY* ROAt-1 -1.2462 1.0752** -0.2176 1.2727** 0.9742 0.9671 
 (0.4559) (0.0454) (0.8832) (0.0221) (0.3186) (0.1607) 
POSTMAN* ROAt-1 -0.2281 -0.0801 -0.0871 -0.1251 -0.4765 -0.2340 
 (0.6423) (0.7252) (0.9030) (0.6049) (0.2744) (0.4194) 
MANDATORY*POSTMAN* ROAt-1 7.0733*** 1.3052 3.2391** 1.5567* 4.0024*** 1.4589 
 (0.0063) (0.1754) (0.0287) (0.0848) (0.0042) (0.1426) 
DUAL   0.1130 0.0841** 0.0790 0.0924** 
   (0.3529) (0.0387) (0.1949) (0.0407) 
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PC -0.0055 0.0274   0.0459 0.0128 
 (0.8524) (0.4606)   (0.2449) (0.7680) 
TENURE 0.0065 0.0568*** 0.0789*** 0.0456*** 0.0032 0.0851*** 
 (0.6446) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.9004) (0.0000) 
SIZE 0.2289*** 0.2226*** 0.2575*** 0.2246*** 0.2098*** 0.2232*** 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0025) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
LEVERAGE -0.3841*** -0.3190*** -0.4086** -0.3756*** -0.3815*** -0.4281*** 
 (0.0080) (0.0000) (0.0184) (0.0000) (0.0004) (0.0000) 
GROWTH -0.0058 -0.0085 0.0091 -0.0080 -0.0076 -0.0024 
 (0.5685) (0.1703) (0.4119) (0.2341) (0.4073) (0.7451) 
EXCESS -0.0027 0.0016 -0.0059 -0.0005 -0.0055 0.0018 
 (0.3584) (0.4867) (0.3996) (0.8224) (0.1218) (0.4447) 
OWNERSHIP -0.0015 0.0008 0.0010 0.0008 -0.0023 0.0034** 
 (0.2391) (0.4964) (0.6958) (0.4849) (0.1810) (0.0133) 
MEETING -0.0289 0.0118 0.0073 -0.0020 -0.0105 0.0183 
 (0.2508) (0.3938) (0.8521) (0.8808) (0.6446) (0.3145) 
INDEPENDENT -0.1854 0.2141 -0.9072 0.3194 0.5997* -0.0161 
 (0.7651) (0.3786) (0.2725) (0.1670) (0.0580) (0.9561) 
BOARD SIZE 0.0368 0.0886 0.2712 0.0409 0.0971 0.0240 
 (0.8780) (0.3056) (0.3278) (0.6279) (0.3723) (0.8292) 
AGE 0.9269** 0.4541*** -0.0512 0.5606*** 0.2104 0.5478*** 
 (0.0151) (0.0001) (0.9113) (0.0000) (0.3010) (0.0000) 
GENDER 0.5972** 0.0480 -0.0422 0.1305* 0.0671 0.1890** 
 (0.0207) (0.5428) (0.8327) (0.0655) (0.5569) (0.0256) 
EDUCATION 0.2594** -0.0145 -0.2162** 0.0213 -0.0669 0.0256 
 (0.0224) (0.8021) (0.0303) (0.6859) (0.3853) (0.6765) 
INTERCEPT 3.7219* 5.8324*** 7.5521*** 5.4045*** 7.2105*** 5.4988*** 
 (0.0602) (0.0000) (0.0034) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
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CHOW TEST OF DIFFERENCE IN 
MANDATORY*POSTMAN* ROAt-1 
6.75*** 4.33** 4.80** 
(0.0094) (0.0375) (0.0286) 
FIRM FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
YEAR FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
N 1411 6399 947 6878 2782 4424 
R-sq 0.8405 0.7835 0.8369 0.7781 0.7984 0.7533 
Note: NA = Not Applicable. The variable MANDATORY under firm fixed effect, POSTMAN under year fixed effect and both MANDATORY 
and POSTMAN under interactive firm-year fixed effect have been dropped due to multicollinearity problem.
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The question of whether the impact of CSR varies under different ownership 
structure (i.e., SOEs vs Non-SOEs) is further explored. Table 4.4 shows that the 
positive impact of mandatory CSR disclosure on CEO pay performance sensitivity 
is only significant among SOEs, while the impact is not significant among non-
SOEs. Chow-test further verifies that the coefficient is not equal between SOEs and 




Table 4.4 The impact of Mandatory CSR disclosure on CEO pay performance 
sensitivity between SOEs and non-SOEs 
This table represents the regression results for the impact of Mandatory CSR 
disclosure on CEO pay performance sensitivity between SOEs and non-SOEs. 
‘SOE’ includes listed firms that are ultimately controlled by the state. ‘NON-SOE’ 
includes listed firms that are not ultimately controlled by the state. See Appendix 1 
for variable definitions. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level, and p-values 




Dependent variable: ln(CEO PAY) 
  
MANDATORY NA NA 
   
POSTMAN NA NA 
   
ROAt-1 0.6077** 1.5381*** 
 (0.0103) (0.0000) 
MANDATORY*POSTMAN -0.2304** -0.1361** 
 (0.0350) (0.0141) 
MANDATORY* ROAt-1 1.1751 0.3111 
 (0.2997) (0.6278) 
POSTMAN* ROAt-1 -0.0445 -0.5252 
 (0.8809) (0.1240) 
MANDATORY*POSTMAN* ROAt-1 4.8371*** 1.6348 
 (0.0007) (0.1324) 
DUAL 0.1191** 0.0504 
 (0.0173) (0.3426) 
PC 0.0025 0.0484 
 (0.9389) (0.3277) 
TENURE 0.0262*** 0.0666*** 
 (0.0060) (0.0000) 
SIZE 0.2081*** 0.2493*** 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) 
LEVERAGE -0.3853*** -0.3214*** 
 (0.0000) (0.0037) 
GROWTH -0.0098 -0.0033 
 (0.2519) (0.6166) 
EXCESS -0.0014 -0.0014 
 (0.5822) (0.6911) 
OWNERSHIP 0.0031** -0.0023 
 (0.0207) (0.1645) 
MEETING -0.0154 0.0134 
 (0.3750) (0.4559) 
INDEPENDENT 0.3744 0.1107 
 (0.2352) (0.7271) 
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BOARD SIZE 0.1877* 0.0524 
 (0.0982) (0.6359) 
AGE 0.3991*** 0.5166*** 
 (0.0049) (0.0024) 
GENDER 0.0929 0.0569 
 (0.2756) (0.5839) 
EDUCATION 0.0616 -0.0408 
 (0.3082) (0.6057) 
INTERCEPT 6.0540*** 5.2648*** 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) 




FIRM FE YES YES 
YEAR FE YES YES 
N 4040 3977 
R-sq 0.7805 0.7793 
Note: NA = Not Applicable. The variable MANDATORY under firm fixed effect, 
POSTMAN under year fixed effect and both MANDATORY and POSTMAN under 





4.4.3 Downward stickiness in CEO compensation 
The above analysis supports the view that CEO pay performance sensitivity is 
higher after the mandate among firms mandatorily required to disclose their CSR 
report. However, a strand of literature has shown that pay performance sensitivity 
differs in firms with good or bad performance (Gaver and Gaver, 1998; Anderson 
et al., 2003; Mo et al., 2018). Specifically, Gaver and Gaver (1998) show that the 
coefficient of positive earnings (gains) is significantly higher than that of negative 
earnings (losses) on CEO compensation, which is later known as downward 
stickiness in CEO compensation. In other words, there is a possibility that the 
results are simply driven by the financial performance of the firms instead of 
mandatory disclosure, i.e. firms subject to the requirement happened to have a good 
performance after the mandate in 2008, while the control firms have bad years after. 
To rule out this alternative explanation, the sample is divided into firms with 
positive ROA (i.e., positive gains compared with the previous year) and negative 
ROA (i.e. losses compared with the previous year) 40. Table 4.5 shows that the 
mandatory CSR disclosure has a significant positive impact on CEO pay 
performance sensitivity for both subsamples, and the chow test verifies that there 
                                                          
40 We split the sample into gains/losses based on (ROA in the current year-ROA in the previous 
year) instead of positive/negative ROA in the current year due to listing policy in China. Firms will 
receive a delisting warning if they have negative earnings for two consecutive years, and will be 
delisted if they have negative earnings for three consecutive years. Therefore, there will be very few 
listed firms with negative ROA in the Chinese markets. We test the downward stickiness in CEO 
compensation with the consideration of the characteristic of the Chinese market. 
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is no difference in the coefficients. In general, the results in Table 4.5 show that 




Table 4.5 Downward stickiness in CEO compensation 
This table represents the regression results for the impact of Mandatory CSR 
disclosure on CEO pay performance sensitivity between firms with the increased 
and decreased ROA compared with the previous year in a given year. 
‘POSITIVE’ includes listed firms that have a positive change of ROA compared 
with the previous year in a given year. ‘NEGATIVE’ includes listed firms that 
have a negative change of ROA compared with the previous year in a given year. 
See Appendix 1 for variable definitions. Standard errors are clustered at the firm 
level with p-values in parentheses. *, **, *** represent significance at the 10%, 
5% and 1% levels respectively. 
 
POSITIVE NEGATIVE 
Dependent variable: ln(CEO PAY) 
  
MANDATORY NA NA 
   
POSTMAN NA NA 
   
ROAt-1 1.2429*** 1.3258*** 
 (0.0000) (0.0024) 
MANDATORY*POSTMAN -0.1485** -0.1609** 
 (0.0302) (0.0407) 
MANDATORY* ROAt-1 0.1735 1.3395 
 (0.8425) (0.1413) 
POSTMAN* ROAt-1 -0.3750 0.3548 
 (0.2483) (0.4657) 
MANDATORY*POSTMAN* ROAt-1 3.0464*** 2.3869* 
 (0.0079) (0.0979) 
DUAL 0.0987 0.0520 
 (0.1148) (0.2882) 
PC 0.0750* -0.0274 
 (0.0910) (0.5170) 
TENURE 0.0450*** 0.0529*** 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) 
SIZE 0.1934*** 0.2191*** 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) 
LEVERAGE -0.3200*** -0.2857*** 
 (0.0054) (0.0044) 
GROWTH -0.0020 -0.0075 
 (0.7869) (0.4927) 
EXCESS -0.0017 0.0012 
 (0.5522) (0.7086) 
OWNERSHIP 0.0016 0.0015 
 (0.3301) (0.2773) 
MEETING 0.0092 -0.0048 
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 (0.6540) (0.8155) 
INDEPENDENT 0.0982 0.3029 
 (0.7715) (0.3768) 
BOARD SIZE 0.2158* 0.0760 
 (0.0793) (0.5072) 
AGE 0.3407** 0.4930*** 
 (0.0416) (0.0011) 
GENDER 0.0849 0.1586* 
 (0.4602) (0.0731) 
EDUCATION -0.0391 0.0147 
 (0.6177) (0.8213) 
INTERCEPT 6.7120*** 5.5720*** 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) 




FIRM FE YES YES 
YEAR FE YES YES 
N 3328 3938 
R-sq 0.7951 0.7727 
Note: NA = Not Applicable. The variable MANDATORY under firm fixed effect, 
POSTMAN under year fixed effect and both MANDATORY and POSTMAN under 




4.4.4 Other robustness tests 
4.4.4.1 Before and after comparison 
To further verify the main finding, the sample is split into pre-mandate (BEFORE) 
and post-mandate (AFTER). Table 4.6 shows that CEO pay performance sensitivity 
among firms that are mandatorily required to disclose their CSR report is not 
significantly higher before the mandate (among BEFORE subsample), however, 
the coefficient of MANDATORY* ROAt-1 becomes significantly positive among 
the AFTER subsample. Chow-test further verifies that the difference in these two 
coefficients is statistically different from zero. This robustness test further suggests 
that mandatory CSR disclosure increases CEO pay performance sensitivity.  
 
4.4.4.2 Propensity score matching 
The propensity score matching (PSM) procedure is implemented to rerun the 
model. To find firms comparable to those treatment group, the control firms are 
selected from those firms which are not required to release their CSR report in 
2008. The control firms are selected so that they are as close as possible to treatment 
firms in terms of growth, leverage, size, industry affiliation, and whether they 
belong to SOEs or non-SOEs. I have used the nearest neighbour matching 
technique with replacement. The result in Table 4.7 shows that the coefficient of 
the three-way-interaction term is significantly positive, which is consistent with the 
main finding that there is a more profound increase for CEO pay performance 
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sensitivity in the treatment group compared with the control group after PSM 
procedure. 
Table 4.6 Robustness test by comparing before and after the event 
This table reflects the CEO pay performance sensitivity of mandatory disclosure 
firms before and after the 2008 mandatory requirement. ‘BEFORE’ includes years 
from 2005 to 2008. ‘AFTER’ includes years from 2009 to 2012. See Appendix 1 
for variable definitions. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level, and p-values 




Dependent variable: ln(CEO PAY) 
  
MANDATORY NA NA 
   
ROAt-1 0.3930** 0.6647*** 
 (0.0356) (0.0001) 
MANDATORY* ROAt-1 0.2669 2.6011* 
 (0.5950) (0.0560) 
DUAL 0.1028* 0.0904* 
 (0.0716) (0.0531) 
PC 0.0283 0.0057 
 (0.4974) (0.8613) 
TENURE 0.0506*** 0.0384*** 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) 
SIZE 0.1680*** 0.2724*** 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) 
LEVERAGE -0.4426*** -0.0941 
 (0.0000) (0.4150) 
GROWTH -0.0015 -0.0059 
 (0.8528) (0.4504) 
EXCESS 0.0010 -0.0027 
 (0.7422) (0.3426) 
OWNERSHIP -0.0013 0.0027* 
 (0.4140) (0.0523) 
MEETING 0.0077 -0.0123 
 (0.6563) (0.4319) 
INDEPENDENT 0.2510 -0.0411 
 (0.4251) (0.9063) 
BOARD SIZE 0.0864 0.1374 
 (0.4189) (0.3062) 
AGE 0.7682*** 0.3637** 
 (0.0000) (0.0405) 
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GENDER 0.0426 0.0555 
 (0.6749) (0.6287) 
EDUCATION 0.0382 0.1030 
 (0.5831) (0.1520) 
INTERCEPT 5.6892*** 5.0478*** 
 (0.0000) (0.0001) 




FIRM FE YES YES 
YEAR FE YES YES 
N 3438 4332 
R-sq 0.8045 0.7822 
Note: NA = Not Applicable. The variable MANDATORY under firm fixed effect, 
POSTMAN under year fixed effect and both MANDATORY and POSTMAN under 
interactive firm-year fixed effect have been dropped due to multicollinearity problem.   
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Table 4.7 Propensity score matching approach 
This table represents the regression results for the impact of mandatory CSR 
disclosure on CEO pay performance sensitivity after adopting the propensity 
score matching approach. The sample includes firms mandatorily required to 
disclose their CSR report in the year 2008 and their matching firms. See 
Appendix 1 for variable definitions. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level, 
and p-values are in parentheses. *, **, *** represent significance at the 10%, 5% 
and 1% levels respectively. 
 
PSM 










MANDATORY* ROAt-1 1.3812** 
 (0.0183) 
POSTMAN* ROAt-1 -0.1682 
 (0.6924) 


































FIRM FE YES 
YEAR FE YES 
N 3100 
R-sq 0.7811 
Note: NA = Not Applicable. The variable MANDATORY under firm fixed effect, 
POSTMAN under year fixed effect and both MANDATORY and POSTMAN under 
interactive firm-year fixed effect have been dropped due to multicollinearity problem.
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4.4.4.3 Other robustness tests 
Other robustness tests are conducted by using alternative measurements of key 
variables, and show the results in Table 4.8. First, long-term incentives are included 
in CEOs’ compensation, and the regression is rerun. Following Cao et al. (2018), 
‘TOTAL PAY’ is defined as the sum of salary, bonus, allowance and the value of 
long-term incentives. The value of long term incentives is calculated as multiplying 
the number of shares and stock options by the closing stock price at the end of the 
year (see Column (1) for the estimation results). Second, the proxy for performance 
is replaced with Tobin’s Q and ROA at year t. The results are shown in Columns 
(2) and (3), respectively. Last, to dispel the concerns that the effect of mandatory 
CSR disclosure on CEO pay performance sensitivity will lag, the independent 
variable ‘MANDATORY’ is replaced by its one-year lagged variable. Column (4) 
shows the results. All the results are consistent throughout these four columns. The 
main finding, i.e. mandatory CSR disclosure improves CEO pay performance 
sensitivity, still stands after using alternative measurements of CSR, CEO pay and 




Table 4.8 Robustness tests based on different measurement of key variables 
This table represents the regression results for the robustness tests using different 
measurements of key variables. See Appendix 1 for variable definitions. Control 
variables (the same as in Table 4.2) are included but not reported to save space. 
Standard errors are clustered at the firm level with p-values in parentheses. *, **, 
*** represent significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 








MANDATORY NA NA NA NA 
     
POSTMAN NA NA NA NA 
     
ROAt-1 0.7423***   0.9078*** 
 (0.0079)   (0.0000) 
MANDATORY*POSTMAN -0.2273** -0.1892** -0.1153***  
 (0.0171) (0.0125) (0.0093)  
MANDATORY* ROAt-1 0.6030    
 (0.5371)    
POSTMAN* ROAt-1 0.5593   -0.2053 
 (0.1758)   (0.3598) 
MANDATORYt-
1*POSTMAN* ROAt-1 2.2263*    
 (0.0844)    
TOBINQt-1  0.0239*   
  (0.0595)   
MANDATORY* TOBINQt-1  0.0011   
  (0.9599)   
POSTMAN* TOBINQt-1  -0.0051   
  (0.7117)   
MANDATORYt-1*POSTMAN* 
TOBINQt-1  0.0729*   
  (0.0862)   
ROA   0.7450***  
   (0.0001)  
MANDATORY* ROA   1.3721***  
   (0.0075)  
POSTMAN*ROA   0.2300  
   (0.3379)  
MANDATORY*POSTMAN
*ROA   1.4043*  
   (0.0661)  
MANDATORYt-1    NA 




1*POSTMAN    -0.1442*** 
    (0.0035) 
MANDATORYt-1* ROAt-1    0.9577* 
    (0.0819) 
MANDATORYt-
1*POSTMAN* ROAt-1    2.2348** 
    (0.0117) 
INTERCEPT 1.1239 5.2474*** 5.4099*** 5.6876*** 
 (0.5012) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
CONTROL VARIABLE YES YES YES YES 
FIRM FE YES YES YES YES 
YEAR FE YES YES YES YES 
N 8050 7683 8402 8017 
R-sq 0.9026 0.7775 0.7800 0.7795 
Note: NA = Not Applicable. The variable MANDATORY under firm fixed effect, 
POSTMAN under year fixed effect and both MANDATORY and POSTMAN under 





Using the sample of all the Chinese firms listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen 
stock exchanges during the period from 2005 to 2012, the impact of mandatory 
CSR disclosure on CEO pay performance sensitivity is examined by the present 
study. Taking the 2008 CSR disclosure mandate as an exogenous shock, I find that 
CEO pay performance sensitivity is higher (lower) among those firms that are (not) 
subject to the requirement after the mandate. It is also found that the positive impact 
of mandatory CSR disclosure on pay performance sensitivity is more profound in 
firms with a powerful CEO, and the impact is only present among SOEs. The key 
findings remain after controlling for firm fixed effects and year fixed effects. All 
the results remain robust to alternative measurements of key variables and sample 
selection bias. The alternative explanation is also ruled out that downward 
stickiness in CEO compensation is a concern for the findings since the impact 
remains significantly positive not only for firms with gains but also for firms with 
losses.  
 
Overall, the study adds new evidence of the impact of CSR on firm behaviour. 
Different from other developed countries where CSR disclosure is largely 
voluntary, CSR is initially encouraged and then mandatorily required (for some 
firms) in China. Evaluating the effectiveness of this strong government mandate 
sheds lights on the question of whether mandatory CSR disclosure could bring 
value-added benefit to firms by better aligning the CEO compensation with firm 
performance. The findings have implications for other economies with similar 
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institutional background, especially those countries that intend to promote and 




Chapter 5: Conclusions 
This thesis investigates two important corporate strategies that help firms gain 
market competitiveness, namely political connection and CSR disclosure. The 
results of the thesis imply the different functions of political connection and CSR 
disclosure in China, where a different institutional background prevails.  
 
5.1 The roles of political connections among family firms and non-family 
firms 
The first study of this thesis adopts a natural experiment approach using corruption 
cases involving higher-level bureaucrats from 2009 to 2014. It examines how 
political connections affect family firms and non-family firms differently by 
examining how their behaviour changes following the loss of political connections 
after the exposure of corruption scandals. This study finds that expropriation 
activities by related family firms do not change significantly after firms lose their 
political connections, but there is a significant reduction in expropriation by related 
non-family firms.  However, the performance, bank loans and investment 
expenditure of family firms declined significantly after losing their political 
connections whereas non-family firms are not affected very much.  
 
It also explores the heterogeneous effect of losing political connection on firms’ 
behaviour. The results indicate that family firms which built political connections 
through direct bribery, firms located in the provinces with lower marketisation, 
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firms located in the same provinces as their related corrupt officials and firms from 
industries with higher corruption intensity suffer more from the loss of political 
connections. 
 
Lastly, it attempts to explore the underlying reasons behind the response of family 
firms to the political disconnections by considering their characteristics. It finds 
that after losing their political connections, expropriation activities decline for 
family firms that are no longer run by their founders or were privatised from SOEs, 
or with only one family member involved in ownership or/and management. 
Similarly, for family firms still run by their founders or initially established by 
entrepreneurs, and with more than one family member involved in the firm, firm 
performance (‘ROA’ and ‘Q’), bank loans and investment expenditures decrease 
significantly after losing their political connections.  
 
Overall, the first study provides evidence that political connections in China have 
a differential impact on family and non-family firms because while political 
connections are beneficial for family firms on average, they seem detrimental to 
non-family firms as the interests of minority shareholders are sacrificed via 
expropriation. Within family firms, political connections appear to be 
counterproductive when they are no longer run by the founder, or are privatised 
from SOEs rather than established by entrepreneurs, or have only one participating 




5.2 The alternative political strategy for non-SOEs 
Continuing to take advantage of high profile corruption scandal exposures, the 
second study of this thesis uses the sample of Chinese listed non-SOEs that disclose 
their CSR reports during the period of 2010 to 2015 and their matching firms to 
examine the impact of losing political connection on the likelihood of disclosing 
CSR report. The results indicate that firms are more likely to respond to government 
signals to re-build their political legitimacy by disclosing their CSR report after 
losing their political connections. Moreover, the results indicate that the impact is 
more pronounced among firms having a greater demand for political capital, 
namely firms having severe financial constraints, firms locating in provinces with 
low marketisation and firms belonging to the industry with more competition.  
 
It also explores the channel through which losing political connection affects CSR 
disclosure, and finds that corruption related firms disclose their CSR report as an 
alternative political strategy despite the increased operational costs incurred after 
losing the economic benefits enjoyed due to the pre-existing political connections. 
 
Overall, this study adds new evidence on the firm’s political strategy, namely their 
responses after they lose their political connections. Although there are numerous 
benefits political connection can bring to the firms, there is a risk of losing it 
considering its illegitimate nature. Therefore, firms are motivated to take an 
alternative approach to build political legitimacy. In the context of China, the 
results suggest that firms strategically respond to the government’s advocacy of 
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being socially responsible to seek rent instead of contributing to the external 
stakeholders. These findings have implications for the government; it should 
closely monitor the CSR performance of the firms to recognise a symbolic move 
taken by firms which simply disclose their CSR report with vague and unclear 
information. 
 
5.3 The impact of mandatory CSR disclosure on CEO pay performance 
sensitivity 
Using the sample of all the Chinese firms listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen 
stock exchanges during the period from 2005 to 2012, the third study of this thesis 
examines the impact of mandatory CSR disclosure on CEO pay performance 
sensitivity. Taking the 2008 CSR disclosure mandate as an exogenous shock, it 
finds that CEO pay performance sensitivity is higher (lower) among those firms 
that are (not) subject to the requirement after the mandate. It also finds that the 
positive impact of mandatory CSR disclosure on pay performance sensitivity is 
more profound in firms with a powerful CEO, and the positive impact is only 
present among SOEs. The key findings remain after controlling for firm fixed 
effects and year fixed effects. All the results remain robust to alternative 
measurements of key variables and sample selection bias. It further rules out the 
alternative explanation that downward stickiness in CEO compensation is a concern 
for the findings since the impact remains significantly positive not only for firms 




Overall, the study adds new evidence on the impact of CSR on firm behaviour. 
Different from other developed countries where CSR disclosure is largely 
voluntary, CSR is initially encouraged and then mandatorily required (for some 
firms) in China. Evaluating the effectiveness of this strong government mandate 
sheds lights on the question of whether mandatory CSR disclosure could bring 
value-added benefit to firms by better aligning the CEO compensation with firm 
performance. The findings have implications for other economies with similar 
institutional background, especially those countries that intend to promote and 
intervene in corporate social responsibilities. 
 
5.4 Concluding remarks 
This thesis explores two important corporate strategies prevalent in the Chinese 
markets. By taking advantage of high profile corruption cases and the mandate of 
CSR disclosure in 2008, the results of three studies are obtained using a difference 
in difference approach.  
 
Overall, this thesis shows that political connection, as an important capital, plays a 
different role in family firms and non-family firms among non-SOEs. The results 
are consistent with political connections employed for expropriation in non-family 
firms and for value-adding activities in family firms. After non-SOEs lose their 
political connection due to corruption scandal exposures, they appear to endeavour 
to rebuild their political legitimacy by disclosing their CSR report and respond 
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strategically to the government’s advocacy. Further exploring the role of CSR 
disclosure in China, mandatory CSR disclosure is found to better align the interests 
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Appendix 1: Definitions of variables 
Variable Definition and/or Calculation 
ADVANTAGE The percentage of shares held by the controlling 
shareholder/ sum of percentages of shares held by the 
second to fifth largest shareholders 
AFTER 1 The dummy variable set to one if firm-year observation 
is 1 year after the loss of political connection 
AFTER 2 The dummy variable set to one if firm-year observation 
is 2 year after to the losing of political connection 
AFTER 3 The dummy variable set to one if firm-year observation 
is 3 year after to the losing of political connection 
AGE The age of the CEO in a given year. The natural 
logarithm of this value is used in the regression. 
BANK LOAN (Long-term loan+ short-term loan)/total assets 
BEFORE 1 The dummy variable set to one if firm-year observation 
is 1 year prior to the loss of political connection 
BEFORE 2 The dummy variable set to one if firm-year observation 
is 2 year prior to the loss of political connection 
BOARD SIZE The natural logarithm of the number of directors in the 
board. 
BRIBING The dummy variable set to one if firms belong to 
‘bribing firms’. 
CAR(-1,+1) The cumulative abnormal return over three-day event 
window around December 4, 2012 when Xi’s anti-
corruption campaign was announced. 
CAR(-2,+2) The cumulative abnormal return over five-day event 
window around December 4, 2012 when Xi’s anti-
corruption campaign was announced. 
CAR(-5,+5) The cumulative abnormal return over 11-day event 
window around December 4, 2012 when Xi’s anti-
corruption campaign was announced. 
CASHFLOW Cash and equivalent assets/ total assets 
CEO PAY The reported sum of salary, bonus and allowance. The 
natural logarithm of this value is used in the regression. 
  
CEO SHARE Percentage of shares held by the CEO. 
CSR The dummy equals 1 if the firm releases CSR report. 
CSR SCORE Overall CSR scores from Runling, ranging from 0 to 
100. 




CORRUPTION The dummy variable set to one if firms belong to 
‘related firms’. 
CORRUPT*POST An interaction variable between CORRUPTION and 
POST 
COST Ratio of total costs of the enterprise to the sum of all 
income arising from operating business of the company 
DUAL The dummy equals 1 if the CEO is also the chair of the 
board and 0 otherwise. 
EDUCATION The level of CEO’s education (1=secondary vocational 
diploma or below; 2= three-year college diploma; 
3=bachelor; 4=master; 5= PhD). The natural logarithm 
of this value is used in the regression. 
EVENT YEAR The dummy variable set to one for the year when a 
corruption scandal is exposed. 
EXCESS The difference between the ultimate controlling 
shareholder’s control right and cash flow rights. 
EXPROPRIATION The total annual amount of RPTs that fall into the 
category of ‘ex ante potential’ expropriation transactions 
divided by total assets. 
FAMILY The dummy variable set to one if the founder and/or 
other member of his family by either blood or marriage 
owns at least 15% of control right. 
GENDER The dummy equals 1 if the CEO is male, and equals 0 if 
the CEO is female. 
GROWTH The sale growth calculated as (total sales this year – 
total sales last year) / total sales last year. 
INDEPENDENT Independent board of directors/ total board directors. 
INVESTMENT Net capital expenditure/total assets 
LEVERAGE Total liabilities/ total assets 
L-DEBT Ratio of short-term interest-bearing debt to total assets 
MANDATORY The dummy equals 1 if the firm is subject to the 
mandatory CSR disclosure in 2008. 
MB Ratio of market value to book value of equity. 
MEETING The natural logarithm of the number of shareholders’ 
general meetings in a given year. 
MONITOR Herfindahl index of shareholdings by 2 to 5 
shareholders times their ownership 
OWNERSHIP Percentage of shares held by the controlling shareholder. 
PC The dummy equals 1 if the CEO is politically connected 
(a former or current government officials, military 
officer, or a member of the NPC or CPPCC) and 0 
otherwise. 
POST The dummy variable set to one for years following the 
year of corruption case exposures. 
POSTMAN The dummy equals 1 for years from 2009 to 2012. 





REGIONAL GDP GDP per capita (in 10 thousands of RMB) in the 
province where the firm is registered. 
ROA Net income/ total assets 
S-DEBT Ratio of long-term interest-bearing debt to total assets.  
SIZE The natural logarithm of a firm’s total assets. 
SOE The dummy equals 1 if the firm is ultimately controlled 
by the state and 0 otherwise. 
ST A dummy variable that equals 1 if firm has losses in the 
preceding two years. 
SUBSIDY Total government subsidy/total profits 
TANGIBILITY Tangible assets/ total assets 
TAX Total tax expenses/total assets 
T-DEBT Ratio of total interest bearing debt to total assets.  
TENURE The number of years as the firm’s CEO. The natural 
logarithm of this value is used in the regression. 
TOTAL PAY The reported sum of salary, bonus, allowance and long 
term incentives (multiplying the number of shares and 
stock options by the closing stock price at the end of the 








Appendix 2: Industry name and intensity ranking  
Industry 
Code 




A Agriculture, forestry animal husbandry and fishery 36.46% 5 
B Mining 54.22% 16 
C Manufacturing 34.84% 4 
D Electric power, heat, gas and water production and supply 50.00% 10 
E Construction 46.58% 9 
F Wholesale and retail industry 51.87% 13 
G Transport, storage and postal service 39.09% 6 
H Accommodation and catering 58.33% 17 
I Information transmission, software and information technology services 40.86% 7 
K Real estate industry 51.16% 12 
L leasing and commercial service 30.77% 3 
M Scientific research and technical service 13.24% 1 
N Water conservancy, environment and public facility management 52.87% 14 
O Resident service, repair and other service 27.27% 2 
Q Health and social work 53.33% 15 
R Culture, sports and entertainment 50.00% 11 
S Diversified industries 44.51% 8 
 
